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Borrowing from the resilience literature and utilizing a typology developed by 
Markusen and Carlson in 1988, this study will begin to match distinctive 
responses to deindustrialization with specific economic development 
strategies in order to better understand how certain Rust Belt regions fared in 
light of their given responses and the various strategies they employed. In 
their article, ―Bowing Out, Bidding Down, and Betting on the Basics: 
Midwestern Responses to Deindustrialization in the 1980s‖, Markusen and 
Carlson (1988) describe three types of responses to economic restructuring. 
The ―Bowing Out‖ approach abandoned the idea of manufacturing reliance, 
focusing economic development efforts instead on the attraction and growth of 
service sector employment opportunities. The ―Bidding Down‖ approach 
focused on curtailing manufacturing losses by decreasing the cost of doing 
business in a given region. ―Betting on the Basics‖ describes economic 
development strategies that targeted existing heavy industry, emphasizing the 
retention and expansion of firms already in the area. Also included in this 
study is a fourth type of strategy that I call ―Sharing the Wealth‖, which was 
proposed by Clavel and Kleniewski (1990) and describes strategies that 
embraced growth in the service sector and worked to incorporate linkage 
policies for the redistribution of related benefits in that sector.  
 
 In this study, regional responses in eight metropolitan areas of the United 
States Rust Belt region are analyzed through the lens of adaptive resilience. 
The regional responses are subsequently categorized based upon current 
economic and demographic data, data collected through extensive interviews 
with former stakeholders, and archival research utilizing planning documents. 
In order to gain a diverse and robust understanding of each region‘s response, 
interviews were conducted with leaders from the public, private and non-profit 
sectors, and leaders representing offices with urban, suburban or regional 
interests. In the end, my research finds that those regions that ‗Bet on the 
Basics‘ were less likely to exhibit adaptive resilience than those that chose to 
‗Bow Out.‘ The research also indicates that timing matters; many of the 
regions that responded swiftly did exhibit adaptive resilience, while those who 
took more time to respond generally did not.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
Frequently mistaken for a cyclical recession or temporary economic downturn, 
deindustrialization unfolds over time, often coinciding with population out-
migration, economic restructuring and widespread employment losses. 
Regional responses to the challenge of deindustrialization have varied in both 
their approaches and in their outcomes. While some regions have successfully 
weathered the trend, others have fought, and in some cases continue to fight, 
diligently to reverse or curtail its negative effects. Such divergent processes 
and outcomes highlight the importance of understanding what features of a 
region, including regional asset bases, modes of governance, civic capacity, 
leadership, and external factors contribute to decline or facilitate recovery. 
Theories of resilience from an array of disciplines provide a conceptual 
framework through which these questions can be answered. Using resilience 
as a lens, this research seeks to apply established theory and methods from 
the resilience literature to the question of regional decline, allowing for the 
emergence of a more specific understanding of how and why regions varied in 
their abilities to respond to deindustrialization.   
 
Broadly speaking, the main purpose of the research is to increase our 
collective understanding of the meaning of resilience in regions that have 
experienced long-term industrial decline, and to do so by examining the 
efficacy of various responses to this trend. Focusing specifically on America‘s 
Rust Belt region, the research will seek to uncover how eight metropolitan 
regions in this particular area fared in light of long-term and increasingly 
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pervasive deindustrialization. In order to do so, the research has been divided 
into two main parts: a single case study of Detroit, followed by an eight-region 
examination of other metropolitan regions in the U.S. Rust Belt. 
 
Motivations 
My unwavering interest in the Rust Belt region and its problems stems from a 
parallel interest in understanding how regions operate as both economic and 
governmental systems. A recent surge in the regional literature suggests that I 
am not alone; many researchers are interested in issues of economic 
development, government fiscal health, environmental quality, traffic 
congestion, affordable housing, workforce quality, and ensuring access to 
opportunity as they pertain to supra-local governments. However, a basic 
review of the literature suggests that there is little agreement among scholars 
about how regions recover from persistent problems.  
 
My interest in regional responses to economic challenges began long before 
this particular body of research commenced; although I might not have always 
known it, I have been thinking about places and economies for decades. I 
spent most of childhood in a very small city in Upstate New York. If you have 
heard of Oswego, NY, it is probably only because of its record snow fall or 
maybe because of the small college that is located there: The State University 
of New York (SUNY) at Oswego. The city is less well-known for its main 
economic driver, a two-unit nuclear power plant called Nine Mile Point Nuclear 
Station. In 2006, when both units were being considered for re-licensing, there 
was great uncertainty amongst Oswegonians; local newspapers covered the 
re-licensing extensively and discussions surrounding this uncertainty were a 
 3 
main topic of conversation at many a retiree coffee klatch. Twenty-year license 
extensions were ultimately granted to both units but discussions now have 
turned to whether or not a third power plant will gain approval. The fate of the 
city and the surrounding employment-shed, areas that have suffered greatly 
during recent economic downturns, now rests in the continued success of the 
two original power plants and approval of this third plant in the near future. 
Oswegonians have long known that jobs, taxes, and housing prices are all 
inter-twined with the fate of the nuclear plant. Just like the leaders interviewed 
for this study, residents of Oswego find it difficult to ignore the possibility that 
the local economy will suffer greatly if the economic base is compromised. 
Though we do not yet know the fate of this third power plant (nor the long-term 
fate of the city of Oswego), I can only hope that leaders are preparing for both 
the best and the worst.  
 
What also led me to study the effects of economic restructuring on shrinking 
regions was the research training I received while working at the Buffalo 
Branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Having completed my 
master‘s degree at the State University of New York at Buffalo, I started my 
time at the Fed with a keen awareness of the challenges facing mid-sized 
northeastern cities in the post-industrial era. This knowledge, coupled with the 
regional economics training I received during this period of employment, led 
me to a path of inquiry that focuses broadly on the performance and 
sustainability of regions, especially during periods of transition. 
 
While the challenges I observed in Oswego and the disappointing projections I 
estimated in Buffalo remain largely in the present or very near future, the 
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difficulties discussed in this study unfolded many years ago. Nevertheless, my 
experiences in both situations – either watching my beloved hometown await 
the decisions of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission or estimating just 
how badly the Buffalo economy would perform - seem oddly reminiscent of the 
historical tensions I describe in my dissertation research outlined below.  
 
Rather than looking forward, this body of research tends to look back in history 
to examine industrial Midwestern metropolitan regions as they struggled with 
the economic restructuring that began to unravel regional economies during 
the late 1970s and early 1980s. Given the historically-unprecedented nature of 
this economic challenge, making decisions about how to respond were often 
quite difficult for regional leaders. Using a combination of both economic data 
and qualitative data collected from interviews with former stakeholders in each 
region, this research identifies how local reactions to this prolonged economic 
downturn were fashioned, whom they involved, and in what ways they 
contributed to or detracted from regional resilience in these metropolitan 
regions.  
 
Though the broader goal of this research has always been to make relevant 
and increase our understanding of why some regions perform better than 
others in the wake of a crisis, I had little idea just how applicable this research 
would become. When I began my dissertation research in early 2008, the 
United States economy was performing relatively well and many regions 
across the country were reaping the benefits of that solid performance. A short 
while later, particularly in the fall of 2008, metropolitan areas began to struggle 
as our national economy experienced a marked deceleration of economic 
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activity. Suddenly, the difficulties that places like Detroit and Pittsburgh 
experienced in the 1970s and 1980s became all the more relevant today as 
regions now grapple with their own problems of widespread unemployment, 
paralyzing foreclosures and general economic and fiscal instability. Though 
this recession is not likely to play out in exactly the same way as those that 
occurred in the early 1980s, there are still many valuable lessons to be 
learned about how regions responded to these same challenges nearly three 
decades ago.  
 
Road Map to the Dissertation 
The outline of the dissertation is as follows. Here, in Chapter 1, I provide you 
with a brief introduction to the dissertation and a short discussion of the 
motivations and goals behind this body of research. In Chapter 2, I introduce 
you to, or reacquaint you with, the United States Rust Belt, as well as the 
concepts of resilience, economic development and deindustrialization. It is 
here that I also begin to make connections between these concepts, mainly by 
utilizing theories of adaptive resilience as well as two economic development 
typologies created during the late-1980s and early-1990s.  
 
In Chapter 3, I propose three main research questions, all of which urge us to 
consider how decision makers affected regional outcomes, especially in Rust 
Belt regions during the 1970s and 1980s. These three questions serve as the 
guiding framework for this research, moving us towards a better understanding 
of regions, regional leadership and economic development. In Chapter 3, I  
also provide an introduction to the qualitative and quantitative data collected 
for this study and the methods by which the have been interpreted and 
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analyzed. Chapter 3 also includes two main hypotheses, which introduce 
certain arguments about the relationship between economic development 
responses and resilience in the case study regions.  
 
The eight regions included in this research – Buffalo, Cincinnati, Cleveland, 
Columbus, Detroit, Indianapolis, Milwaukee, and Pittsburgh - are briefly 
described in Chapter 4. This chapter also includes fundamental analyses of 
each region‘s economic base, as well as their recent economic, social and 
political histories. Along with basic quantitative data on population, 
employment, income and poverty, these economic histories help to identify 
response and recovery resilience in the eight regions.  
 
The bulk of the findings are presented in Chapter 5, 6, and 7. I begin first with 
a deep case study of Detroit in Chapter 5. Because Detroit has faced such 
incredible challenges in the past few decades, the region is given its own 
chapter and all the attention that a single case study affords. The case study 
includes a thorough discussion of the Detroit region‘s economy and society, 
relevant stakeholders, associated economic development response efforts, 
and a lengthy analysis of adaptive resilience. Findings from the Detroit case 
informed later work in the other case study regions presented in Chapters 6 
and 7.  
 
The case study regions highlighted in Chapter 6 responded to 
deindustrialization in much the same way that Detroit did – by largely focusing 
their economic development efforts on the retention of heavy manufacturing. 
The specific responses crafted in Milwaukee, Buffalo, and Cleveland are 
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outlined and then contrasted. Common regional characteristics and lessons 
learned from these regions are also presented. 
 
In stark contrast, actors in the case study regions discussed in Chapter 7 
chose a different approach with most opting to move away from manufacturing 
and towards a more diverse industrial base. These four regions – namely, 
Indianapolis, Cincinnati, Columbus and Pittsburgh – took steps to move 
beyond what was easiest or what was familiar in hopes of achieving a better, 
more resilient outcome. As in Chapter 6, this chapter concludes by comparing 
the regional outcomes and by presenting lessons we might take away from 
these regional responses.  
 
Final conclusions about the resilience of regions in the face of 
deindustrialization are presented in Chapter 8. In order to do this, I first revisit, 
and then discuss, the hypotheses presented in Chapter 3. I end by proposing 
a series of remaining questions about the benefits of certain economic 
development response types, the preconditions necessary for certain 
responses, and the usefulness of adaptive resilience as a framing concept for 
studies of regional economic development.  
 
In the end, this research represents one researcher‘s honest attempt to 
answer fundamental questions about regional responses to deindustrialization. 
Like any good research project, this body of research answers a few questions 
and raises many more. As a young scholar, I take comfort in the fact that we 
still have more to learn about regions, economic development and resilience 
and hope to further engage in research that answers these remaining 
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questions. Until then, let this body of research serve as a reminder of all that 
we knew, all that we now know, and all that remains to be uncovered. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Conceptual Framework 
 
Introduction 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, metropolitan areas throughout the 
Midwestern Rust Belt region of the United States struggled with the effects of 
deindustrialization, watching as their economic bases shifted from 
manufacturing-intensive to more services-based economies. This transition 
was difficult for most Rust Belt regions because it generally meant 
simultaneously confronting population outmigration, above average 
unemployment, and diminished revenue. Further difficulty stemmed from 
dwindling and often uncertain federal support for the very economic 
development initiatives that would ostensibly make this transition easier. 
Regional responses to these challenges varied greatly; some regions 
successfully re-imagined their economies while others faltered or struggled 
against the changes taking shape.  
 
In an effort to improve our understanding of economic restructuring and 
regional change, I begin this chapter by briefly exploring the topics of 
deindustrialization and resilience, particularly as they pertain to affected 
metropolitan areas of the United States. I then discuss economic development 
responses in the wake of deindustrialization and follow with a discussion of 
typologies that may be helpful in sorting through these responses and in 
relating them back to the concept of regional resilience. 
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The United States Rust Belt 
The United States Rust Belt includes the industrialized portions of the states 
that make up the Great Lakes region. When people refer to the Rust Belt, they 
are generally referring to the entire states of Michigan and Ohio, northern and 
central Indiana, northern Illinois, southern Wisconsin and the western portions 
of Pennsylvania and New York. The term Rust Belt emerged as a counterpoint 
to the Sunbelt: the southern, more prosperous area of the United States that 
stretches from Florida and Georgia to the southern portion of California.   
 
In this study, eight large metropolitan regions found within the Rust Belt are 
examined: Buffalo, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Detroit, Indianapolis, 
Milwaukee, and Pittsburgh (See Figure 1). These regions have been selected 
because of their size: with the exception of Chicago, these eight regions were 
the only Rust Belt regions with populations greater than 1 million in 1980. 
Because of its extremely large size and the complexity of its response to 
deindustrialization, the Chicago region has been excluded from this study. The 
remaining eight regions vary significantly in terms of demographic 
composition, political leanings, and present-day economic bases, however all 
are located within the Rust Belt, have storied manufacturing-intensive pasts, 
and have weathered significant challenges during the late-20th century.  
 
Once known for their manufacturing and production prowess, these Rust Belt 
regions now conjure up images of rusted machinery, padlocked gates and 
abandoned industrial compounds. Much of this change occurred during the 
1970s and 1980s when the Rust Belt region experienced widespread 
economic restructuring – often called deindustrialization - that changed the 
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face of regional economies the world over. Metropolitan areas of the Rust Belt, 
for the most part, experienced devastating losses in the form of disappearing 
jobs, population outmigration and dwindling tax revenue. As a whole, the 
region saw 23.6% of its manufacturing employment disappear during this time 
period (Kahn 1997).  
Deindustrialization  
In order to understand how deindustrialization affected the eight case study 
regions, it is useful to first recognize the origins and complexities of the 
deindustrialization trend. Part of the difficulty in understanding 
Figure 1 - The Rust Belt Region with Selected Metropolitan Regions 
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deindustrialization stems from the fact that it‘s not often used by researchers 
today; in the United States, deindustrialization typically refers to the changes 
seen in the economy and in broader society during the late-1970s and early-
1980s. The term is a historical construct, meaning that it happened during a 
certain point in history and was a construct of larger local and global economic 
processes, including trade liberalization and a growing spatial division of labor.  
 
The term deindustrialization is also slightly confusing because it is a 
misnomer. Deindustrialization in the Rust Belt in no way resulted in no 
industry; instead, deindustrialization was part of a major economic 
restructuring that would change the economic landscape and industrial 
composition of these regions forever. Global restructuring of manufacturing 
often meant that many corporate headquarters positions would stay put but 
lower wage jobs were outsourced to less expensive areas of the world. In 
places like the Rust Belt, these higher wage headquarter positions remained 
an important part of the regional economy but represented a comparatively 
small portion of total regional employment.  
 
In most Rust Belt regions, deindustrialization caused a sharp downturn in low- 
and medium-wage manufacturing jobs and a gradual uptick in service sector 
employment. In other words, industries could still be found in these regions, 
just not in the same proportions or magnitudes as they had been in the past. 
Despite these losses in employment, improved efficiencies and mechanization 
actually increased output in some metropolitan areas. However, the focus in 
this body of research is on jobs and not output because economic 
development targets are most often tied to employment. 
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 At its most basic level, deindustrialization is generally defined as the relative 
decline of the manufacturing sector (Bluestone and Harrison 1982). Providing 
an expansion of this fundamental definition, researchers have offered a variety 
of increasingly complex definitions with varying degrees of specialization. 
Kutscher and Personick (1986) offer a more nuanced definition, describing 
deindustrialization as a lack of investment in basic production that, when 
combined with plant closings and layoffs, results in a large negative 
merchandise trade balance. A more relativist definition is provided by Pieper 
(1999), who defines the trend as a relative loss - with respect to the rest of the 
economy - of the industrial sector‘s contribution to overall labor productivity 
growth.1  
 
Looking at deindustrialization as it pertains to actual places, the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York released a report in the spring of 2006 on the state 
of manufacturing in the United States, primarily focusing on the upper 
Midwestern states, a region that is basically one and the same with the Rust 
Belt. Their research concluded that much of this area had seen widespread 
and persistent decline in the manufacturing sector from the 1980s forward. 
Though not all Rust Belt regions have been affected similarly, the analysts 
presented evidence that the United States overall has lost more than 5 million 
manufacturing jobs in the last three decades and that the share of the US 
                                                 
1
 Still other researchers recognize the interplay between demographic and economic shifts. 
Emphasizing the importance of shrinking populations in deindustrializing regions, Van der 
Gaag, et al (1999) define such a process as negative natural population growth as a result of 
declining fertility levels and increasing numbers of deaths due to aging. In their research on 
declining populations in the European Union, the researchers concluded that the sharpest 
population losses have been observed in economically less prosperous regions (Van der 
Gaag, et al. 1999). 
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labor force employed in this sector has dropped from 20% in 1979 to less than 
11% in 2006 (Deitz and Orr 2006). The authors predict that these losses - 
many of which stem from a shedding of lower-skilled workers in a move 
towards higher-skilled and less labor-intensive production - will likely continue 
in the long term and continue to plague the Rust Belt region. 
 
That structural change has occurred in the Rust Belt is generally accepted by 
economists today; looking back, however, to the time when this trend first 
began to unfold, we see that such an assertion was not always accepted. 
During the early 1980s, economists grappled with the issue of whether 
changes in industrial composition could best be described as cyclical or 
structural in nature. In 1982, Robert Lawrence and his colleagues at Brookings 
argued that most employment losses related to plant closings at that time were 
only cyclical in nature and not permanent. He was not alone in thinking that 
deindustrialization was a myth and that cyclical change, rather than structural 
change, better described the industrial shifts happening in the late 1970s and 
1980s (Branson 1983). 
 
Alternative views citing a more structural type of change were given by Thurow 
(1980), Bluestone and Harrison (1982), and Magaziner and Reich (1982), 
among others. Thurow, who was the first to coin the term ―sunrise industries‖, 
argued that structural changes in the economy had paralyzed government‘s 
ability to assist in economic recovery. He advocated focused government 
investment in sunrise industries, including high technology production and 
service activities. Bluestone and Harrison (1983), who provided empirical 
evidence of structural change in the United States, argued that 
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deindustrialization resulted from the increased mobility of capital and a 
systematic shift in resources to low-cost locations. Bluestone followed with a 
1984 article, ―Is Deindustrialization a Myth? Capital Mobility versus Absorptive 
Capacity in the U. S. Economy‖ finding that notable job losses transpired in 
many basic industries throughout the Midwest. Primarily in agreement with 
Bluestone and Harrison, Magaziner and Reich (1983) proposed a series of 
policies and plans to improve the relationship between industry and 
government as a way of combating the structural change seen as a result of 
deindustrialization. In the end, those who supported structural change 
seemingly won out, as it is commonly believed today that the industrial 
structure of regions within the Rust Belt underwent permanent and often 
irreversible changes as evidenced by the substantial permanent job losses 
seen in key basic industries (Varaiya and Wiseman 1981). 
 
Within the structural change camp, further hypothesizing about the causes of 
deindustrialization also occurred. From this discourse emerged two main 
theories: the concept of postindustrial society seen through the lens of product 
cycle theory and the concept of capital mobility seen through the lens of 
industrial relation theory. Although both theories contribute to our 
understanding of deindustrialization, they differ widely in their discussion of 
global and local forces.    
 
Product cycle theorists generally believe that long-term patterns of 
international trade are influenced by product innovation and subsequent 
diffusion.  The product cycle theory draws upon Ricardo‘s (1821) model of 
comparative advantage, which posited that diffusion is the natural process 
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whereby businesses move toward places where their inputs can be obtained 
less expensively. Thus, an international diffusion of manufacturing seems 
likely as it is a necessary component of the product life cycle. It makes sense 
then that in a postindustrial society the growth and decline of regions reflects 
the life cycle of its core industries as they move through the processes of 
maturation, decentralization and ultimately relocation. Through the lens of 
product cycle theory, plant closings were seen as part of a natural 
transformation from manufacturing and production to service-based and 
administrative jobs (Yago, et al. 1984).  
 
Industrial organizational theory, on the other hand, explained plant closings as 
a consequence of increased capital mobility (Ibid). Underlying this increase in 
capital mobility was a surge in North-South trade and fierce international 
competition. Lee (2005) argued that ―Southern import penetration, 
accompanied by low-wage competitive advantage, has led rich Northern 
countries to withdraw from the traditional low-skill intensive manufacturing 
industries‖ (72). Similarly, Lee found that international competition often 
resulted in multinational firms searching for cheaper labor and less restrictive 
regulations of labor and environments abroad (73). Exacerbating this trend in 
the Rust Belt was the rise of large, multi-locational firms, which are even less 
accountable to the region in which they are located because of the relative 
ease with which production can be moved to lower-wage regions in the US 
and elsewhere.   
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Global Forces with Regional and Local Implications 
Distillation of the existing research on deindustrialization suggests that we still 
have much to learn about its causes, its effects, and its implications for various 
regions. Knowing that deindustrialization was a very complicated and nuanced 
phenomenon, we can ascertain that it affected each case study region, and 
possibly its central city, in slightly different ways. For some regions, job losses 
were swift and devastating. For others, the losses were gradual but 
unrelenting. Still other places saw minimal job losses or central city losses that 
were masked by gains in other parts of the region. Such variations in how 
deindustrialization played out at both the regional and sub-regional levels can 
likely be explained by a variety of factors including local and regional assets, 
history, leadership, governmental structure, and politics (Hill, et al. 2008).  
 
While these differences will be addressed in subsequent chapters, it is 
important here, in the context of a deindustrialization discussion, to flesh out 
how different sectors of manufacturing were affected by deindustrialization at 
the global scale. Though an overview of the sectoral specializations in each 
case study region will not be provided until Chapter 4 (when a more thorough 
exploration is possible), a basic understanding of the Rust Belt tells us that 
within the manufacturing sector, there were two main specialties for which the 
region was known: automobile production and steel manufacturing. 
Deindustrialization affected both industries greatly but in slightly different 
ways. 
 
Between the onset of the industrial revolution and the end of World War II, 
steel production grew in proportion to an ever-increasing global demand, 
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especially during wartime. As production capacity grew and demand began to 
wane during the post-war period, the global market became saturated and 
steel prices saw a steep and swift decline, particularly during the 1970s 
(Revenga 1992). The downturn was especially detrimental to the steel 
economies of the Rust Belt, causing production and employment to slow 
dramatically in the late-1970s and 1980s (Crandall 1996). Though some of this 
employment loss was due to improved technological efficiencies, much of it 
was due to outsourcing and disinvestment. Such losses affected steel-
intensive regions immensely because steel jobs were generally union jobs with 
high wages and good benefits. If these jobs were replaced at all, it was often 
with lower-paying jobs in the service sector (Sassen 1990(a)).   
 
Like the steel industry, the automobile industry experienced rapid growth 
during World War I and II (Ingrassia and White 1995). In the automobile 
industry, however, that growth continued through the 1950s, with the 
exception of the Great Depression. During the 1940s and 1950s, automobile 
production - led by General Motors, Cadillac and Ford - became a symbol of 
American prosperity. However, beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, Asian and 
European automobile manufacturers began to enter the United States market, 
gradually capturing market share with their smaller, more reliable, and 
generally less-expensive vehicles (Dohse, et al. 1985). As foreign automobiles 
gained ground in the 1970s and 1980s, sales of American-made automobiles 
fell off gradually, causing massive devastation in many Rust Belt regions (High 
2003). Additional employment losses in automobile manufacturing also 
occurred when manufacturers looked to mechanization as a way to lower 
production costs, improve efficiencies, and increase profits (Schoenberger 
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1987).  In total, the United States saw a loss of approximately 500,000 motor 
vehicles and equipment jobs between 1979 and 1982, the majority of which 
were located in the United States Rust Belt (Singleton 1992).  
 
Compounding these job losses in the auto industry were additional losses 
seen in related sectors like parts production, which were generally located in 
regions within the Rust Belt.  As Bluestone and Harrison (1982) noted, ―The 
biggest losers in this instance are those who work in closely allied industries 
such as steel, rubber, metalworking machinery, and metal stampings‖ (72). In 
other words, losses in automobile production jobs beget losses in many other 
related industries, including steel. Given that many of these related 
components were produced in other metropolitan areas, one can begin to 
grasp how interdependent these regions really were.   
 
From the aforementioned literature, we can state confidently that 
deindustrialization occurred within the United States Rust Belt during the latter 
part of the 20th century. We can also assert that it affected individual regions 
within the Rust Belt in different ways and at different times. From the sectoral 
analysis we learn that global economic forces affected each industry in 
different ways and at slightly different times. We return to this subject in 
Chapter 4, but for now we are left with the understanding that economic 
restructuring affected various sectors of the economy differently, varying by 
time and degree. For a researcher, such variation is simultaneously 
challenging and rewarding; it‘s challenging in that it causes difficulty in 
identifying research-worthy commonalities and rewarding because it affords us 
the opportunity to uncover interesting and potentially useful threads across 
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cases. In the case of deindustrialization, these findings become even more 
interesting when mapped against theories of regional resilience, a concept to 
which we now turn. 
 
Resilience and Regions 
Unlike deindustrialization, the concept of regional resilience has only recently 
risen to prominence.2 Though resilience has long been used as a way to 
describe an individual‘s response to a specific challenge or traumatic event, its 
application to places and structures has only lately been explored (Bonanno 
2004; Kaplan 1999). Recent investigations of urban resilience have found that 
cities tend to be resilient in the face of natural disasters; meaning that they 
often revert back to their pre-disaster state as measured by tangible indicators 
like population and jobs, or the slightly more ambiguous concepts of resumed 
economic activity or regional traffic flow (Vale and Campanella 2005).  In all, 
the literature says much about resilience in the face of sudden or episodic 
disruptions and comparatively little about the ability of places to recover in the 
face of other types of disasters, including the longer-term stress of 
deindustrialization (Berke and Campanella 2006). Given that resilience 
remains such an ambiguous, or fuzzy, concept, further exploration seems 
warranted (Markusen 1999; for more on resilience as it relates to fuzziness, 
see Pendall, et al. 2010).  
 
 
                                                 
2
 The Building Resilient Regions network, a MacArthur Foundation-sponsored research effort 
of which I am a student member, examines the role of governance and other factors in 
shaping regional resilience outcomes in the face of long-term region-scale economic and 
social challenges (http://brr.berkeley.edu).     
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The Limitations of Ecological and Engineering Resilience 
Like deindustrialization, the concept of resilience has been analyzed and 
defined differently by scholars across a variety of disciplines, including 
ecology, psychology, economics, disaster studies, political science and other 
fields. We learn from ecologists and engineers that there are two main types of 
resilience: ecological resilience, which describes instances in which some sort 
of disruption pushes a system from one equilibrium to another; and 
engineering resilience, which pertains to instances in which a system returns 
to its presumed steady-state after a disruption, as measured in this case by 
indicators like water quality and the rate of return of certain species (Berkes 
and Folke 1998, 12). It is this second definition that is utilized most often by 
fields that are associated with urban planning because it emphasizes the 
recovery of people and places in the wake of some specific shock or 
prolonged stress (Pickett, et al. 2004; Vale and Campanella 2005).  
 
In order to understand these main conceptualizations of resilience, it is useful 
to think about the two main types of challenges that regions face: disasters, 
which generally happen once and often rather quickly, and slow-burns or slow-
moving crises, which unfold gradually over time. Studies of responses to 
disasters (e.g., hurricane, flood, tornado, tsunami), which often use the 
engineering version of resilience, tend to focus on the ability of a city or region 
to recover its population, economy, or built form (Vale and Campanella, eds. 
2005).  A city or region that is resilient in the face of a disaster would therefore 
be one that resumed its growth trajectory or previous functions after a brief 
disruption (Pendall, et al. 2010).  
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On the other hand, researchers studying a city or region‘s response to a slow 
burn or slow-moving crisis (e.g., economic restructuring, influx of immigrants) 
are more likely to focus on the transformation of systems as they adapt over 
longer periods of time. Instead of looking for a quick ‗return to normalcy‘, a 
resilient region is one where there has been a gradual reduction in its 
unemployment or poverty rates. Rather than looking far backward in time, 
researchers of slow-moving crises often look to the recent past to see whether 
conditions have improved in the last year or in the last decade. A resilient 
region in this case would be one that, in the face of a slow burn, has either 
improved on the outcome being measured, or at least not worsened, since the 
previous time period (Pendall, et al. 2010). Depending on the variable being 
considered, we might measure this type of resilience by the length of time 
needed to resume a gradual decrease in unemployment or poverty.   
 
In the end, neither one of these traditional conceptualizations of resilience is 
appropriate for the type of research being conducted here. When regional 
actors develop a response to deindustrialization, they aren‘t looking to achieve 
(or maintain) a new equilibrium, nor are they looking to simply ‗bounce back‘ to 
their pre-challenge state. Regional resilience is not simply accepting a new 
equilibrium, especially if that new equilibrium just means the sub-par status 
quo of the post-challenge period. In other words, regional actors ought not to 
be satisfied with a new equilibrium that includes a higher unemployment rate 
or greater inequity amongst residents, both of which are common features of a 
post-disaster state. Simply stated, urban planners and policy-makers should 
never be satisfied when a disruption or challenge sends a region into a new, 
less desirable equilibrium.  
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At the same time, regional resilience is also not simply ‗bouncing back‘ to a 
region‘s pre-challenge state, especially if that state was less than desirable to 
begin with. More importantly, a ‗return to normal‘ in the face of global 
restructuring would not be possible anyway. This engineering view of 
resilience is imperfect in that it is only concerned with how fast or how easily a 
region ‗bounces back‘ or recovers from a particular challenge. Such a 
framework says nothing about the tradeoffs associated with ‗bouncing back‘ 
and nothing about how regional actors might prepare themselves to deal with 
future problems or might learn from the mistakes they have made in response 
to a given challenge. Instead, engineering resilience corresponds to the speed 
with which a region returns to its ‗normal‘ or pre-challenge state, veritably 
ignoring the concepts of adaptation, preparation or experiential learning.  
 
Adaptive Resilience  
A review of the relevant literature confirms that there clearly are tensions 
among and between different conceptualizations and measures of resilience. It 
would be imprudent to suggest then that there is any one real measure of 
regional resilience or any one optimal regional state, as both the measure and 
the state will depend on the problem and the region being considered 
(Christopherson 2010). One way to help clarify our discussion of resilience is 
to think about an individual region – say, Detroit - as a complex adaptive 
system.  
 
Rather than merely striving for a return to normalcy or a resumption of pre-
challenge behaviors or outcomes, an adaptive system refers to a system that 
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has the ability to change or adapt in response to stresses and strains 
(Carpenter, et al. 2005). In such systems, resilience is not related to 
equilibrium, a return to ‗normal‘, or even to resilient outcomes; it is instead a 
―dynamic attribute associated with a process of continual development‖ 
(Pendall, et al. 2010). In Detroit, and in most of the other case study regions, 
where decades of restructuring have eroded any sense of ‗normalcy‘, it is this 
adaptive systems perspective of resilience that seems most relevant.  
 
Adaptive resilience is most often explained through the use of a ‗figure 8‘ 
diagram, which depicts the four phases of a region‘s adaptive cycle as it 
adjusts to internal and external challenges (for more on the adaptive cycle, 
see Holling, et al. 2002).  Each of the four phases – conservation, release, 
reorganization and exploitation – relates to the process of adaptive resilience, 
exhibited by the system‘s susceptibility to stresses or shocks (see Figure 2). 
Rather than saying that a region is or is not resilient, the adaptive system 
model tells us that resilience levels vary depending on how the region adapts 
to changes and cycles through these four phases. Any given region will 
experience varying levels of resilience, depending on where it is within the 
four-phase cycle. Each quadrant denotes a unique phase in the adaptive 
cycle. Each phase reflects the characteristics of a system or a region and 
describes the level and direction of resilience at a given moment in time. A 
region that has recently experienced the loss of a major employer would likely 
be in the release phase, a period of great uncertainty where resilience is low 
but potentially increasing. Depending on how regional actors responded, this 
same region may soon experience reorganization, a period of great innovation 
and likely some experimentation.  
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For example, if we think about the classic Rust Belt region of Detroit, 
Michigan, it seems appropriate to say that the region has long hovered 
between the lower-level resilience phases of conservation and release. The 
Detroit region, which will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 5, 
experienced a relatively long period of conservation, as automobile production 
soared in the early part of the 20th century. Later on, as domestic automobile 
producers faced greater challenges, the region experienced release, resulting 
in a protracted period of uncertainty and collapse.  
 
Figure 2 –Four-phase cycle of system adaptation and change. Source: Pendall, 
et al (2010), Adapted from Holling, et al. (2002). 
 
Such thinking is, of course, overly simplistic. Determining a region‘s adaptive 
resilience is not as easy as pointing to a certain quadrant of the figure-8 
diagram; the adaptive capabilities of a region are far more nuanced than that.  
Adaptation may be as straight-forward as implementing job training programs 
for displaced workers or as complex as improving a region‘s social safety net. 
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How a region chooses to adapt to challenges and how well they navigate the 
four stages of the adaptive cycle depends on a variety of factors, many of 
which will be discussed vis-à-vis the eight case study regions below. Despite 
its imprecision, the figure 8 diagram provides a useful, albeit simplified, 
framework for thinking about the adaptive resilience of regions.  
 
One problem that complicates matters is the fact that the adaptive resilience of 
a given region will likely differ based upon the person with whom we talk. For 
instance, a corporate executive might see increased productivity or greater 
market share in the face of international competition as adaptive resilience. 
Whereas a union official might disagree, seeing the preservation of jobs as 
more important. A local politician, who is duly concerned with preserving jobs 
in her or his constituency, will probably also care about city revenues. Thus, 
each of these actors may assess a region‘s adaptive resilience by his or her 
own set of indicators, including: job growth; productivity growth in terms of 
value-added per job; increased market share; preservation of union jobs; and 
others. Sometimes these types of outcomes may in fact be at odds with one 
another. For instance, in the case of Detroit, a GM official, who is really only 
concerned with increasing market share, does not care whether production 
jobs remain in metropolitan Detroit or even whether the region as a whole will 
prosper in the long run; he or she probably only cares that quality GM 
automobiles are being produced as quickly and efficiently as possible.  On the 
other hand, a local public official – who once may have cared about market 
share because of the historical correlation between GM‘s success and 
metropolitan Detroit‘s prosperity – is probably now more concerned with 
keeping GM and other high-paying jobs in his or her jurisdiction than whether 
 27 
or not GM‘s market share is increasing. Hence, we can see how there might 
be divergence in terms of what each actor sees as adaptive resilience in their 
region.  
 
Complicating matters even more is the fact that additional measures that fall 
outside of the economic sphere may also relate to the adaptive resilience of a 
given region. In the case of Detroit, which has adapted quite poorly in terms of 
most conventional economic measures, the region did see improvements in 
terms of livability, civic engagement, and social capital despite some 
disappointing developments of the more economic variety. The importance of 
non-economic measures in studies of regional resilience is not a new 
discovery. Scholars have found a variety of alternative measures of regional 
performance that fall outside the purview of traditional economic indicators. 
Stiglitz (2002) has found that ―broadly participatory processes (such as ―voice,‖ 
openness, and transparency)‖ contribute to sustained regional health (163). 
Similarly, Pastor, et al. (2009) have argued that regional resilience is 
increasingly determined by business and community group efforts coalescing 
around issues of regional equity, including infrastructure, housing and 
workforce development. Others have found that these traditional locational 
factors are necessary pre-conditions, and softer quality of life factors like 
community image and identity may provide supplementary, optimal conditions 
for regional performance (Wong 2001).  As qualitative data suggest below, 
these non-economic measures tell a very important part of the region‘s story 
and indicate that adaptive resilience may in fact reveal itself beyond the mask 
of traditional economic indicators.  
 
 28 
Responses and ‘Good Outcomes’ 
Such divergence suggests that there may be more than one way to assess 
how well a region navigates a challenge like deindustrialization. One way to 
clarify our assessment is to envision a set of hypothetical ‗good outcomes‘ that 
would act as barometers of a region‘s adaptive response to a given challenge. 
Though there are no hard and fast rules about how a region should recover 
from a challenge, the presence of ‗good outcomes‘ would suggest that a 
region has navigated the challenge well and the absence of ‗good outcomes‘ 
would suggest that it had not been as successful in its navigation of the 
challenge. Depending on the subject matter of interest, these good outcomes 
might focus on the environment, society as a whole or individual persons, 
infrastructural systems, among others.  
 
For the purposes of this study, the relatively narrow focus will be on outcomes 
related to demographics, economy and equity, as they are most closely 
related to the goals of most economic development plans and policies. 
Borrowing from Foster (2010), whose case study of Buffalo will be discussed 
with greater detail in Chapter 4, we find a number of ways in which ‗good 
outcomes‘ relate to adaptive resilience. In terms of demographics, our quest to 
uncover ‗good outcomes‘ urges us to ask whether population for the region as 
a whole stabilized or increased as the region adapted to the challenge at 
hand. At a more micro level, we also want to know whether there is an 
equitable distribution of people between city and suburbs and whether or not 
the region is racially integrated.3 In terms of the economy, we would want to 
                                                 
3
 Foster (2010) does not explicitly include measures of city-suburban population ratios or 
racial composition. However, for the purposes of this multi-N study, these measures are 
included so that comparison of these indicators across cases is made possible. 
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know whether employment levels and rates have stabilized or improved over 
time and whether per capita income has improved for people in the region. 
And finally, in terms of equity, we would want to know whether the poverty rate 
has improved over time and whether the ratio of poverty in the central city to 
poverty in the suburbs has also improved. Through a combination of 
quantitative data in Chapter 4 and qualitative data in Chapters 5 through 7, 
answers to all of these questions for each region will be discussed below. In 
the meantime, we can say that there is evidence of ‗good outcomes‘ in the 
face of deindustrialization if: a region has a stable, equitably-distributed, and 
racially integrated population base; a stable or improving unemployment rate; 
improving per capita income; and declining but equitably-distributed poverty.  
 
If we think about adaptation and response as a means to achieving these 
‗good outcomes‘ throughout the adaptive cycle, we must also ask another set 
of questions about the actors and the decisions that they made. To gauge a 
given region‘s movement through the adaptive cycle, it is essential to ask 
whether regional leaders have responded in a way that improves the chances 
for a healthy region in the long run. Have regional leaders incorporated broad 
community input into crafting their response? Have they drawn upon the 
strength of the region or have they increased divisiveness? Do they continue 
to learn from their past mistakes and from their successes? Have they used 
this information to increase employment opportunities for residents, improve 
the educational system, invest in sustainable transit, and/or increase regional 
equity? How have they adjusted to the realities of changing population and 
employment levels? To answer many of these questions, it is necessary to 
examine both quantitative and qualitative data. Knowing how each region 
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fares in light of both types of data makes it possible to then effectively locate 
each region‘s position within the four stages of the figure 8 diagram.  
 
Knowing which quadrant or phase best describes each case study region in 
the wake of deindustrialization goes a long way in telling how and how well 
each region adapted to the trials of deindustrialization. The challenge then 
becomes figuring out why regions experience the adaptive cycle in different 
ways. How do some regions ‗turn the corner‘ between conservation and 
release or between reorganization and exploitation? Does ‗turning the corner‘ 
necessarily result in ‗good outcomes‘? Why do some regions remain in the 
conservation quadrant longer than others?    
 
These questions remind us of the importance of spending time to identify 
actors and their underlying motivations and assumptions. Furthermore, these 
questions also lend weight to the idea that there are many ways to understand 
adaptive regional resilience in the wake of a long-term challenge, including 
conventional economic measures and indicators of a less economic variety. In 
subsequent chapters, both types of measures will be examined vis-à-vis each 
case study regions‘ economic development response to deindustrialization. 
Conclusions based upon these measures will help us to identify how each 
region has used economic development planning to adapt over time and how 
its actions relate to the four phases of the figure 8 diagram. However, reaching 
this goal will require that we first think about the range of economic 
development responses available to these regions. 
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Economic Development: Planning, Process and Actors 
Historically, one of the main ways regions have responded to economic 
challenges was through economic development planning and the use of 
related tools and strategies. However, during the 1970s and 1980s, as the 
Rust Belt grappled with widespread economic restructuring, there was also a 
dramatic shift in the way that economic development was conceived, funded 
and executed. Nationally, we saw a shift in focus from federally-driven 
initiatives to more local- and state-based practices as well as increased public-
private partnerships (Stoker 1998). The impetus for this shift came largely from 
the Republicans in power at the time, many of whom called for widespread 
deregulation and decentralization of numerous government services including 
many economic development initiatives. With this decentralization came 
substantial cutbacks in federal government funding for programs like Urban 
Development Actions Grants (UDAG), Community Development Block Grants 
(CDBG), and numerous Economic Development Administration (EDA) grants.  
 
In addition to these federal funding cutbacks, regions also grappled with the 
stresses of increasing international trade and greater international access to 
the United States consumer market. Increased access resulted in increased 
imports, which provided more options at lower costs for U.S. consumers but 
more competition for U.S. producers. Increased international trade, 
perpetuated in part by U.S. policymakers‘ indifference towards foreign 
competition in manufacturing, exposed weaknesses in many Midwestern 
economies. Dominant industries across the Midwest, many of which had long 
been bolstered by state and federal government efforts, began to realize that 
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their failure to innovate had rendered large sectors of the economy inefficient, 
if not obsolete.  
 
As corporations belatedly scrambled to innovate, modernize, and invest in 
appropriate technologies, local and regional leaders looked for ways to help 
corporations and boost their economies. A growing uncertainty about federal 
support for economic development efforts led many state and local 
governments to find their own ways of addressing these problems (Kossy 
1996). In the industrial Midwest, finding new solutions often meant searching 
for new sources of leadership and financial support. Rather than solely relying 
on federal grants for their economic development projects, regional leaders 
increasingly chose to form their own economic development organizations in 
order to set agendas, access federal dollars, and leverage private investment 
for regional projects. The growing importance of private investment for 
economic development brought with it an increase in the role of the private 
sector in the decision-making process (Cox and Mair 1988, Stone 1989).  
 
As private sector involvement grew, economic development officials became 
intermediaries who would act as regional cheerleaders, identifying potential 
projects and then negotiating deals to make them happen. This new private-
public partnership generally placed greater emphasis on creating a good and 
attractive business climate and moved away from previous concerns with inner 
city poverty alleviation and equitable development (Molotch 1988). The tools 
used for economic development began to shift from federal and state 
entitlement programs to local and regional incentives, subsidies, business 
assistance, and the banking and development of land. Fittingly, the metrics 
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changed from ambiguous concepts like regional equity and poverty alleviation 
to employment rates and tax revenues (Kossy 1996). 
 
In most places, private sector involvement would change the dynamic of the 
decision-making process and the tone of the development agenda. As Kossy 
(1996) notes, ―economic development was recast to address the whole 
constellation of issues affecting the business climate, as standards of 
community and industrial competitiveness became synonymous with 
community quality‖ (302). Recasting economic development meant something 
different for each region; the shape of a region‘s agenda is likely to depend on 
who is involved in the process, the region‘s strengths and weaknesses, as well 
as its assets and constraints (Strange 1997; DiGaetano and Lawless 1999; 
DeSocio 2007). Recasting economic development also differed across regions 
based on the approaches that regional actors took.  
 
In some regions, economic development remained largely within the policy 
realm, involving policy-driven agendas focused on things like annexation and 
increasingly popular relocation incentives. In other regions, economic 
development emphasized planning or visioning processes in order to set the 
agenda and tone for future regional development. In some regions, economic 
development officials set their sight on tourism by subsidizing the construction 
of amenities like stadiums, waterfronts, and more.4 Although slightly rarer, 
economic development programs sometimes focused on downtown living by 
                                                 
4
 Scholars have long debated the efficacy of the amenity and event-based attraction 
approaches to economic development (Gottlieb 1994; Burbank, et al. 2002). In general, most 
of these subsidized projects, especially stadium construction, do not benefit the host region in 
the longer term (Bachelor 1998). 
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either supporting or creating housing and amenities for people who wished to 
live downtown (McGovern 1998; Birch 2002). In most regions, economic 
development involved an amalgamation of policy and planning.  Whether or 
not any of these economic development programs and policies were effective 
in dealing with economic restructuring remains to be seen. Uncovering 
variations across cases and determining the efficacy of each region‘s 
response are two of the underlying goals of this study.  
 
Research emerging from the fields of planning and political science has 
provided us with a plethora of findings on the performance of individual 
regions in the wake of economic restructuring (Sassen 1990(b); Crump and 
Merrett 1998) and additional research on regional economic development 
responses to economic restructuring (Rodriguez-Pose and Tomaney 1999; 
Heathcott 2005).  Much of the research in these fields finds that power is 
generally held by the elites of the political, public and economic realms and 
that the relative power of each depends in part on the region‘s governance 
and government structures, industrial composition, racial and class makeup 
and organization, and the confluence of state, national, and international 
forces (Mollenkopf 1983; Logan and Molotch 1988; Stone 1989; Imbroscio 
1998; Davies 2002).  
 
Looking back at this cast of characters, we can imagine diverse, lively and 
contentious conversations centered on the question of how each region 
should respond to deindustrialization. The multitude of actors most certainly 
presented a variety of opinions about how the strategy should unfold and 
whom it should involve. Making sense of this process is not easy. However, 
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imagine, for a second, that the creation of a regional strategy is similar to the 
preparation of a complex meal being made in a busy and over-staffed kitchen.  
This kitchen – like a microcosm of the region – is filled with many people 
making suggestions about how to prepare this meal. The suggestions they 
make are probably based on their own past experiences in making food and 
their own preferences about how they would like the meal to taste.  
 
Whether or not their final suggestions will be taken into consideration will 
probably depend, in part, on: how loud their voice is, how experienced they 
are in making meals, how much their ingredients cost and the perceived 
contribution that their suggested action or ingredient will make to the final 
product.  We can imagine that if one of the more senior chefs gets his way, the 
meal might look a lot like the final product he had envisioned. Or, if a group of 
the more junior chefs collectively come up with a more enticing option, we can 
see how their idea might greatly influence the final product. In the end, the 
meal could taste any number of different ways. The final recipe will likely 
depend on who is most convincing in their suggestions and who has the most 
power.5  
 
Now, if we look at a region trying to devise a plan to deal with long-term 
industrial restructuring (their meal), we see that there are many different actors 
(chefs) who may wish to contribute to, or influence the final plan. Similar to the 
chefs in the kitchen, regional actors will compete to have their suggestions 
                                                 
5
 As political scientists and researchers of pluralism have long stated, power flows from a 
variety of different sources including those within the political realm and those outside of it 
(Jones and Bachelor 1993; Dahl 2005). Elite theorists have noted, however, that power is 
most often held by elites – from the public, private and civic sectors - who generally have 
higher levels of resources and the backing of patrons (Putnam 1993). 
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heard. Some of the less powerful players – for example, the smaller 
municipalities – might band together to voice their desires. Or, alternatively, 
one major power broker – say, an executive of a large corporation or a 
suburban county executive – may simply demand that their suggestions be 
considered and maybe even implemented. The final regional response will 
depend upon which regional actors are heard and which ideas they propose.6  
Making sense of these economic development responses and the various 
ways in which regions crafted their responses follows below.  
 
Typologizing Economic Development Responses  
Because a regional economy is regionally dependent by definition, it seems 
fitting that further investigation of the decision-making process at the regional 
scale would help us to better understand how and why regions varied in their 
responses to deindustrialization. Though numerous case studies have been 
conducted in order to investigate how a single region crafted its response or 
how a small number of regions crafted their individual responses, there is very 
little in the literature that attempts to compare the economic development 
responses to deindustrialization across a larger group of regions. This type of 
study is important in that it helps identify the particular approaches used in 
                                                 
6
 Researchers of network density and social capital have found that dense networks of civic 
engagement create higher levels of trust, which in turn yields higher levels of cooperation in 
the face of a challenge (Putnam 1993). Within this communitarian approach, such cooperation 
is thought to reduce transaction costs and assist in collective action efforts thereby increasing 
the likelihood of a desirable outcome (Putnam 2001). In slight contrast, the social mobilization 
literature suggests that acknowledgement of existing strategic relationships among various 
factions of interest within a community is necessary in order to then use these relationships as 
leverage in mobilizing collective actions (Skocpol 1996 and DeFillipis 2001). Safford (2004) 
has argued that the combination and intersection of civic and economic relationships in a 
given area determines the degree to which its actors are able to facilitate collective action in 
response to deindustrialization. 
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given areas, categorizes these responses and then begins to develop 
hypotheses about the effectiveness of these approaches across cases.  
 
When making comparisons across cases, researchers often utilize typologies 
as a way of categorizing, or sifting through, the various cases in a study. 
Though simple sorting does little in the way of explaining causality, typologies 
do make it easier to compare and contrast across cases as well as identify 
commonalities worthy of future analysis. Typologies from a variety of 
disciplines abound.  
 
Sternberg (1987) drew upon the tradition of political economy to group 
economic development strategies. Arguing that municipalities often have more 
economic development capabilities than they commonly use or even are 
aware of, Sternberg developed a typology of nine economic development 
policy groups by individual strategies and programs. A few years later, 
Peliserro and Fasenfest (1989) developed a simple typology of suburban 
economic development policy orientations. Using a survey of economic 
development offices in suburban Chicago, the authors found that the 
economic development approaches of any given suburb generally could be 
assigned to one of five categories: aggressive, regulatory, cooperative, 
retentive, and reactive. 
 
More recently, in a research note for Economic Development Quarterly, Reese 
(2006b) used cluster analysis to develop a typology of policy practice of cities 
based on their local economic development strategies. Her findings suggest 
that there are three main approaches to economic development. The first 
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combines infrastructure investment and financial incentives. These cities tend 
to provide investments in water, sewer, and roads, as well as in downtown 
streetscapes and service enhancements. The second approach uses all 
possible techniques, including tax incentives, business assistance, and land 
development policies. The third approach is to remain passive and to do very 
little in the way of economic development. Ultimately, Reese‘s findings are 
useful in that they are among the first to utilize survey data from individual 
economic development practitioners. However, the research notes the need 
for further research on economic development strategies of the past and 
strategies beyond the city scale.  
 
As the literature attests, numerous scholars have grappled with the 
construction of typologies to assist in the categorization of local responses to 
restructuring. Only one, however, matched distinctive responses to 
deindustrialization with specific economic development strategies. In their 
article, ―Bowing Out, Bidding Down, and Betting on the Basics: Midwestern 
Responses to Deindustrialization in the 1980s‖, Markusen and Carlson (1988) 
described three main responses to economic restructuring. The first, which 
Markusen and Carlson call ‗Bowing Out‘, described instances in which 
economic development officials chose to cut their losses and abandon the 
idea of manufacturing reliance, focusing their economic development efforts 
instead on the attraction and growth of service sector employment 
opportunities. The second, ‗Bidding Down‘, involved strategies that tried to 
curtail manufacturing losses by decreasing the cost of doing business in a 
given region, enticing manufacturers to either move in or to stay by offering 
subsidies, tax credits and other lucrative offers. The third, known as ‗Betting 
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on the Basics‘, described economic development strategies that targeted 
existing heavy industry, emphasizing the retention and expansion of firms 
already in the area. Incidentally, it is this third category that Markusen and 
Carlson think most useful to industrial Midwestern regional economies. The 
authors argued that industrial retention, a hallmark of ‗Betting on the Basics‘, 
was the approach most concerned with community issues because it 
acknowledge the social cost of plant shutdowns. I also include a fourth type of 
strategy that I call ‗Sharing the Wealth‘, which was later proposed by Clavel 
and Kleniewski (1990) and included strategies that embraced growth in the 
service sector and worked to incorporate linkage policies for the redistribution 
of related benefits in that sector. To some extent, the ‗Sharing the Wealth‘ 
approach embraced all three strategies – attraction, retention and 
entrepreneurship – as long as there was an emphasis on equitable growth and 
linkage practices. The responses and corresponding strategies for all four 
response types are summarized in Table 1.  
 
In the case study descriptions below, each region will be analyzed and 
subsequently assigned to one or more response groups. In the meantime, 
preliminary research shows that, to some extent, most regions employed at 
least one of these strategies during the late 1970s and early 1980s. In some 
cases, a region started using one approach and then shifted over time to 
employ another approach. In other cases, a region may have utilized a 
combination of two approaches throughout the entire period of study. These 
possibilities suggest that there is much to be learned about the adaptive 
resilience of regions, their responses to deindustrialization, and how their 
approaches changed over time.  
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Table 1 - Markusen and Carlson's (1988) Typology of Responses and Strategies 
to Deindustrialization (summarized by author) 
 Strategies   
Responses 
Attracting 
business from 
elsewhere 
Fostering 
new business 
formation 
Retaining 
local firms 
‗Bowing Out‘ – concentrating resources 
on high tech, finance and service 
centers, Thurow‘s sunrise industries, 
and letting manufacturing die a natural 
death 
X X   
‗Bidding Down‘ – economy must 
revitalize its basic industry by 
overcoming uncompetitive cost 
structures (focuses on 
labor/management conflicts and on 
trimming the cost of doing business) 
X   X 
‗Betting on the Basics‘ – advocates 
targeting of existing heavy industry for 
ED efforts; rejects ―sunrise‖ industry 
route; emphasis on retention and 
expansion strategies  
  X X 
‗Sharing the Wealth‘ – focuses on 
service sector growth and the 
development of policies oriented 
toward labor and community groups 
rather than the corporate sector; 
incorporates linkages policies for the 
redistribution of service sector growth 
X X X 
 
 
Overall, the deindustrialization and resilience literatures tell us a lot about the 
intricacies and nuances of regions. The deindustrialization literature tells us 
that the 1970s and 1980s were a particularly difficult time for much of the 
United States Rust Belt. Though some regions eventually saw at least some 
improvement, many continue to struggle with the effects of structural change 
today. Our interpretation and understanding of how these regions responded 
to deindustrialization is greatly informed by the resilience literature, which tells 
us that there are a variety of ways we can look at regional responses. For the 
purposes of this study, we can conclude that the resilience concept is most 
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useful when we think about regions as complex adaptive systems working 
their way through the four stages of the figure 8 diagram. Moving away from 
the engineering and ecological perspectives that view resilience as an 
outcome, I will instead focus on the ability of a region to continually adapt and 
respond to a given challenge or set of related challenges. I will do so through 
the use of both traditional economic measures and indicators of a less 
traditional variety. To that end, in Chapter 3, I describe the types of data used 
in these indicators as well as the process by which they were collected. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Questions, Data, Hypotheses, and Methods 
 
Having now been acquainted with both the deindustrialization and resilience 
concepts, we may now turn towards the particulars of this research project. 
More specifically, it is in this chapter that I make clear the specific research 
questions, data, hypotheses, and methods used to conduct this research. I 
begin first by outlining the main motivations of this research in question form. I 
then describe the data necessary to answer these questions and the process 
by which the data were collected. Two main hypotheses are then proposed 
and subsequently followed by a discussion of the methods used in this study 
and the limitations of this research. In all but the methods section, the 
descriptions pertain to the research program for the single case study of 
Detroit seen in Chapter 5 as well as the eight-region comparison seen in 
Chapters 6 and 7.  
 
Research Questions 
There are three main questions at the root of this research. All three pertain to 
economic development in Rust Belt regions, albeit in slightly different ways. All 
three also encourage us to consider the unique features of metropolitan 
regions, particularly during one important period of history. In their own way, 
all three also urge us to consider how decision makers affect regional 
outcomes, either on their own or in combination with other important factors. 
The research questions described below are intended to steer us towards a 
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better understanding of regions, regional leadership and the intersection of the 
two. 
 
Stemming from a desire to learn more about the decisions being made in the 
wake of deindustrialization, I start by asking a fairly simple question: who was 
involved in crafting each region‘s economic development response to 
deindustrialization and how did they go about crafting it? In the first part of this 
question, the overarching goal is to identify the main stakeholders involved in 
each region‘s decision-making process. Then, once these leaders have been 
identified, I seek to understand the decision-making process itself in each of 
the eight case study regions. Identifying the people who are sitting at the 
‗decision-making table‘ goes a long way in explaining a region‘s power 
dynamic. For instance, a region ruled largely by the economic elite might gear 
their recovery plan towards policies and practices that will aid their own firm or 
their own economic sector. Or, in a region where political leadership is strong, 
the recovery plan might be geared towards workforce development and 
various other constituent-friendly types of strategies. Therefore, knowing who 
is at the table is helpful information in that it narrows in on potential 
interviewees who help us to both better understand their region‘s decision-
making process and gain insight into the types of actors involved in this 
process. 
 
Building on the findings from this first question, the second research question 
urges us to consider the underlying rationale of each region‘s economic 
development response. Knowing who was ‗at the table‘ gives us some general 
insight as to the kinds of issues that were likely discussed but tells us little 
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about specific agendas. To gain a better understanding of what it is that 
regional leaders wanted from the economic development response, we must 
ask another question: what were the specific motivations or goals of each 
region‘s economic development response?  In asking this question, the hope 
is that we will better understand the basic goals of each region‘s response so 
that we might then map them against the regional outcomes seen in the longer 
term. 
 
Once we know more about the primary players and their motivations, we can 
then begin thinking about how these components relate to adaptive resilience. 
More specifically, we can ask a third research question: to what extent did 
these regions experience ‗good outcomes‘ as they adapted to the challenges 
associated with deindustrialization?  In other words, findings from the first two 
research questions urge us to consider how well each region adapted and 
responded to the challenge of deindustrialization by way of economic 
development. In order to answer this question, we will turn to the 
aforementioned measures of ‗good outcomes‘ and also uncover more detailed 
information about the particular strengths, weaknesses, assets and liabilities of 
each case study region.  
 
The motivation for all three research questions comes from the fact that the 
relationship between adaptive resilience and ‗good outcomes‘ is not clear and 
is likely different for each individual region. In order to better understand that 
relationship, it is necessary to weave together a more holistic understanding of 
how regions respond throughout the entire adaptive cycle. It would be 
imprudent to look at a simple aggregate indicator to determine resilience; 
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instead, we must understand how the engagement of actors, the setting of an 
agenda, and, eventually, ‗good outcomes‘ all determine whether or not a 
region has exhibited adaptive resilience in the face of a given challenge.  
 
Data 
The primary and secondary data used in this study come from a variety of 
sources (see Table 2). Much of the quantitative data about national economic 
trends discussed below in Chapter 4 come from the federal government, 
including the U.S. Census Bureau, Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. The qualitative data presented in Chapters 5 
through 7, however, are primary data collected by the author through 
participant interviews for the purposes of this study. Other data come from 
local periodicals, planning documents, as well as state and local budgets. The 
data collection process was similar for all eight regions except that far more 
interviews were conducted for the Detroit case study than were conducted for 
the seven other regions.  
 
In order to gain first-person accounts of the local decision-making process in 
Detroit, I first identified, and later conducted interviews with, 27 key 
stakeholders in the summer and fall of 2008. For the other eight regions, I 
conducted 31 additional interviews in 2009, with an average of three or more 
for each of the remaining seven regions. In all eight regions, the lists of 
stakeholders were culled from historical public records of relevant local, state 
and regional meetings; previously published research on this time period; and 
by recommendation from other living stakeholders in the region.  
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Table 2 - Questions, Data, and Methods 
Question 
RQ1: Who was 
involved in crafting 
each region’s 
economic 
development 
response  and how 
did they go about 
crafting it?  
RQ2: What were 
the specific 
motivations or 
goals of each 
region’s economic 
development 
response?   
RQ3: To what 
extent did these 
regions 
experience 
‘good outcomes’ 
as they adapted 
to the 
challenges 
associated with 
deindustrializati
on?  
Data  
Local, regional, and 
state planning 
documents; 
periodicals; interview 
transcripts  
Local, regional, and 
state planning 
documents; 
periodicals; 
interview 
transcripts; local 
budgets  
Interview 
transcripts; 
periodicals; data 
collected from: 
U.S. Census; 
Bureau of 
Economic 
Analysis; Bureau 
of Labor Statistics 
Methods 
Archival research; 
content analysis; 
participant interviews 
Archival research; 
content analysis; 
participant 
interviews; budget 
analysis 
Participant 
interviews; 
content analysis; 
archival research; 
quantitative 
analysis 
 
In most cases, initial contact was made with the staff of each region‘s current 
economic development agency. Current staff was asked to identify the person 
who can best speak to the economic development decision-making process at 
the onset of deindustrialization. In most cases, I was referred to a former head 
of the local or regional economic development organization or government 
planning department. From there, I sought the names of at least one person 
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from the central city, one person from the county, one person from one or two 
of the major suburbs, and a person from any related regional entities in 
existence. Attempts were then made to interview at least three people from 
this list of stakeholders. In all eight regions, participants reflected a diverse 
sample of interests, including leaders from both the private and public sectors 
and from offices having urban, suburban and regional interests. Interviews 
specifically targeted the important players who made decisions about 
economic development planning and policy during the late 1970s and early 
1980s.7  
 
Participants were asked about their perception of their region‘s economy 
during this time period, their responses to the economic changes that they saw 
unfolding and their opinions on the efficacy of these responses (see Appendix 
for complete interview guide). Furthermore, interviewees were also asked to 
discuss the local effects of deindustrialization, the specific types of policies 
and programs implemented to address these effects, and the effectiveness of 
the chosen economic development strategies used in each of the eight Rust 
Belt regions. The primary interview questions for this portion of the dissertation 
research included the following: 
 
• When did you first become aware of the severity of the 
deindustrialization trend? 
                                                 
7
 Much of this interview process mirrored the process established in Mayer and Greenberg‘s 
(2001) study. The authors interviewed local leaders in 34 small- and medium-sized cities that 
experienced prolonged economic prosperity built around a major industry or firm and then 
underwent drastic economic decline when the industry or firm downsized or closed. The 
authors conducted extensive interviews with local officials, community leaders, and economic 
development practitioners, asking about their local responses. In the end, Mayer and 
Greenberg conclude that union issues and environmental undesirability were significant 
obstacles in many regions and that the most critical components of success in redevelopment 
efforts were leadership and community involvement (215).  
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• To what extent did you engage in efforts to then move the region 
towards recovery? 
• Which industries, if any, were prioritized in your region‘s economic 
development strategy? 
• What were the specific types of policies or strategies that were 
implemented to address deindustrialization in your region? 
• What were the objectives of the various strategies? 
• To what extent were these strategies successful?  
• To what extent did response efforts incorporate a regional perspective? 
 
The interviews lasted between 60 and 90 minutes and followed a standard 
protocol intended to elicit open-ended responses. Interviews were conducted 
either in person or via telephone and were recorded, transcribed, and then 
summarized.  
 
Hypotheses 
The qualitative data gleaned from these interviews with regional stakeholders, 
combined with the aforementioned quantitative analysis, will help to identify 
the relationship between regional economic development responses to 
deindustrialization and post-deindustrialization outcomes. To that end, two 
main hypotheses have been developed to guide this study of the relationships 
between local economic development responses and adaptive resilience in 
deindustrializing regions. 
 
First, if we think about the ongoing (and very public) challenges seen in the 
Detroit region - which has been relatively forthcoming in its commitment to 
manufacturing and ostensibly to ‗Betting on the Basics‘ – we cannot help but 
notice a region that has experienced great economic challenges in recent 
years. Though less is publicly known about the degree of commitment to 
manufacturing in other Rust Belt regions, it seems plausible that regions in 
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which leaders committed to manufacturing by ‗Betting on the Basics‘ will not 
adapt as readily or as well as regions where leaders pursued other 
alternatives. If this hypothesis holds true, we should expect to see Detroit 
respond poorly to the challenges of deindustrialization and hover in the 
conservation and release stages for an extended period of time. Furthermore, 
we should also expect to see prolonged periods of conservation and release in 
other regions that similarly chose to ‗Bet on the Basics.‘  
 
A second hypothesis stems from the old adage that ‗the early bird gets the 
worm.‘ More specifically, it seems plausible that adaptive resilience will be 
seen in regions where leaders responded to early signs of deindustrialization 
and quickly developed an appropriate economic development response. We 
would expect such regions to relatively quickly turn the metaphorical ‗corner‘ 
by navigating the collapse and uncertainty associated with the release phase. 
Alternatively, we might expect to see lower levels of adaptive resilience in 
places where leaders reacted slowly to the realities of deindustrialization. In 
such cases, we might also expect to see a more reactive, rather than 
proactive, approach to the crafting of a response and a lengthy conservation 
or release phase. It makes sense that regional leaders who worked to get out 
ahead of the manufacturing downturn would exhibit more adaptive resilience 
(and ‗turn the corner‘)  than regional leaders who denied the existence of 
deindustrialization or ignored calls to respond. This question of timing is 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7 below.  
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Method 
The first part of this research, a single case study of Detroit, builds upon 
previous case studies of economic development responses in Flint (Lord and 
Price 1992), Pittsburgh (Detrick 1999), Cleveland (Hill 1995), Youngstown 
(Safford 2004), and Buffalo (Foster 2010). These individual case study 
analyses provide valuable insight into how individual regions responded to 
economic change during the latter half of the 20th century. The Detroit case 
study, presented in Chapter 5 below, is loosely modeled after these individual 
case studies.  
 
As Yin (1994) has noted, the single case study approach is of great use in 
situations ―where the case represents a critical test of existing theory, where 
the case is a rare or unique event, or where the case serves a revelatory 
purpose‖ (44).8 To some extent, the case study of Detroit does all three of 
these things. Utilizing the lens of adaptive resilience to examine the region‘s 
response to deindustrialization makes this case study both a critical test of 
existing theory and a case that could potentially serve a revelatory purpose. 
Furthermore, what makes the story of Detroit so unique, and so worthy of the 
deep inquiries provided by a single case study approach, is the region‘s 
severe and prolonged poor economic performance. Because of its pronounced 
challenges, a single case study of the Detroit region is essential. The depth 
afforded by this approach allows for a more thorough examination of the 
intricacies and nuances of this very important case.  
                                                 
8
 Other studies of resilience have also utilized the single case approach to examine 
community resilience (Harte, et al. 2009), regional resilience (Foster 2010), and disaster 
resilience (Rose 2004). 
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While such depth is necessary in extreme cases like Detroit, one of the main 
drawbacks of the single case study approach is the inability to compare 
responses across cases. In the Rust Belt, such comparisons are helpful in 
determining commonalities and differences in terms of both the types of 
responses seen and the efficacy of these responses across regions. 
Somewhere between the wide breadth and shallow depth of a large-N analysis 
and the narrow breadth and profound depth of a single case study lies the 
small-N analysis utilized in the second part of this study (Chapters 6 and 7). 
Such an approach allows for a comparison across a select number of highly-
relevant cases and the subsequent development of hypotheses related to 
these findings. In other words, the small-N study allows us ―to develop ‗thick‘ 
(complex or multidimensional) concepts and theories that are well-suited for 
description and for making inferences about simple causation on a small scale 
or in a few cases‖ (Coppedge 1999, 465). Drawing upon interviews with local 
stakeholders, this small-N study affords a broad yet thorough comparison of 
eight cases, all the while compromising little in the way of depth.  
 
In both parts of this research, the unit of analysis is metropolitan regions in the 
United States Rust Belt; one single region in Chapter 5 and seven additional 
regions discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. Because economic development 
policies and plans are often implemented at the sub-regional scale, some 
responses discussed in the case studies will pertain to only portions of a 
region. In such cases, the distinction between sub-regional and regional 
responses will be noted and any potential implications will be discussed.  
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The concept of regions has long been discussed in the academic literature 
though its prominence has risen greatly in recent years (MacKinnon, et al. 
2002, Hall 2002). The increasing popularity of the region as a concept has in 
many ways corresponded to its usefulness in explaining and conceptualizing 
changes seen in broader metropolitan economies. As counties, cities and 
towns continue searching for ways to stay competitive in a challenging 
economic environment, institutions operating at the regional scale are 
increasingly thought to provide the foundation for innovation and flexibility in 
the high-technology sectors (Saxenian 1994). Furthermore, regions are 
thought to be the building blocks of a competitive economy because of the 
potential for agglomerations, competitive industry clusters and knowledge 
spillovers (Cooke and Morgan 1998; Porter 1998).  
 
Though the field as a whole remains unconvinced of the regional 
competitiveness debate (Imbroscio 2006), numerous researchers have made 
the case that widening variations seen in metropolitan growth rates in recent 
years indicate that the region is in fact an important economic unit with which 
to capture such disparity (Drennan, Tobier, and Lewis 1996). Its significance 
as an economic unit has been further bolstered by recent work showing that 
the region is the scale at which most of the nation‘s income inequality has 
been generated, observed and perpetuated (Jargowsky 1997; Ihlanfeldt and 
Sjoquist 1989; Wilson 1996). Such findings have, at least in part, contributed 
to the increasing existence of organizing at the metropolitan level to 
specifically challenge these issues of spatial and racial inequality. Some of the 
most notable examples of this can be seen in the work of Orfield (1997, 2002) 
and Rusk (1993, 1999), both of whom argue on behalf of regional approaches 
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to the sharing of tax revenues and decision-making at a regional level. Overall, 
the recent literature on equity and spatial fragmentation, both subjects that are 
of great import to the Rust Belt area, suggests that the region is an important 
unit of analysis and likely plays a role in determining the outcomes of the 
people who live within it. 9  
 
Limitations 
It should be noted that in this project, as is the case in all research projects, 
there are some limitations.  First and foremost, focusing specifically on the 
Rust Belt limits the generalizability of the research findings to some extent.  
Although the focused nature of the subset analyses will allow for a multi-
faceted approach to studying economic development responses to 
deindustrialization, this study will not be generalizable to all types of 
deindustrializing regions.  In particular, other regions, especially in other 
countries, may face their own unique constraints because of differences in 
local, external, civic and other pressures. A basic scan of the literature 
suggests that other areas of the world have experienced deindustrialization in 
different ways and at different times than we saw in the United States Rust 
Belt during the 1970s and 1980s (Rowthorn and Ramaswamy 1997; 
DiGaetano and Lawless 1999). Even within the United States, 
                                                 
9
 Recent exchanges between the new and critical regionalists remind us that the region 
remains an exciting, albeit somewhat controversial topic (Pike, et al. 2007). New regionalists 
tend to emphasize the region as the most important geographic unit with which to study the 
effects of political and economic processes (Storper 1995; Porter 2003). Critical regionalists 
tend to emphasize the power of the nation state and the power of global forces in shaping the 
actions and reactions of regions (Ward and Jonas 2004; Allen and Cochrane 2007). More 
specifically, the modern tensions between the new and critical regionalist schools of thought 
urge us to consider how regions interact with political, economic and social processes at the 
global level.  
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deindustrialization has occurred in different ways and at different times (see 
Koistinen 2000 on New England and Minchin 2009 on North Carolina).  
 
Furthermore, divergent outcomes also exist within regions at the sub-regional 
scale. Because there rarely are responses developed that are truly regional in 
nature, it is sometimes necessary to study a variety of sub-regional responses 
in order to get a sense of how the region responded as a whole. Researchers 
have come to believe that the strength of a given region depends, at least in 
part, on the strength of the region‘s central city or cities (Ihlanfeldt, 1994; Voith 
1996;). When you strive to learn about regional success based on sub-
regional strategies, the findings are inherently less generalizable and less 
conclusive. Though these place-specific conclusions may ultimately limit the 
generalizability of this research, the lessons we learn from these regions of the 
Rust Belt will likely outweigh any limits we experience in terms of 
generalizability. Because it is the metropolitan scale that we are most 
concerned with, most findings will pertain to a given metropolitan region as a 
whole. In more complex cases where there are stark contrasts between a city 
and the region in which it is located, I make every effort to differentiate 
between the various parts. 
 
Second, the research is somewhat limited in that it is impossible to definitively 
determine cause and effect, especially in historical cases like those explored 
in this study. In other words, it is difficult to determine whether specific 
interventions caused the outcomes observed in these regions or whether 
those outcomes would have been observed absent any intervention. 
Researchers have noted the difficulty in determining the efficacy of local and 
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regional economic development programs and policies in general (Pressman 
and Wildavsky 1984), and specifically in the face of highly mobile capital and a 
national policy supporting trade liberalization (Schumpeter 1982; Demetriades 
and Hussein 1996). In so doing, their findings encourage us to document past 
interventions as a way of continuing our exploration of the relationship 
between economic development interventions and outcomes. Documentation 
of these historical interventions will bring us one step closer to understanding 
how economic development responses shape regional outcomes.  
  
Because so much time has passed since many of these events took place, 
some of the interviewees may have had difficulty correctly remembering the 
specific details of certain recollections. As such, some of the qualitative data 
run the risk of being historically inaccurate or imprecise. In all eight regions, 
additional efforts were made to cross-reference events and recollections to 
verify their accuracy. In most cases this was done through the examination of 
economic development plans and other archival documents from the 1970s 
and 1980s. In some cases, follow-up interviews were also conducted to 
confirm the veracity and timing of certain historically-significant events.     
 
Despite these potential limitations, the information presented in this 
dissertation will likely be of use to regions (and their leaders) confronting slow-
burning challenges like deindustrialization in the future. Overall, the research 
will highlight how regions confronting deindustrialization varied in both their 
responses and in their outcomes and will illustrate how some regions 
successfully navigated this difficult time period while others are still fighting to 
reverse or curtail its negative effects.   
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CHAPTER 4 
Regional Setting 
 
During the 1980s, portions of the United States celebrated steady growth while 
others experienced prolonged and painful economic contractions. In New 
England, the West and the South, an increase in military contracts, financial 
services, and business services helped fuel substantial regional growth. The 
Rust Belt region, however, was largely left behind. Many of the large 
manufacturers that had traditionally been the backbone of the Midwestern 
economy began shedding jobs either through disinvestment, moving 
elsewhere, automating or outsourcing. Well-paying, stable employment 
opportunities throughout the Rust Belt continued to disappear. So, while the 
nation‘s periphery rebounded in the mid- and late-1980s, beginning a period of 
sustained growth, much of the Rust Belt was on the brink of disaster.   
 
Researchers have long been cognizant of that fact that you cannot paint a 
picture of an area as large as the United States Rust Belt with just one broad 
stroke; doing so overlooks the many intricacies seen in a region as large and 
diverse as this. To be certain, there are a variety of uniting features that make 
this region a cohesive unit. Most of the Rust Belt is known for being in the 
heartland and near or on one of the Great Lakes, having strong agricultural 
roots or associations and long-standing ties to heavy industry. Yet, in spite of 
such important commonalities, the Rust Belt region is a surprisingly nuanced 
and complicated place. The Rust Belt includes parts of 8 different states, more 
than 100 metropolitan areas, and nine major metropolitan regions. Each state 
has its own political flavor, each city its own proclivities and each region its 
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own disposition, making it exceedingly complicated to understand the Rust 
Belt region and the parts that comprise it.  
 
In order to uncover the complexities of the Rust Belt and its various 
interlocking parts, a deeper and more thorough investigation is necessary. In 
this chapter, a brief introduction to these regions is presented and certain 
common characteristics are noted. Then, in Chapter 5, a single case study of 
Detroit is presented. As it has long been the poster child of deindustrialization 
and the most obviously affected by contractions in manufacturing, the Detroit 
region is presented on its own first, and then again later on as one of eight 
regions.  In Chapters 6 and 7, all eight case studies are presented and 
grouped according to the type of economic development response they 
employed. Processes and outcomes as they relate to adaptive resilience are 
discussed throughout Chapters 5, 6, and 7.  
 
Before we analyze the responses seen in these eight regions, however, we 
must first better understand the economics, politics and demography of each 
individual region. It is to this task that we now turn. Since this is a story of 
regions transitioning from manufacturing, the eight regions will be presented in 
order from most dependent on manufacturing to least dependent on 
manufacturing, as measured by their manufacturing employment levels in 
1970.10 A general discussion of each region will be provided first, followed at 
the end of the chapter by a preliminary discussion of commonalities across 
                                                 
10
 The starting point of 1970 has been chosen because, for many of these regions, the early 
1970s marked the peak of their manufacturing employment base. 
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cases and then some proposed quantitative metrics for adaptive resilience and 
‗good outcomes.‘ 
 
Eight Distinct Metropolitan Regions 
No two Rust Belt regions are alike. Though similarities may exist in some 
instances, each of the following regions differs greatly in terms of size, political 
leanings, leadership base, assets, and constraints. Understanding how these 
regions differ in these and other ways is an important precondition for 
determining how they responded to the challenge of deindustrialization. As 
Table 3 attests, the eight regions included in this study varied substantially in 
terms of their dependence on manufacturing in general and within various key 
subsectors. We begin first with a brief discussion of Detroit, the most 
dependent on manufacturing of all eight regions.  
 
The metropolitan statistical area of Detroit-Warren-Livonia includes the six 
counties of Lapeer, Livingston, Macomb, Oakland, St. Clair, and Wayne. In 
2008, the region was America‘s eleventh-largest and was home to 4.5 million 
people. Though these numbers have varied little since 2000, fluctuations 
during the previous century caused turbulent changes in Detroit‘s population 
and its employment base. The region saw population losses in both the 1970s 
and the 1980s. The local economy has long been dependent on automobile 
manufacturing and is home to the ―Big Three‖ automobile manufacturers: 
Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors. Though much has changed in recent 
years as these companies have modified both the techniques and locations of 
their production processes, Detroit remains an important location for both 
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automobile manufacturing and related support businesses such as parts, 
electronics and design suppliers (Klier and MacMillen 2005).  
 
Table 3 - Regions by Manufacturing Dependence and Sector (1970) 
Region 
Manufacturing 
as percent of 
total 
employment 
(1970) 
Sectoral strengths in the 1970s 
Detroit 31.6 automobiles, transportation equipment 
Milwaukee 31.4 machine manufacturing, industrial controls 
Cleveland 
31.2 
primary metals, machine manufacturing, 
transportation equipment 
Buffalo 29.9 steel, automobile parts 
Cincinnati 
28.3 
consumer goods, machine manufacturing, 
transportation equipment 
Pittsburgh 27.5 steel, glass, aluminum 
Indianapolis 
24.2 
consumer electronics, industrial automation 
and instrumentation 
Columbus 
22.2 
machine manufacturing, fabricated metals, 
food processing 
 
The Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis metropolitan area was home to 1.5 
million people in 2008. The Milwaukee region consists of four counties: 
Milwaukee, Waukesha, Washington, and Ozaukee. The region runs along the 
western border of Lake Michigan and at the confluence of the Menomonee, 
the Kinnickinnic, and the Milwaukee Rivers. Like so many of the other regions 
in this study, the Milwaukee region was originally settled because of its 
strategic location. Long known for its brewing and manufacturing, the region 
has faced substantial difficulty in the wake of deindustrialization but still 
remains a manufacturing-intensive economy. Early strengths in tool-making 
contributed to the region‘s specialization in machine manufacturing and 
industrial controls during the 1970s and 1980s. Population has remained 
relatively stable in the region, although it did see a slight decrease during the 
1970s.  
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The Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor MSA had a population of 2.1 million people and 
was the 26th largest MSA in 2008. The region consists of five counties: 
Cuyahoga, Geauga, Lake, Lorain and Medina. During the early 20th century, 
Cleveland rose to prominence as a center of industry, particularly in steel 
manufacturing. The region‘s early success was due in part to its strategic 
location on the Cuyahoga River and Lake Erie, which helped to establish the 
city as an important manufacturing hub. Anchor industries during the 1970s 
and 1980s included primary metals, fabricated metals, non-electrical 
machinery, electrical machinery, and transportation equipment. Population 
within the region decreased significantly during the 1970s and 1980s but it has 
since begun to stabilize during the 1990s and 2000s.  
 
The Buffalo-Niagara Falls MSA is a moderately-sized metropolitan region of 
approximately 1.1 million people in 2008. The region consists of two counties: 
Erie and Niagara, home to the cities of Buffalo and Niagara Falls, respectively. 
At the dawn of the 20th century, Buffalo emerged as an important location for 
grain storage, steel production, railroad and shipping commerce, automobile 
production and aerospace design and construction. As the original western 
terminus of the Erie Canal System, the region also saw substantial benefits 
from commerce associated with Great Lakes trade and transportation. These 
industrial and locational strengths, as well as inexpensive and plentiful 
hydroelectric power from the Niagara River, afforded the Buffalo region 
continued success throughout the first half of the 20th century. Employment 
losses in the steel industry, a significant part of the region‘s economic base 
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during the 1970s and 1980s, however, irrevocably harmed the region‘s 
economy in ways that can still be seen today. 
 
The Cincinnati-Middletown MSA is a 15-county region spanning portions of the 
states of Indiana, Ohio and Kentucky. The region was home to approximately 
2.1 million people in 2008. Industrial development within the region began 
during the second half of the nineteenth century. Much of this development 
benefited greatly from the strong transportation links afforded by the Miami 
and Erie Canal, a canal that was completed in 1845 and connected the region 
to Lake Erie. The canal, and later the railroads, gave Cincinnati a locational 
advantage in terms of shipping and transportation and also helped the region 
gain access to valuable raw materials. These two advantages, combined with 
a strong local demand for goods and a strong and skilled local workforce, 
helped the Cincinnati economy gain ground throughout much of the 19th and 
20th centuries. Industrial strengths during the 1970s and 1980s included 
manufacturing of consumer goods, machinery, and transportation equipment. 
The region has since shifted away from heavy manufacturing and moved 
towards chemical and pharmaceutical goods, as well as financial services.  
The Pittsburgh MSA was home to approximately 2.3 million people in 2008 
and consists of six counties: Allegheny, Armstrong, Beaver, Butler, Fayette, 
Washington, and Westmoreland. Allegheny County, where the City of 
Pittsburgh is located, has long been considered the center of the region both 
politically and economically (Killikenny 1906). The Pittsburgh Region as a 
whole emerged as an industrial center based on its high-grade coal reserves 
in the mid-19th century and its dominance in the steel manufacturing sector 
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grew throughout the early 20th century (Clark 1989). By the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, job losses in manufacturing, many within the steel industry, were 
cause for great concern in the Pittsburgh region. Between 1980 and 1986, the 
region lost 115,000 manufacturing jobs with nearly 50% of these losses 
coming from the steel industry alone. The severity of this loss was somewhat 
masked by the relative gains seen in other non-manufacturing sectors, 
specifically in healthcare, education, technology and financial services (Detrick 
1999). Overall, total regional employment decreased by 7 percent during this 
time period as Pittsburgh moved from a production economy to a service 
economy.   
The Indianapolis-Carmel MSA is a nine-county region of approximately 1.7 
million people in 2008. In the early- to mid-20th century, this state capital‘s 
economy largely revolved around government and heavy industry, including 
the manufacturing of pharmaceuticals and durable goods like motor vehicle 
parts and machine tools. Having consciously moved away from most of its 
manufacturing in the late 20th century, the Indianapolis economy today is more 
diverse, with specialties in health care, education, finance and education. 
Another major economic engine for the region is tourism, and specifically 
tourism related to sports and conventions. 
 
The Columbus region was home to 1.7 million people in 2008. The 
metropolitan area includes eight counties and is the third-largest MSA in Ohio 
behind Cleveland and Cincinnati. Earlier manufacturing strengths include an 
emphasis on machinery, fabricated metal and food processing, which to some 
extent remain a small but important part of the region‘s economy today. As 
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Ohio‘s state capital, the region‘s economy is largely dominated by the public 
sector, including state and local government employees as well as employees 
working for The Ohio State University. As of October 2009, there were 
approximately 155,500 public sector employees, about 18% of all employees 
working in the region (BLS – Metropolitan Area Employment and 
Unemployment). Beyond a strong public sector, the region also has a very 
strong financial services sector - including numerous insurance and banking 
corporations – and a strong clothing retail base that has grown considerably in 
the last few decades.  
 
Mapping Common Traits and Characteristics  
Looking back at Table 2 and at the descriptions provided above we can begin 
making some preliminary observations about these regions. First, Table 2 
shows that there is not a huge difference in manufacturing dependence 
between the most dependent region, Detroit (31.6%), and the sixth-ranked 
region, Pittsburgh (27.5%). While there is a natural breaking point between 
Pittsburgh and Indianapolis, all of the regions that were at least as dependent 
as Pittsburgh – meaning a dependence on manufacturing of 27.5 percent of 
more – experienced pretty similar difficulties during the 1970s and 1980s. 
Most of these regions saw substantial job losses in manufacturing, extensive 
fiscal challenges, and population stagnation or decline. Indianapolis and 
Columbus, on the other hand, which were comparatively less dependent on 
manufacturing, suffered considerably less during this deindustrialization 
period. Further insight about why regional outcomes may have differed will 
follow in Chapters 5 through 7.  
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One other thing we learn from these brief introductions is that among the more 
popular specializations were the manufacturing of steel, automobiles and other 
transportation equipment. Steel towns tended to fall in the middle of the 
spectrum, in regions having dependence on manufacturing somewhere 
around 27 to 29 percent. Automobiles and transportation equipment were 
seen in Detroit, the most dependent, and in Cleveland and Cincinnati, which 
both exhibited mid-range manufacturing dependency. Higher-technology types 
of industrial strengths tended to be seen in regions on the lower end of the 
manufacturing dependency spectrum, most notably in Indianapolis, and to 
some extent in Columbus.  
 
A simple listing of industrial strengths tells us only about the composition of 
each region‘s economic base but when we map these strengths against more 
detailed information about the size of these industries over time, this 
information becomes inherently more useful. Figure 3 depicts changes in the 
size of these manufacturing subsectors in the United States from 1969 – 2003. 
Featured in this chart are the main industrial strengths of the eight case study 
regions. Mapping the changes in each subsector over time adds a temporal 
dimension to our discussion of economic change.  
 
Because different sectors were affected by deindustrialization in different ways 
and at different times, we can imagine that each region, depending on their 
particular specializations, would experience deindustrialization differently. For 
instance, if we look within the period of interest, say 1973 to 1989, the earlier 
warnings occurred in transportation equipment and primary metals, both of 
which also saw little recovery during the late 1970s and early 1980s. One 
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would expect then that regions that depended on these sectors for their 
livelihoods may have reacted earlier than regions where other, less-affected or 
later-affected industries were dominant. In the case of transportation 
equipment, we might expect to see earlier responses from Detroit, Cleveland 
and Cincinnati.   
 
 
Figure 3 - National Employment by Subsector (1000s of jobs, SA), 1969 – 2003 
 
Or, in the case of primary metals, we might expect to see early responses in 
Cleveland, Buffalo, and Pittsburgh. Though the nature and timing of specific 
regional responses will be discussed later on, it is useful here to begin thinking 
about the unique experiences of each of the eight case study regions. To that 
end, we continue exploring quantitative measures of these regions below. 
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Adaptive Resilience: Response and Recovery  
Now that we know some of the important compositional characteristics of 
these eight regions, it seems useful to begin looking at how these regions 
faired, quantitatively, vis-à-vis some simple measures of regional resilience 
and hypothetical ‗good outcomes.‘ In her case study of Buffalo, Foster (2010) 
proposed two main ways of looking at adaptive resilience in the case of slow-
burning crises. Though Foster said nothing about ‗good outcomes‘, she did 
differentiate between response and recovery resilience, asking how a region 
responded to a given challenge and how well it recovered from that challenge 
over time. For the Buffalo case study, Foster presented a number of standard 
measures for two separate time periods. First, she examined figures from the 
1970s and 1980s to determine how well the region responded to 
deindustrialization. Next, she examined figures from 1989 to 2000 to 
determine how well the region performed in the recovery phase. To gauge the 
region‘s relative performance, figures for Buffalo were compared to other 
regions in the state of New York, and other regions of similar size and 
industrial composition. Ultimately, she concluded that both Buffalo‘s response 
resilience and recovery resilience were comparatively low, which would 
suggest a lack of ‗good outcomes‘ for the region. Below, I borrow from this 
framework to conduct an initial quantitative assessment of the eight case study 
regions.  
      
  
       
 
 
      Table 4 - Selected Characteristics of Eight Case Study Regions in the Response Period (1969 – 1989) 
 
 
Pct. Population 
Change 
Pct. 
Employment 
Change 
Per Capita Income Poverty 
Region 
Manuf. as 
Percent of 
Total 
Empl. 
(1970) 
1969-
1979 
1979-
1989 
1969-
1979 
1979-
1989 
1989($) 
Pct. 
Chg. 
1969-
1989 
Rate 
(1970) 
Rate 
(1990) 
Central 
City to 
Suburbs 
Ratio 
(1970) 
Central 
City to 
Suburbs 
Ratio 
(1990) 
Detroit 31.6 -0.7 -2.4 9.7 7.9 $15,649 35.0 8.4 13.0 2.2 2.4 
Milwaukee 31.4 -0.4 2.5 20.6 6.2 $14,785 34.6 7.8 11.6 1.0 7.1 
Cleveland 31.2 -6.5 -3.1 6.2 0.8 $15,092 31.6 8.8 11.8 1.6 1.6 
Buffalo 29.9 -7.9 -4.3 3.8 5.1 $13,403 33.3 9.0 12.0 2.4 2.6 
Cincinnati 28.3 9.5 5.1 18.0 16.8 $14,401 42.6 10.7 11.5 2.0 0.8 
Pittsburgh 27.5 10.3 -6.8 8.2 -0.6 $13,785 39.1 10.1 12.1 4.3 0.3 
Indianapolis 24.2 9.0 7.1 18.9 18.3 $14,936 40.1 8.6 9.5 0.1 3.1 
Columbus 22.2 38.5 10.7 27.8 21.4 $14,537 43.5 10.3 11.8 0.7 2.1 
Mean 28.3 6.5 1.1 14.2 9.5 $14,574 37.5 9.2 11.7 1.8 2.5 
 
6
7
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Table 4 summarizes the performance of the eight case study regions using 
Foster‘s (2010) measures of response resilience, namely in terms of 
population change, employment change, per capita income, and poverty in the 
1970s and 1980s. In order to gauge each region‘s relative performance, the 
mean for all eight regions is also provided. Those regions that performed 
worse than the mean for the group on any given measure are marked in bold.    
 
Among the more obvious observations seen in Table 4 is the correlation 
between manufacturing dependence and below-average performance across 
most indicators. Regions in the top half (meaning most dependent on 
manufacturing) are more likely to fall below the mean than those regions in the 
bottom half. Detroit, the most dependent on manufacturing, was below the 
mean on every indicator except per capita income, which implies that if you 
were lucky enough to have a job there, your income was probably above 
average. Milwaukee, just behind Detroit in manufacturing dependence, was 
below average across many measures; notable exceptions include major 
employment growth between 1969 and 1979, as well as modest population 
growth between 1979 and 1989. Among the more manufacturing-dependent 
regions, Milwaukee performed slightly better than expected. Despite being 
below the mean on many measures, the Milwaukee region did see population 
growth in the second half of the response period and modest growth in 
employment in both portions of the response period.  
 
Indicators for Cleveland and Buffalo paint a pretty dismal picture; Buffalo fell 
below the average across all measures except poverty, while Cleveland fell 
below on all but per capita income and poverty. Again, these findings suggest 
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that there was little, at least quantitatively, to suggest the presence of ‗good 
outcomes‘ in these regions.  
 
Like Detroit, the Cleveland per capita income measure suggests that 
remaining jobs paid pretty well in the region. In Cincinnati, the opposite was 
true – it performed surprisingly well, and above average on all measures 
except per capita income. Therefore, the kinds of jobs that were in Cincinnati, 
although comparatively stable, probably did not pay as well as in other Rust 
Belt regions. Below average per capita income was also apparent in 
Pittsburgh, as was population decline in the second half of the response 
period and employment throughout. In these regions, there were some but not 
many ‗good outcomes‘, which suggests that these region‘s had mixed results 
in their navigation of the deindustrialization challenge. 
  
Two regions that exhibited greater success in navigating the trials of 
deindustrialization were Indianapolis and Columbus. Quantitatively, both 
regions fared much better than their counterparts, displaying above average 
scores across all indicators except for below-average per capita income and 
above-average poverty in Columbus.  
 
Overall, these relatively simple indicators of response resilience suggest that 
manufacturing dependence likely did matter. Regions where manufacturing 
dependence was pronounced generally performed poorly on most of Foster‘s 
(2010) key response indicators and did not produce many ‗good outcomes.‘ In 
other words, the degree to which your economy was rooted in manufacturing 
likely played an important role in how much response resilience you exhibited 
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and how well you navigated the adaptive resilience cycle. However, 
aberrations certainly abound. The relatively solid performance of Cincinnati, 
which basically started with average manufacturing dependence, encourages 
additional explanation. Pittsburgh, with its relatively low manufacturing 
dependence, performed surprisingly low on measures of population, 
employment, and per capita income. Further explanation of these and other 
remaining questions about regional responses to deindustrialization will be 
explored in the remaining chapters.  
 
Shifting gears, Table 5 summarizes elements of regional resilience for the 
recovery period, or the 1990s decade which followed two decades of decline. 
Again, quantitative indicators for various measures across all eight regions are 
presented. The goal for this post-deindustrialization assessment is to identify 
those regions that performed well on various standard economic indicators, 
determine the extent to which each region experienced ‗good outcomes‘ in the 
recovery period, and raise questions for the remaining analysis. 
 
The findings from Table 5 suggest that manufacturing dependence within the 
eight regions has decreased dramatically since 1970 but the overall rank of 
each region in that regard remains largely unchanged. This continuity in 
ranking suggests that, even though manufacturing had contracted across the 
board, it still mattered most in the regions where it had always had a strong 
presence. More importantly, it also hints at the possibility that a manufacturing 
legacy is generally a strong legacy and one that is perhaps quite difficult to 
move away from. A more thorough discussion of the challenges associated 
with a manufacturing legacy is provided in subsequent chapters. 
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Table 5- Selected Characteristics of Eight Case Study Regions in the Recovery 
Period (1989 - 2000) 
 
 
Pct. 
Population 
Change 
Pct. 
Employm
ent 
Change 
Per Capita 
Income 
Poverty 
Region 
Manuf. 
as 
Perce
nt of 
Total 
Empl. 
(2000) 
1989-2000 1989-2000 2000($) 
Pct. 
Chg. 
1989-
2000 
Rate 
(2000) 
Central 
City to 
Suburb
s Ratio 
(2000) 
Detroit 18.1 4.8 15.3 $24,275 15.8 10.6 1.9 
Milwaukee 17.5 4.8 15.6 $23,003 16.2 10.4 5.3 
Cleveland 15.9 2.2 12.2 $22,319 10.4 10.6 1.4 
Buffalo 13.6 -1.6 3.0 $20,143 12.2 11.9 2.4 
Cincinnati 13.5 8.9 24.1 $22,947 19.0 9.5 0.7 
Pittsburgh 10.4 -1.5 12.5 $20,935 13.4 10.8 0.3 
Indianapolis 11.8 17.8 30.6 $23,198 16.0 8.6 2.7 
Columbus 9.9 14.8 29.4 $23,020 18.2 10.1 2.1 
Mean 13.7 6.8 17.8 $22,713 14.6 10.3 2.1 
 
Another important conclusion that can be drawn from Table 5 is that many of 
those same underperformers from the response period remain below average 
in the recovery period as well. Detroit, Milwaukee, Cleveland and Buffalo 
remained relatively consistent underperformers across most of these 
resilience measures, suggesting a lack of ‗good outcomes.‘ Cincinnati 
continued to walk the middle ground and Pittsburgh underperformed on most 
measures, despite a much lower manufacturing dependence than the other 
underperformers. Some of the interesting changes seen between response 
and recovery are the double-digit population growth seen in Indianapolis and 
Columbus and the exceedingly high employment growth seen in Cincinnati 
and Indianapolis. Also, somewhat surprisingly, Milwaukee, Cincinnati and 
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Columbus all saw their per capita income standings shift from below the mean 
to above it during this time period.  
 
Conclusion 
All of these shifts - for better or worse - suggest that fortunes may have 
changed for some of these regions between the response and recovery 
periods. This then begs the question of whether or not these shifts had 
anything to do with the individual region‘s response or whether it was purely 
luck that changed certain regional outcomes. As was also true in Foster‘s case 
study of Buffalo, we are left with many questions about the adaptive resilience 
of regions. Namely, we are left wondering about the specific responses crafted 
in each of these regions, the efficacy of those responses in the long run, and 
the relationship between these responses and ‗good outcomes‘ in the eight 
case study regions. We must also ask what resources were available in each 
case to help with the response and subsequent recovery. Even more 
importantly, we must ask who was responsible for crafting these responses, 
what were their intentions, and how did they decide upon their response, or in 
some cases non-response?  
 
Armed with the initial findings provided above and fueled by these unanswered 
questions, further exploration of these regions, and the economic development 
responses they developed in the wake of deindustrialization, will follow below. 
The goal for the next three chapters is to marry what we now know, 
quantitatively, about the responses and recoveries seen in these regions with 
a series of qualitative accounts of what happened in each. Together, these 
findings will help us to better understand regional resilience in the context of 
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these eight regions. We begin first with an in-depth examination of the most 
complicated region: Detroit, Michigan.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Detroit: The Perils of ‗Betting on the Basics‘  
 
In this chapter, we turn to America‘s most salient example of 
deindustrialization: Detroit, Michigan. As the historical epicenter of American 
automobile manufacturing, the Detroit metropolitan area has long grappled 
with economic stressors both small and large. In general, economic downturns 
in the United States economy have tended to hit harder and last longer in 
Detroit than in many other metropolitan areas (FDIC 2009). One of the most 
important downturns in recent history began with a brief recession that 
occurred between January 1980 and July 1980 and was then quickly followed 
by another that lasted from July 1981 through November 1982 (NBER 2009). 
In Detroit, where the majority of US auto manufacturing jobs were located, 
these recessions proved extremely challenging and prompted a variety of 
responses from the private, public and non-profit sectors.  
 
Overall, the findings outlined below suggest that the response seen in Detroit 
aligned most closely with what Markusen and Carlson (1988) would call, 
‗Betting on the Basics.‘ The findings also suggest that the region remained in 
the conservation and release phases of the adaptive resilience figure-8 for a 
prolonged period of time. Though the regional economy as a whole exhibited 
low levels of resilience during this time period, there is evidence of ‗good 
outcomes‘ along other, less-traditional means. An analysis of this region‘s 
response and its corresponding results as it contributed to or detracted from 
Detroit‘s regional resilience is the subject of this chapter.  
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In a slight divergence from the multi-N approach seen in later chapters, a 
single case study approach is used here because of the truly exceptional 
nature of the Detroit region. What makes the story of Detroit so unique, and so 
worthy of the deep inquiries provided by a single case study approach, is the 
region‘s role as the symbolic headquarters of the American automobile 
industry as well as the region‘s severe and prolonged poor economic 
performance and protracted racial segregation. In order to uncover a more 
detailed understanding of Detroit‘s unique position, I begin this chapter by 
briefly exploring Detroit‘s recent economic and social history. I then identify the 
important stakeholders at play in Detroit during the period of interest. Using 
qualitative data collected through interviews with many of these stakeholders, I 
then explore the ways in which local leaders contributed to the development of 
a response to this challenge. I conclude by asking how these local decisions 
did or did not contribute to adaptive resilience in the Detroit metropolitan 
region as a whole and the smaller areas of which it consists.    
 
Detroit’s Economy and Society 
In 1900, approximately 500,000 people lived in the Detroit MSA. Following two 
decades of significant growth, the total population reached 2.3 million in 1930 
and continued to climbed to a high of nearly 4.5 million in 1970 (See Figure 4, 
SEMCOG 2002). Population losses in the 1970s and 1980s, primarily a 
byproduct of the economic restructuring that the region experienced during 
that time, resulted in a slight decrease in the total population – to 4.2 million 
people in 1990 - at a time when many other regions across the United States 
were growing (Ibid). In recent years, that trend has reversed once more and 
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population has increased again to its former high of 4.5 million people. Much 
of this resurgence is due to increased population in the suburbs, which means 
that the region as a whole has gained in recent years despite the principal 
city‘s loss of nearly 500,000 residents since 1980 (Ibid).  
 
As the home to the ―Big Three‖ automobile manufacturers (Chrysler, Ford, and 
General Motors), the local economy was historically been dependent on 
automobile manufacturing (See Table 6). Though significant losses in this 
industry have been detrimental to the region, Detroit remains an important 
location for both automobile manufacturing and related support businesses 
such as parts, electronics and design suppliers (Klier and MacMillen 2005). In 
Detroit, the transportation equipment manufacturing companies employed 
more than 150,000 people in 2007, a little more than 8 percent of the region's 
private sector jobs (Armstrong 2007). As Table 7 attests, these jobs represent 
a larger share of the Detroit area employment and pay substantially higher 
wages in Detroit than the national average. The higher concentration of these 
types of jobs means that changes in the economy that affect the broader 
automobile industry disproportionately affect the Detroit region (Ingrassia and 
White 1995).  
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Figure 4 - City of Detroit and Metropolitan Detroit Population, 1900-2000 
(SEMCOG 2002) 
 
 
Table 6 - Major Employers in Detroit MSA, 2007 (Source: Crain’s Detroit 
Business)  
 
Company Employees 
Ford Motor Company 55,342 
General Motors Corporation 52,861 
University of Michigan 33,374 
Chrysler LLC 32,597 
Detroit Public Schools 17,329 
U.S. Postal Service 15,385 
U.S. Government 15,328 
Henry Ford Health Systems 15,139 
St. John Health 14,286 
City of Detroit 13,762 
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Table 7 - Occupational Employment and Wages by Major Occupational Group, 
United States and Detroit-Livonia-Dearborn Metropolitan Area, May 2007 (BLS 
2008)  
 
 
Employment 
share (in 
percent) 
Mean hourly 
wage (in 
dollars) 
Major Occupational Group US Detroit US Detroit 
Production 7.6 8.5* 15.05 20.93* 
Transportation and material 
moving 
7.2 8.4* 14.75 19.48* 
* = The employment share or mean hourly wage for this area is 
significantly different from the national average of all areas at the 90 
percent confidence levels. 
 
The extent to which the Detroit region relied on the automobile industry 
became increasingly clear during the 1970s. Despite warning signs in the past, 
the recession of 1969-70 and the energy crisis of 1973 affected the Detroit 
region significantly. A sharp drop in demand for large American cars, coupled 
with the rise of foreign automobiles, meant that Detroit‘s automobile industry 
had to innovate or make significant changes in order to stay competitive. 
Therein lies the complexity of the Detroit case; in search of lower costs and 
higher quality products, many automakers either introduced labor-saving 
technologies to their production facilities or moved production facilities to other 
lower-cost regions, which generally resulted in significant job losses for the 
Detroit region.  
 
The integration of automation technologies continued through the 1980s and 
1990s, generally increasing productivity and efficiency, while simultaneously 
causing record-high outputs of motor vehicles and a widespread reduction in 
the number of automobile workers needed (Farley et al. 2000). Further 
complicating the matter is the fact that Detroit also felt the effects of an 
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emerging geographic shift in production during this time period. Between 1950 
and 1970, Detroit‘s share of national automotive employment decreased from 
35 to 20 percent, as corporations looked to other, less expensive parts of the 
country and world for their production facilities.  
 
Coinciding with this national and international shift was a shift within the region 
that would greatly change the profile of the city and its suburbs; during the 
1980s, employment in Wayne County fell (-4.3%), while the suburban counties 
and the metropolitan area as a whole saw an increase in employment (38.5% 
and 15.6%, respectively) (County Business Patterns 2003). During the 1990s, 
job losses within Detroit tapered off but employment in the suburban counties 
and in the metropolitan region as a whole continued to grow (30.4% and 
17.1%, respectively) (Ibid). Suburban prosperity is so pronounced that 
metropolitan Detroit continues to be a high- income region (the per capita 
income was $52,004 in 2006), despite the alarmingly high poverty rate (23.1% 
in 2006) in the central city (US Census).   
 
This economic disparity within the region in many ways mirrors the racial 
disparity and segregation that also can be seen across the region. There are 
large differences seen between the central city and its suburbs that often get 
lost in aggregate indicators. Suburban communities are primarily residential 
and have many common characteristics. Homeownership in these 
communities is prevalent and rental housing scarce. There is little public 
transportation, car ownership is high, and suburban commuters have long 
been accustomed to extended commutes (Glazer 1965). A demographic tide 
of suburbanization and discriminatory practices in both housing and lending 
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keeps many African-Americans confined to the city (Cohen and Dawson 1993; 
Thompson 2001; Sugrue 2005). Residents of the largely white suburbs like 
Warren, West Bloomfield and Farmington Hills experience a higher than 
average employment rate and a higher per capita income than many parts of 
the United States. On the other hand, residents of the central city of Detroit are 
overwhelmingly black and are often the city‘s most impoverished residents 
(Darden, et al. 1987). 
 
Such shifts highlight the fact that in Detroit there has long been tension 
between corporations seeking to increase profits and local leaders who want 
to keep people employed in good, high-paying jobs. As this research will 
demonstrate below, the Detroit region is an interesting case because the 
region ultimately failed in two main ways. First, Detroit‘s large automobile 
corporations have not typically remained internationally competitive despite 
changes in their production techniques. Second, local leaders were largely 
unable to prevent the disappearance of high-paying jobs due to relocation or 
the substitution of capital for labor (automation). Together, these two 
challenges remind us that deindustrialization is an interesting long-term crisis 
because it caused a massive readjustment to Detroit‘s employment trajectory 
and it presented leaders with a series of very difficult decisions to make about 
how to respond. 
 
Stakeholders 
In Detroit, there were four main groups of actors who made decisions about 
how to respond to deindustrialization: politicians, including city, suburban and 
regional officials; leaders from the private sector; labor leaders; and civic 
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groups, such as activists and social service providers. Selected individuals 
from each group contributed to the development of an economic development 
response, albeit a somewhat disjointed one. 
 
As one might expect, politicians were among the most vocal groups involved 
in the decision-making process. Among the politicians, one of the primary 
players was Detroit‘s Mayor Coleman Young (1973-1994), who was known for 
his ―corporatist governing structure … (oriented) around the city‘s downtown 
renaissance agenda‖ (DiGaetano and Lawless 1999: 559). Detroit traditionally 
has had a strong mayoral system, so Young played a very important role in 
crafting a plan for the city, and to some extent the region. To that end, Young 
did have a series of successes including the creation of the Detroit Economic 
Growth Corporation, Downtown Development Authority, Economic 
Development Corporation and various built projects (Bachelor 1998). 
However, the effects of the recessions and federal cutbacks in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s ultimately limited what he was able to accomplish (Thomas 
1990).  
 
Among government agencies, one of the main groups to be part of the 
conversation at the regional scale was the Southeastern Michigan Council of 
Governments (SEMCOG), a membership organization of local governments in 
Livingston, Macomb, Monroe, Oakland, St. Clair, Washtenaw and Wayne 
Counties. The group bills itself as a regional collaboration of local elected 
leaders working to solve regional issues that transcend individual 
governmental borders. As the region's designated Metropolitan Planning 
Organization, SEMCOG is responsible for regional transportation planning. It 
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should be noted that SEMCOG was fraught with many of the same problems 
of other COGs and never really gained the clout necessary to enforce 
cooperation (Thomas 1990). Nevertheless, SEMCOG government members 
and staff were often vocal participants in the decision-making process.  
 
Other important political voices of this time period include Governors William 
Milliken (1969-1983), a moderate Republican, and his successor, James 
Blanchard (1983-1991), a Democrat. Despite their opposing political 
viewpoints, both Blanchard and Milliken were seen as sympathetic to 
automobile corporation interests who would do anything in their power to keep 
these corporations in Michigan, and mainly in the Detroit region. Suburban 
officials, who were more likely to be Republican, were also important members 
of the decision-making process. One of the main Republican voices in 
Oakland County, is now-County Executive Brooks Patterson. Though 
Patterson did not take office as County Executive until 1993, he has long been 
a vocal and sometimes controversial figurehead for this wealthy suburban 
county. He has publicly acknowledged his pro-business, pro-sprawl beliefs. 
During the 1970s, he worked in the Oakland County Prosecuting Attorney's 
office, where he led the protest against court-ordered cross-district busing. 
Given the pro-business orientation of many of these public officials, it is not 
surprising that corporate executives were generally given a pretty significant 
say in how the region would respond.   
 
Corporate executives that participated in the regional recovery process 
primarily came from the Big Three and related automobile businesses, as well 
as from regional banks and other service-sector entities. The Detroit Regional 
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Chamber was the main regional business organization and one of the largest 
and most powerful Chambers of Commerce in the country. It represented 
businesses throughout the 10-county region of southeast Michigan, focusing 
its efforts primarily on business investment and attraction, workforce 
development, and public policy advocacy on behalf of member 
businesses. The Chamber, along with another business group, Detroit 
Renaissance, generally represented the white, corporate elite interests (Jo 
2002). Other business-led groups, like the Detroit Economic Growth 
Corporation and New Detroit, which were designed by Mayor Young and his 
supporters, were sometimes criticized for being ―a forum for articulating the 
black agenda‖ (Rich 1989, 81). To his credit, Mayor Coleman worked closely 
with most of these groups, regardless of their racial or political orientation. 
These close associations all but guaranteed that business interests were an 
important, if not overarching, consideration of any economic development 
strategy crafted during this time period.   
 
The main labor representation in the Detroit recovery process came through 
the United Auto Workers (UAW), one of the largest labor unions in North 
America. Though the UAW has since seen a dramatic decline in membership 
since the automobile manufacturing sector‘s restructuring began in the 1970s, 
Detroit is home to the UAW and has long held the reputation of being a union 
town. Initially, the UAW‘s involvement in regional issues generally put them on 
the defensive, as they deflected criticism about the high cost of doing business 
in Detroit. Over time, however, the UAW and other unions became involved in 
attempts to marry economic development efforts with workforce development 
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efforts, ultimately becoming an important player in the decision-making 
process. 
 
One of the most important civic groups to emerge during this time period was 
the Detroit Alliance for a Rational Economy (DARE), an activist group that 
focused on issues of economic development and corporate subsidies. This 
group of local professionals and activists questioned the usefulness of on-
going economic development practices and proposed alternative scenarios for 
redevelopment in Detroit. They were largely peripheral members of the 
regional dialogue until one of their members, Ken Cockrel, was elected to the 
Detroit City Council in 1977. While in power, Cockrel gave voice to a growing 
contingent of marginalized activists in Detroit and utilized his supporters‘ local 
knowledge to suggest progressive strategies for moving the region forward.  
 
In their own ways, these four main groups of actors helped to create an 
economic development response, or series of responses, in the Detroit region. 
Though the extent to which each person or group contributed to that response 
certainly varied, all played a role in the crafting of the region‘s response and 
acted as stewards for the region as it moved forward. What follows below is an 
analysis of the process by which this response was crafted as described by 
interviewees in this study.  
 
Efforts to Respond 
Within Detroit, reactions to, and ideas about the cause of, the unfolding 
economic shift varied greatly. Local leaders, as well as the academic 
community, debated the nature and extent of this industrial shift (Bluestone 
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and Harrison 1982; Lawrence 1982; Branson 1983).  One interviewee, a state 
employee with the Department of Management and Budget during the 1970s 
and 1980s, described the uncertainty that unfolded as early reports about job 
losses trickled in.  
―In the early 1980s, our field staff would come in with stories about GM 
and Ford, Chrysler closing a plant here or there and the potential 
impact. But again they were still doing so well; we didn‘t take it as a 
crisis. We knew there were looming issues but nobody thought the 
automobile industry would be in the shape that it is today, at that time. 
No one could believe it because they were so dominant with well over 
50% of the market share in the 1980s. There was just not a feeling that 
that would lessen to the degree it has.‖  
 
Another state official working within the Department of Commerce echoed 
these sentiments, noting that most people were not prepared for what 
unfolded in Detroit during the 1980s and beyond.  
―I think few if any of us had any idea as to just how rapidly this would 
progress in the 80s, 90s and into the 21st century. I don‘t think any of 
us saw that what was happening would result in the beginning of the 
21st century being a transition from manufacturing to high-technology, 
knowledge-based and information industries just as the previous 
century had seen the shift from agriculture to manufacturing. I think if 
you go back and compare… it is very similar to what happened at the 
beginning of the 20th century but I don‘t think we saw it at that point. I 
think we saw symptoms, but we weren‘t sure where it was going to 
lead us ultimately.‖ 
 
Having failed to reach any real consensus on the nature and extent of the 
industrial shift, local leaders devised a variety of strategies to combat 
associated job losses and relocations. Like many other manufacturing-
dependent regions, local leaders in Detroit found that deciding which avenue 
to explore was not easy; it was a difficult task that many interviewees recall 
grappling with at the time. One interviewee, a former employee of SEMCOG, 
described the ongoing debate within his organization. 
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―We had a lot of conversations centered around the question of 
whether we should throw all of our energies into saving the 
automobile-related jobs or put money behind other types of attraction 
strategies. In many ways, I think we all wanted to do both. But 
convincing ourselves that a combination of both was a good idea was 
a difficult task that I don‘t think was ever resolved.‖   
 
The quandary that this participant describes is quite telling in that it 
summarizes the confusion about what could or should be done to ameliorate 
the problems that Detroit was experiencing.  
 
One way to sift through this confusion and begin to identify common threads in 
the wake of these challenges is to categorize the responses described by 
each interviewee. If we categorize the responses that interviewees described 
using the typology created by Markusen and Carlson (1988), we find that a 
range of approaches and ideologies were employed (see Table 8). Of the 27 
interviewees that were conducted in Detroit, 13 people described responses 
that either explicitly or implicitly subscribed to the ideology of ‗Betting on the 
Basics.‘ Seven people subscribed to the ‗Bidding Down‘ ideology, meaning 
that their efforts emphasized the cultivation of a lower cost climate in which to 
conduct business. Five interviewees described strategies of reinvention and 
diversification, which largely aligned with the ‗Bowing Out‘ approach. The two 
remaining interviewees described strategies that aligned with ‗Sharing the 
Wealth‘, Clavel and Kleniewski‘s (1990) service sector-based strategy of 
linkage and redistributive policies.  
 
Though the viewpoints offered by local practitioners generally correspond to 
one of the typological categories, the overall range of responses mentioned 
offers a spectrum of options employed by these localities. Economic 
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development actions that fall within the category of ‗Betting on the Basics‘, 
which constitute the majority of the responses described by interviewees, are 
described first.  
 
      Table 7 - Interviewee Responses by Ideological Approach 
Economic Development Approach 
Number of 
Interviewees 
‗Betting on the Basics‘ 13 
‗Bidding Down‘ 7 
‗Bowing Out‘ 5 
‗Sharing the Wealth‘ 2 
 
‘Betting on the Basics’ 
Remaining steadfast in their belief that the manufacturing sector would 
ultimately rebound and employment in that industry would eventually resume 
former trajectories, leaders who subscribed to the ‗Betting on the Basics‘ 
approach tended to focus on indigenous entrepreneurship and retaining 
existing heavy manufacturing firms. Associated economic development efforts, 
accordingly, targeted existing heavy industry, rejecting arguments in favor of 
the ―sunrise industries.‖ Rather than invest in new and emerging sectors, 
proponents of the ‗Betting on the Basics‘ approach placed greater emphasis 
on retaining and expanding the existing industries, ignoring calls to diversify 
their industrial structure. As the figure-8 diagram suggests, the rigidity of this 
approach prolonged the Detroit region‘s conservation phase, a time in which 
stability is a higher priority than innovation.  One Detroit-area academic with 
extensive knowledge of the ways in which localities responded to early 
warnings of the unfolding industrial shift found that:   
―Michigan stakeholders didn‘t believe in industrial decline. They were a 
victim of their largeness and thought that they were immune to global 
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fluctuations. Stakeholders were much more concerned with stretching 
their global tentacles than worrying about the threat of economic 
problems here in Detroit.‖ 
 
Though the respondents‘ reasoning sometimes differed, the sense of immunity 
and concern for increasing global market share was echoed by numerous 
interviewees. A former planner for the City of Detroit simply stated that, in 
response to economic changes, ―non-action was the order of the day.‖ This 
non-action may have only referred to the corporate-sector mentality of the 
time. While the Big Three were hesitant to publicly acknowledge the industrial 
shift that seemed to be taking place, many of the other public stakeholders 
were not so timid in recognizing the impending challenges.  
 
Within the city administration, the unfolding industrial shift was of great 
concern. One former official in the Department of Economic and Community 
Development noted that, in some ways, local leaders were galvanized by the 
threat of industrial extinction. Despite widespread recognition that the 
automobile industry was shrinking, the official described efforts – on the part of 
both public and union leaders – to willingly ―reinforce an industry that was 
slowly getting smaller.‖ This interviewee was not alone in expressing 
frustration at this conservative retention strategy. Numerous other 
interviewees mentioned their own misgivings about ―committing too strongly to 
a recreation of history.‖ Such fears were echoed in sentiments expressed by 
another interviewee – an activist working in Detroit during the latter half of the 
20th century – who reflected on the questions he was asking about the 
prevailing economic development strategy of the time.  
―In a funny way, particularly in the late 1970s, there was very little 
emphasis on the workforce development issue. At first the issues were 
on tax abatement—…in Michigan it was called Public Act 198—and a 
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lot of the questions around economic development issues revolved 
around what sorts of tax write-offs were given to companies as 
inducements to settle their large plants in the area.‖ 
 
Despite such gloomy predictions, some local leaders were actually quite 
creative in thinking about how to respond to economic change. Rather than 
concentrating solely or predominantly on the retention and expansion of 
existing heavy industry – economic development strategies that Markusen and 
Carlson would call ‗Betting on the Basics‘ –many leaders instead focused their 
efforts on ‗turning the corner‘ by making Detroit a lower-cost place for 
companies to conduct business, a collective set of strategies known as 
‗Bidding Down.‘ 
 
‘Bidding Down’  
Interviewees that subscribed to the ‗Bidding Down‘ approach – the second 
most popular ideology - frequently discussed the need for public spending to 
create a good business climate for entrepreneurs, new business start-ups, and 
existing firms. Proponents of this approach saw an uncompetitive cost 
structure as the chief obstacle standing between the Detroit region and 
economic prosperity. They believed that revitalization of the Detroit economy‘s 
basic industry would come from the resolution of costly labor-management 
conflicts such as artificially high wages, inefficient work rules, and 
unnecessarily high workman‘s compensation and unemployment insurance 
costs. Proponents of the ‗Bidding Down‘ approach, perhaps in an attempt to 
‗turn the corner‘ and move towards the release phase, focused their efforts on 
lowering these costs, utilizing tools like givebacks and negotiated public and 
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private concessions in order to give businesses incentives to make 
investments and create jobs in the region.  
 
Within the Detroit metropolitan region, the suburban county of Oakland was 
well known for providing subsidies to firms in order to create a lower cost 
business environment. A former Oakland County Executive described his 
efforts as follows:  
 ―We have a program, Emerging Sectors, underway to complement the 
automotive industry. So far, we‘ve brought in or expanded 906 
companies that fit within that paradigm, and we have invested millions 
of dollars and created about 1300 new jobs. But frankly, we‘re losing 
them by the tens of thousands and replacing them by the 500s.‖ 
Like so many of the local public actors who subscribed to the ‗Bidding Down‘ 
approach, this interviewee focuses on establishments and jobs, and not 
necessarily on Big Three market share, gross regional product, or quality of 
life. Because his main diagnostic appears to be job creation, it is unsurprising 
that he highlights the importance placed on economic development incentives, 
typically known as industrial expansion and attraction strategies. Such 
strategies represent the epitome of the ‗Bidding Down‘ response to the 
industrial changes that were taking place.  
 
One interviewee, a state leader from the Department of Commerce, noted that 
from the State of Michigan‘s perspective, the approach was to ―give (firms) a 
lot of tax write-offs, and that‘s the most important thing.‖ Interviewees also 
noted that the city‘s approach was not all that different. A former staff member 
of the Economic Growth Corporation noted that,  
―The Big Three, either directly or indirectly, made a lot of the decisions 
about how economic development would proceed. For the most part, 
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they made it clear they would only stay in Detroit if their interests were 
served.‖ 
 
Though not all economic development efforts prioritized such regressive 
retention strategies, it often felt that way. An activist working within Detroit 
during the 1980s described the combination of both fear and frustration that he 
felt with this approach.  
―The newspaper headlines, day after day, would say that an 
agreement had been reached to save so and so number of jobs from 
moving to Mexico. But at what cost? Where was the money coming 
from and who was losing out?‖ 
The activist was not alone in expressing his frustration at this relatively popular 
response to deindustrialization in Detroit, numerous other interviewees were 
disappointed with this approach. In addition to ‗Bidding Down‘, which was the 
second most popular economic development strategy behind ‗Betting on the 
Basics‘, local actors also considered two other approaches, albeit to a lesser 
extent.  
 
‘Bowing Out’  
One of the less popular options was the ‗Bowing Out‘ approach, which 
Markusen and Carlson (1988) describe as industrial diversification through the 
attraction of service sector jobs and high-tech firms. Leaders who subscribed 
to this ideology frequently mentioned the importance of targeting firms that 
were not focused on automobile manufacturing. Interviewees who believed in 
‗Bowing Out‘ were therefore more likely to support initiatives focused on firms 
that were part of Thurow‘s ‗sunrise industries‘, industrial sectors that were 
growing quickly and were expected to become even more significant in the 
post-industrial economy. In their own way, these attempts to redirect the 
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economy were attempts at ‗turning the corner‘ by moving beyond the rigidity of 
the conservation phase and into the creative destruction of the release phase. 
The success rates of this approach varied significantly across the region. 
 
Numerous interviewees mentioned Macomb County‘s successful attraction of 
firms that were not directly associated with automobile production. One long-
serving public official in Macomb County described early efforts to diversify 
their industrial base.  
―I had a sense that automotive was not going to send us to the 
promised land, so we started to focus our efforts outside of auto 
manufacturing, on emerging sectors like robotics, IT, biotech, 
alternative energy, healthcare, finance, and today on homeland 
security.‖ 
 
What began as a series of scattered investments in alternative industries has 
since evolved into comprehensive targeted development strategies in Macomb 
County and in other areas of the Detroit region. Such development strategies 
have increasingly focused on sectors whose success would yield higher GRP, 
like robotics and biotech, and create more jobs, like healthcare and finance. 
Another interviewee, this time in the Oakland County Executive‘s Office, noted 
that avoiding an over-reliance on the automobile industry remains an important 
priority still today.  
―We are trying to promote our strengths…. We have 93,000 people in 
the healthcare industry in Oakland County, second only to automotive. 
As automotive fades, we think that healthcare is going to become an 
area of economic development that goes beyond this region.‖   
With only 5 interviewees subscribing to this approach of industrial 
diversification and service sector growth, the ‗Bowing Out‘ approach was 
certainly not the predominant ideology.  Even less popular was the ‗Sharing 
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the Wealth‘ approach, which utilized more progressive strategies embracing 
the redistribution of service sector growth. 
 
‘Sharing the Wealth’  
The two interviewees subscribing to the ‗Sharing the Wealth‘ ideology – one 
city union official and the other a staff member at SEMCOG – described their 
attempts to leverage growth in the service sector through linkage policies. 
They focused primarily on the development of policies and practices aimed 
toward labor and community groups rather than the corporate sector. They 
focused their efforts on developing linkage policies for the redistribution of 
service sector growth benefits to improve the greater community. Because it 
was considered a fairly progressive approach in the 1980s, this approach was 
less often utilized than the other, more mainstream approaches. A manager in 
the Department of Commerce during the early 1980s described the tension 
between development and the greater community as follows: 
―You can‘t just talk about the tax impact on a given company or given 
industry, you have to talk about the whole range of societal needs—
housing, neighborhoods, communities, schools, transportation, 
healthcare—you can‘t take any of those out of the equation and 
successfully address the problem of corporate attraction and 
population retention.‖  
It should be noted that many of the people who needed these improvements 
the most were part of the inner-city, disenfranchised population of Detroit who 
had little ability to pay for these amenities. In the meantime, many people with 
the ability to pay, generally higher-income suburban residents who never really 
had to see the day-to-day hardships of their urban neighbors, chose not to and 
instead blamed the inner city residents for their troubles (Sugrue 2005).11 In 
                                                 
11
 In a sense, lacking a coherent regional governance structure allowed the more successful 
areas of the region to isolate themselves, at least informally, from the problems of the inner 
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the end, even though redistributive strategies were not often the main focus of 
economic development efforts, many interviewees noted the importance of 
such improvements as peripheral or secondary concerns. So, even though the 
‗Sharing the Wealth‘ approach was not at the top of the list in terms of 
popularity, it still remained an important thread throughout Detroit‘s recent 
history, which suggests that some Detroit leaders did see the value in linkage 
policies to improve the local community even if their particular economic 
development strategy did not explicitly focus on it.  
 
Overall, the leaders interviewed for this study provided a variety of 
perspectives on their own professional experiences during the 1980s. Their 
descriptions suggest that although a myriad of approaches were employed, 
one approach, ‗Betting on the Basics‘, was the predominant strategy. As such, 
the prevailing ideology during this time period focused on existing heavy 
industry and continued the status quo (i.e., conservation) despite early 
warnings of widespread industrial restructuring. Largely ignoring calls to 
diversify their industrial structure or support more innovative strategies, many 
leaders in the Detroit region continued to focus their efforts on automobile 
manufacturing, putting into place a course of action that continues to 
challenge the region today. Whether or not this particular path has contributed 
to or detracted from regional resilience in Detroit is an important question that 
will be explored in further detail below.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
city. Doing so allowed suburban communities to experience higher average incomes and 
quality of life, while ignoring the plight of their urban counterparts. Ignoring the inner city may 
come back to haunt the region as a whole, as indicated by the problems the region 
experienced with higher levels of unemployment during the most recent economic downturn. 
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Gauging Adaptive Resilience (or the Perils of ‘Betting on the Basics’) 
Overall, the public perception of Detroit is generally not a favorable one; even 
today, newspaper headlines continue to announce further job and population 
losses and an unemployment rate of 14.9%, the highest unemployment rate 
amongst the country‘s largest metropolitan areas and far higher than the 
national average of 9.7%.12 Both a brief accounting of the economic history 
and accounts from local leaders corroborate the substantial challenges that 
the Detroit region has faced in recent decades.  
 
To say that Detroit, on the whole, has adapted well to the challenge of 
deindustrialization does not make sense. As we saw in Chapter 4, the region 
has not improved on most traditional measures of social or economic vitality 
and employment losses continue to plague the region. If we then juxtapose 
the disappointing employment figures with the economic development 
strategies that were meant to improve these figures over time, we see that the 
economic development strategies have not successfully attracted or retained 
firms or increased employment in the longer term. The adaptive resilience 
perspective tells us that, in this sense, the Detroit region has not successfully 
adjusted to the challenges of deindustrialization because it has long hovered 
in the conservation and release quadrants and has not adapted well to 
changes in its economy over time.  
 
                                                 
12
 On February 2, 2010, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that, ―Of the 49 metropolitan 
areas with a Census 2000 population of 1 million or more, Detroit-Warren-Livonia, Mich., 
reported the highest unemployment rate in December, 14.9 percent.‖ 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/metro.nr0.htm  
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However, despite such shortcomings in traditional measures of the economy, 
Detroit remains one of America‘s largest regions and portions of it, mainly 
suburban areas, have fared quite well as measured through indicators like per 
capita income and educational attainment. For better or worse, the region also 
remains the American headquarters of automobile manufacturing in both a 
symbolic and literal sense. The fact that it remains such a central player in the 
United States‘ economy and urban landscape suggests that, to some degree, 
parts of the region have exhibited adaptive resilience, albeit of the somewhat 
less traditional variety.  
 
Outside of the industrial retention strategies that have kept automobile 
manufacturing headquarters in the Detroit region, the majority of these less 
tangible outcomes were not likely related to economic development strategies 
in the more traditional, firm-oriented approach sense.  If we consider a more 
liberal definition of economic development – one that includes both place-
based and people-based approaches – the relationship between these 
strategies and adaptive resilience becomes slightly more plausible.  A more 
place-based approach to economic development might include targeted 
investment to counteract long-term disinvestment in at-risk areas, while a 
people-based approach might include job development or skills training for 
disadvantaged or at-risk populations. In Detroit, interviewees recalled that the 
overall economic development strategies were collective in nature, often 
including a combination of firm-, place- and people-based efforts. It seems 
fitting then that we would find evidence of adaptive resilience in measures 
beyond the number of jobs created (or lost) or the unemployment rate.  
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For example, evidence of adaptive resilience might be the fact that the region, 
despite such overwhelming challenges, is home to three professional sports 
teams, a redeveloping downtown, as well as 10 universities and 13 colleges 
with more than 140,000 students. New downtown stadia were constructed for 
the Detroit Tigers in 2000 and the Detroit Lions in 2002. Detroit also hosted 
the 2005 MLB All-Star Game, 2006 Super Bowl and the 2009 NCAA Men‘s 
Basketball Tournament. All of these events have prompted improvements in 
the surrounding areas, including areas along the city‘s riverfront. Recent work 
on the riverfront includes improvements to the Detroit River Walk and the 
construction of upscale condos along the Detroit Riverfront. These efforts stem 
from a longstanding desire, jump-started by the efforts of leaders in the 1970s 
and 1980s, to reinvent the downtown area as a desirable place to both live 
and recreate. Though these types of regional outcomes are not as easy to 
quantify, they suggest the possibility that the Detroit metropolitan area may 
have exhibited at least some elements of adaptive resilience in the long run.  
 
In the sections that follow, I will discuss three other less tangible indicators of 
adaptive resilience as described by interviewees. This adaptive resilience 
results more from people- and place-based strategies than it does from firm-
based economic development strategies. Though they are more difficult to 
measure than traditional economic development indicators, such as jobs 
created or saved, they are no less important to the region and its survival.  
Together, they offer us alternative lessons in regional resilience and give us 
insight into how regions adapt and bolster themselves in the face of a 
significant challenge.   
 
 98 
Strong Activist Subculture 
Given the common perception that Detroit is one of the most unionized 
metropolitan areas in the United States, it seems fitting that a certain amount 
of civic engagement and localized activism would also be found within the 
region. During the 1940 and 1950s, while manufacturing employment density 
increased in Detroit, unions gained a prominent role in the daily lives of 
workers. In 1985, union coverage in Detroit was 26.7 percent, almost 6 points 
higher than the national average of 21.0 percent (McCall 2001:66).  Estimates 
from the 2005 Current Population Survey show that 16.5 percent of private-
sector workers and 58.2 percent of public-sector workers are union members.  
Best known of the unions is the United Auto Workers (UAW), which is 
headquartered in Detroit and was extremely influential in obtaining better 
working conditions and higher wages for its members. The UAW, other local 
unions, and a growing number of activist groups has given Detroit the 
reputation of being a union town with an activist bent (Lorence 1996).  
 
Activist groups were present throughout Detroit‘s long history but they began 
to focus intensively on local economic issues only in the wake of 
deindustrialization. One activist group who collectively emerged in response to 
problems they saw with local economic development was the Detroit Alliance 
for Rational Economy (DARE). The group formed in 1977 largely in response 
to questionable development practices happening in Detroit at that time. As 
one interviewee and former DARE member noted,  
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―The DARE group formed in response to a common desire to question 
the massive sums of money and tax abatements that developers were 
receiving in downtown Detroit. As part of our efforts, we elected Ken 
Cockrel to City Council in 1977 and he worked hard to oppose the tax 
abatements that we all were fighting against.‖ 
 
In this case, the tax abatements in question pertained to the money being 
invested by the Detroit Economic Growth Corporation (EGC). In materials 
produced by Ken Cockrel for DARE members, the EGC is described as: 
―…a private corporation; its meetings are not open to the public. 
Nevertheless, its annual budget comes primarily from public sources: 
$375,000 from the State of Michigan, and $375,000 from the City of 
Detroit, which is extracted from the Community Development Grant 
Funds‖ (Wood Henrickson 1991, 529). 
DARE members contested the power of the EGC on the grounds that its 
actions were directed primarily by Detroit‘s corporate elite. Its Board of 
Directors was appointed by the Mayor and included the chief executive officers 
of the major local corporations. Cockrel contended that there was only token 
representation from both the trade unions and the community (Wood 
Henrickson 1991). On behalf of the DARE group, Cockrel argued that the 
public was losing out because,  
―Critical decisions are made by a few people who are insulated from 
public control….Their priorities are clearly established by the business 
representatives. These organizations are not places where community 
input can be made, but are organizations whose primary function is to 
―facilitate‖ the investment of private capital in downtown Detroit (Wood 
Henrickson 1991, 530).‖ 
 
Such investments were so troubling to members of DARE that members 
organized to elect public leaders who would question subsidized private 
investment without public consent. One former DARE member noted that, 
―DARE was a pretty interesting organization because we were 
integrated and locally based. Our idea was to get Cockrel elected to 
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City Council and once that happened, we would get more people like 
us elected to City Council and Cockrel would become mayor.‖13 
 
This interviewee noted that DARE‘s primary approach was two-fold: first, they 
would utilize the power of activism to elect reform-oriented leaders to local 
government and second, they would use local knowledge to devise alternative 
strategies to this type of economic development. Though DARE‘s efforts 
supporting the first part of their agenda were interrupted by the premature 
death of Ken Cockrel in 1985, the former DARE member notes that,  
―DARE still remains one of the most interesting and long-term groups 
of people who have consistently been involved in economic 
development issues in an urban area. Even today, the wife of Ken 
Cockrel is on the City Council. The new mayor is Ken‘s son. The spirit 
of DARE and Ken lives on.‖ 
 
In regards to the second part of DARE‘s agenda—the development of 
alternative economic development strategies—similarly important outcomes 
have also materialized. One of the most important writings on alternative 
economic development, Rational Reindustrialization: An Economic 
Development Agenda for Detroit, was written by Dan Luria and Jack Russell 
(1981) and stemmed from their own involvement in DARE. Luria and Russell‘s 
plan encouraged the rebuilding of Detroit through retooling of abandoned 
plants and the retraining of displaced high-skilled auto workers in the emerging 
energy industry. Though much of their plan was never implemented, the tenets 
of a rational reindustrialization remain an important reminder of alternative 
scenarios for economic development in the wake of economic downturns.  
 
                                                 
13
 Ken Cockrel, Jr. was replaced by Mayor Dave Bing on May 11, 2009. 
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Again, the strength of a region‘s activist culture is a measure that is not very 
easily quantified. Nevertheless, it could be argued that having an established 
network of activists allowed the Detroit region to maintain a system of checks 
and balances against the powerful decision-making institutions and 
corporations. Or, alternatively, it could be argued that the strong activist 
subculture within the center city pushed this development into the welcoming 
arms of their suburban counterparts. Either way, such checks guarantee, at 
least informally, that the public will continue to have an semi-organized outlet 
through which they can voice their opinions about the trajectory of the region 
and the way that its economic development funds are spent. Though it may 
not be as formal an arrangement as the ―broadly participatory processes‖ that 
Stiglitz (2002) describes or the regional equity approach that Pastor, et al. 
(2009) write about, the Detroit activists‘ struggle reminds us that such public 
engagement should be celebrated and should not be taken for granted in 
communities experiencing such profound challenges. Even if the degree to 
which public engagement contributes to regional resilience has not yet been 
determined, we can certainly assume that a region without public engagement 
does not a resilient region make.  
 
Growing Importance of Quality of Life, Societal Needs 
One other important way in which the Detroit region adapted to the realities of 
this economic downturn was the understanding that improving the quality of 
life within the core of the Detroit metropolitan area was of great importance. In 
the 1970s and 1980s, public officials across the nation began to understand 
that corporations were paying increased attention to the quality of a region‘s 
services and general amenities as well as the public image of the region 
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(McCarthy 2002). Recognizing the link between employee retention and a 
region‘s quality of life and public image, corporations began looking for 
locations that were attractive to the people that they hoped to employ. Detroit 
in the 1980s, which was generally perceived as being an increasingly 
dangerous and unattractive place to recreate or live, was not often considered 
a desirable place for corporations to locate. One long-time real estate 
developer had this to say about the challenges that Detroit faced: 
―In the early 80s, the downtown area was a scary place for many 
people. There was really no reason to be there. So, when 5:00 rolled 
around, people left and went back to their homes either in the suburbs 
or in other parts of town. No one really saw it as a place they wanted to 
be.‖ 
Such negative sentiments were not reserved for the inner city only; the 
metropolitan area as a whole faced similar challenges. One Macomb County 
official noted that, 
―We faced our fair share of negativity from outsiders even though our 
schools are better than most in the nation, we have great parks and 
our communities are, and have always been, highly desirable places to 
live.‖ 
Given the pervasiveness of this negative perception, interviewees frequently 
alluded to the difficulty in trying to devise a strategy to increase the quality of 
life for the people of Detroit and the corporations headquartered there. One 
city planner described the process as follows: 
―We knew we had to do something. People and companies were 
leaving Detroit in droves. We thought that the downtown needed 
shopping, sporting events and high-end office space but we didn‘t 
always agree on how it would get done. So, we did our best to do it. It 
took a long time but I think we got there.‖ 
 
Many of the efforts employed by stakeholders in Detroit took a long time to 
execute, including the redevelopment of downtown Detroit through the 
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construction of elements like the Renaissance Center, a group of seven 
mixed-use, interconnected skyscrapers on the Detroit River. Later investments 
also have included stadia, three casinos, and a revived Greektown. Though 
development does not always mean increased resilience, interviewees 
generally agreed that much of what was accomplished during this time period 
did put Detroit in a better position than it would have been without this initial 
development and investment. One Detroit City Councilperson‘s staff member 
noted that,    
―I was proud of the development that we were able to push through. 
We didn‘t get everything we wanted - far from it - but we did start 
things in motion and made people begin to see Detroit for what it was. 
The casinos and new stadia came later but they wouldn‘t have even 
been possible if we hadn‘t started pushing for downtown way back 
then.‖  
 
Though not always quantifiable, efforts to improve the downtown were likely 
instrumental in creating the perception of hope and the possibility that life was 
improving for Detroit and its residents. One long-time business owner in the 
central business district noted that,  
―Our mood was pretty low back then. We kept hearing that things 
would get better, that people wouldn‘t keep losing their jobs…. But in 
the end, we didn‘t always believe what the newspapers and city hall 
were saying; we had to see change in order to believe that it could 
happen.‖  
 
The sense that small improvements were happening, like the Renaissance 
Center and the revival of Greektown, and that larger developments were likely 
to happen in the future gave hope to many residents and leaders alike. 
Though hope is not easily measured and promises of a better future cannot be 
quantified, the sense that incremental improvement is possible cannot be 
underestimated in regions suffering from such prolonged downturns (Reese 
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2006). Physical improvements to the downtown, both completed and planned, 
communicated a commitment by leaders to the improvement of the quality of 
life within the core of the Detroit metropolitan area. In so doing, leaders helped 
the region adapt in the wake of this economic downturn by better positioning 
the Detroit region as an attractive place to live, work and recreate.  
 
Workforce Development Efforts 
As Pastor, et al (2009) suggest, additional evidence of adaptive resilience can 
be found in the emphasis that regional leaders placed on workforce 
development efforts in the wake of an economic challenge. As semi-skilled 
automobile workers continued to be displaced throughout the 1980s, efforts to 
move Detroit‘s workers into other positions - either within the automobile 
sector or another industry – intensified. In many cases, workers required 
significant education or re-training in order to find gainful employment. Mostly 
gone were the days when an unskilled laborer could easily find employment in 
one of the Big Three plants. One interviewee, now a professor at Macomb 
Community College, described his own earlier experience in an automobile 
manufacturing plant as follows:  
―The auto industry basically, until the 1980s, hired people off the street. 
You had a short orientation film, went to a medical examiner and then 
they asked you how much money you wanted to give to United Way 
and then you were hired. I experienced that myself. I was hired in 1969 
in a Chrysler plant exactly like that; I went in at 10 in the morning and 
by 4:00 in the afternoon, I was working the afternoon shift.‖ 
  
The now-professor then described how changes in the automobile production 
process and threats from foreign companies quickly changed the hiring and 
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training practices of the Big Three corporations.  He notes that it was in the 
early 1980s,  
―…when workforce development and HR issues and all sorts of 
questions related to education begin to emerge because, lo and 
behold, the automakers find out that the Japanese do intensive 
amounts of training inside the plants and that they take seriously the 
workforce issues and preparation issues.‖ 
 
Responding to the realization that foreign competitors were simply training 
their employees better, early efforts to cultivate worker training programs 
began to coalesce within Detroit and within the State of Michigan around this 
time. Such efforts were aided by the support of a wide variety of stakeholders 
in the automobile industry. One retired automobile union representative 
mentioned that the threat of these increasingly-powerful foreign competitors 
was part of the motivation for union support of worker training efforts.  
―We, the autoworkers, and they, the Big Three, began to realize that we 
had to do some hourly worker training. Then that was the origin—in 
1984—when the UAW contracts established the Joint Training Fund, 
which we saw as a commitment to the future of automobile industry.‖  
 
Efforts to train Detroit-area workers for gainful employment extended beyond 
the automobile sector. In the mid-1980s, the State of Michigan began to 
realize that threats to the economy were, in many ways, a public training issue 
and began to provide money for customized training of both automobile 
workers and workers in emerging sectors like healthcare and biotechnology. 
Such efforts often relied on Michigan‘s community colleges and other local 
organizations for training programs.  
 
One of the earliest local organizations to get involved in worker training was a 
non-profit called Focus:HOPE. In 1981, Focus:HOPE started its Machinist 
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Training Institute in order to train workers for the types of jobs that employers 
were looking to fill. As one employee of Focus:HOPE describes,  
―The goal has always been to improve the community through worker 
training. Our organization has played a unique role in that sense; we 
train people for specific jobs in the community.‖  
 
Since its inception, Focus:HOPE has continued to grow by partnering with 
private companies and local colleges to offer degree programs. These types of 
programs are designed to prepare local workers for high-skilled, and often 
high-wage, positions in the community. One interviewee, a Detroit-area 
business owner who has been involved with Focus:HOPE for several 
decades, described the unique role of the organization.   
―Focus:HOPE is an important part of the Detroit community. It serves 
an important function – worker training – and has been very successful 
in its efforts to do that. Over 10,000 people have sought training 
through Focus:HOPE and many have found jobs that would not have 
otherwise been possible..‖ 
 
Indeed, Focus:HOPE has been an important player in local workforce training; 
its website boasts of having graduated nearly 200 engineers, 2,500 machinists 
and 900 information-technology specialists. Though such numbers may seem 
like a drop in the bucket, a stronger educational environment was just one of 
the many ways in which local officials tried to market the Detroit region as a 
place where both human and social capital were highly valued.  
 
Overall, the Detroit metropolitan region might not look like an archetype of 
adaptive resilience. In fact, on many measures it has been decidedly rigid and 
inflexible, and certain ongoing challenges remind us that the region continues 
to face a difficult future. Nevertheless, certain aspects of the region – some of 
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which were likely formed in response to these difficulties – have helped to 
improve the lives of Detroit residents and better position the region for future 
opportunities.  
 
Significance of Findings 
Though most interviewees were hesitant to use the word resilient to describe 
the Detroit region as a whole, most were quick to point out that portions or 
elements of the region may indicate the presence of adaptive resilience. 
Numerous interviewees described successful adaptation efforts, like 
redeveloping downtown and improving the quality of life for Detroit residents 
by upgrading the amenities and services offered to them. Many pointed to the 
recent hosting of national events and the investment in downtown stadia and 
casinos as evidence of this resurgent path. Other interviewees pointed to the 
strong and long-standing tradition of activism and civic engagement as 
evidence of adaptive resilience. The strength of these groups, historically and 
today, is measured by their ability to engage in the decision-making process 
and affect positive change for the people who call Detroit home. Still other 
interviewees pointed to the region‘s enduring history of workforce development 
efforts as evidence of successful adaptation. Union-supported training efforts, 
along with public sector and non-profit support and leadership, have 
sometimes made it easier for Detroit workers to find gainful employment either 
in the automotive industry or other fields. Though unemployment remains 
incredibly high in the Detroit region, a long tradition of training workers 
indicates a certain type of regional resilience: an investment in human capital. 
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It would be imprudent to ignore, however, the obvious and substantial 
challenges that the Detroit metropolitan area continues to face. Since the 
1970s, residents have watched both jobs and people disappear as local 
automobile manufacturers reacted to mounting pressures at home and 
abroad. The economic downturn had lasting effects on the Detroit region and 
affected different parts of the region in different ways. The urban core suffered 
devastating job losses, while the periphery saw substantial growth in both 
population and jobs. Whites gradually left the city to follow jobs and more 
favorable amenities to the suburbs, while many African-Americans remained 
within the urban core. Just as the region became increasingly segregated, it 
also became progressively more fragmented as municipalities clamored to 
attract new development and new in-migrants. Attracting either of these things 
was generally difficult for all parts of the region, not just the urban core, 
because the region as a whole came to be seen in a relatively negative light.  
 
Despite such adversity, Detroit leaders remained optimistic about their ability 
to intervene and to improve on the local economy in a variety of ways. 
Interviewees described an array of responses at the state, regional and local 
levels. The data collected from these interviews indicate a strong propensity 
for leaders to subscribe to the ‗Betting on the Basics‘ approach. Though the 
‗Betting on the Basics‘, conservation-based approach seemed to work for a 
while – Detroit‘s productivity rebounded slightly during the 1990s – this 
automobile manufacturing-centric approach only temporarily masked 
fundamental weaknesses in the regional economy, many of which have reared 
their ugly heads again in recent years.  We now know that this approach was 
not particularly successful in the long run because it kept Detroit within the 
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conservation phase for far too long. Nevertheless, the information provided by 
these Detroit leaders help to tell the story of how regional leaders responded 
in the wake of a slow-moving crisis. The information gleaned from these 
interviews also provides us with a more nuanced picture of the decision-
making process in 1970s and 1980s Detroit.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Other ‗Basic Betters‘  - Milwaukee, Buffalo, and Cleveland 
 
As was noted in Chapter 3, this research has been divided into two main 
components: a single case study of the Detroit region (Chapter 5) and a multi-
N study that includes Detroit and seven additional Rust Belt regions (Chapters 
6 and 7). In this chapter, the focus is on three other regions that, like Detroit, 
chose to ‗Bet on the Basics.‘ Findings from this research suggest that, to 
varying degrees, Milwaukee, Buffalo, and Cleveland all crafted strategies that 
focused primarily on the retention of manufacturing firms. An analysis of the 
processes by which each of these three regions arrived at their own 
responses, as well as a discussion of related outcomes, follows below. A 
comparable analysis for the remaining four regions, all of which opted to 
pursue other types of economic development responses, follows in Chapter 7.   
 
Similar to the research conducted for the Detroit case study, much of the 
qualitative data collected for this larger study come from interviews with 
regional leaders from the 1970s and 1980s. Interviewees represent a cross-
section of interests, jurisdictions, and sectors in each of the case study 
regions. A minimum of three interviews were conducted in each region, and 
generally targeted at least one stakeholder from the public, private and civic 
sectors. In most cases, additional archival research was also used to verify 
interviewees‘ answers. A variety of perspectives allows for a more nuanced 
understanding of each region‘s situation during this particular moment in time. 
In this chapter, I identify commonalities across these case study regions, and 
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offer a series of lessons that we can draw from both the data collected as well 
as subsequent analysis. First, I begin this chapter by briefly introducing the 
regions, their economies and the processes by which they crafted their 
response. Regions are presented in order from most dependent on 
manufacturing to least dependent as measured by manufacturing as a percent 
of total employment in 1970.  
 
The Regions – Milwaukee, Buffalo, and Cleveland 
As we saw in the case of Detroit, a common regional response to the 
challenges of deindustrialization was to struggle against change, ignore calls 
for diversification, and attempt to recreate the economic base of the past. 
Given that Detroit‘s economy was so intertwined and so dependent on one 
single industry that had done so well for so long, one can understand why 
regional leaders there may have considered themselves immune to 
deindustrialization. Why wouldn‘t leaders there want to ‗Bet on the Basics‘ and 
remain in the conservation phase when doing so had done their region well for 
such a long time?  
 
In other Rust Belt regions, however, the economies were not so specialized in 
one given sector of the economy. Few of these other regions were so 
synonymous with any one particular product or corporation, and therefore they 
were probably less inclined to commit to any predisposed trajectory. To some 
extent, these other regions had options. Though it wouldn‘t have been easy, 
regional leaders in Milwaukee, Buffalo and Cleveland could have chosen 
another response. Nevertheless, these three regions followed a similar 
approach to the one pursued in Detroit. So while Detroit certainly deserves its 
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own single case study, it is not a stand-alone phenomenon; the lessons 
learned in Detroit should also be kept in mind as we examine these three other 
regions that all chose to ‗Bet on the Basics‘, despite appearing to have other 
options. 
  
Milwaukee   
Like all of the other regions that ultimately chose to ‗Bet on the Basics,‘ the 
Milwaukee region was originally settled as a strategic transportation site due to 
its waterfront location. In addition to shipping, Milwaukee‘s early economic 
base included manufacturing, stockyards, and assorted heavy industry. Early 
on, the region was a distribution center for Midwestern agricultural produce, 
especially wheat grown in Wisconsin. Easy and plentiful access to Wisconsin‘s 
wheat, combined with large German and Polish populations, led to a large 
beer-brewing industry from the mid-1850s onward. Other industrial strengths 
included grain processing and storage, as well as tanneries.  
 
Early strengths in brewing, processing, shipping and manufacturing changed 
gradually over time; the brewing industry faded significantly by the 1970s and 
the region‘s manufacturing base continued to grow. In addition to general 
manufacturing production, the region‘s early strengths in tool-making led to a 
local specialization in machine manufacturing and industrial controls. Early 
forays into these particular industries led to long-term specializations that 
would last for decades. A local economic development expert described how 
an early strength in tool-making led to other related sectoral strengths.  
 
―Historically, we started with blacksmiths making tools and then the demand 
grew because agriculture grew to the west of here and they wanted more 
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machines. So we started making machines to make machines, and then we 
needed mechanical controls for those machines, and then we needed 
electronic controls…That‘s how we came to account for much of the world 
market in industrial controls.‖  
  
However, as was the case in so many other regions, success in one area of 
the economy did not always translate into success across the board. Tool-
making and then industrial controls has been one of the few easy successes 
seen in Milwaukee. The region experienced largely unfettered growth up until 
the 1970s. Thereafter, leaders watched as manufacturing jobs disappeared in 
droves. During the 1980s, the region suffered considerably as firms downsized 
or closed altogether. A former council member described these turbulent 
times. 
 
―There certainly was concern. The recessions hurt and then the migrations 
outward certainly had an impact. People were aware of these. There were just 
a number of companies that closed their doors, many of them larger 
employers in the region. In the early 1980s, Babcock and Wilcox made pipes 
for nuclear reactors in West Allis. Then they closed and 1,200 jobs (were lost). 
The biggest single employer was Allis-Chalmers. They made turbines and 
tractors, farm equipment, a host of products and they were always second, 
third, or fourth in where they stood in any given market. Their heyday in West 
Allis, had 17,500 workers there. They shuttered in 1985. Even in brewing, 
Schlitz Brewing, the beer that made Milwaukee famous, disappeared in 1986 
or 1987 and that was another 4,000 jobs.‖ 
 
In reaction to these significant and highly visible losses, leaders embarked on 
an aggressive agenda to retain manufacturing and bolster the economy 
against future challenges. During the 1970s and 1980s, the region fought to 
remain in the conservation phase by ‗Betting on the Basics.‘ The reason why 
this approach was prioritized may be due in part to the fact that attraction 
strategies - the hallmark of approaches like ‗Bidding Down‘, ‗Bowing Out‘, and 
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‗Sharing the Wealth‘ - were not really feasible in Wisconsin. A former suburban 
mayor described why this is the case: 
 
―The difficulty is that Wisconsin doesn‘t play in the incentives game. It has 
very few tools. Part of the state constitution says everyone will be taxed the 
same. So, you can‘t forgive taxes coming in the way many states do. So, we 
have TIFs, a few other things (that) can be done – some training incentives 
and the like…. In Wisconsin, we stand no chance on the attraction… I cannot 
name a company, nor can anyone else, that has moved to southeastern 
Wisconsin in the last 25 or 30 years.‖ 
 
Having so few tools in hand to help attract companies, Milwaukee leaders 
instead chose to focus on the areas of the economy in which they perceived 
they had an advantage. Interviewees suggest that the strong commitment to 
manufacturing, or at least to high-tech varieties of manufacturing, stems from 
the fact that within the city of Milwaukee there was plentiful vacant industrial 
land and a highly-skilled workforce across the region as a whole. While the 
abundant land would come about later through policy changes, the presence 
of a skilled workforce was likely the result of both local culture and political 
intervention. As the former suburban mayor noted, the workforce was seen as 
a real asset during the struggles of the 1970s and 1980s.  
 
―We have had a very skilled workforce. We certainly have a large unskilled 
workforce but the skilled workforce had a terrific work ethic. I‘ve talked with 
lots of CEOs and Human Relations folks who mention the work ethic of 
Milwaukee workers….So this was a selling point. And the skill levels were 
high. We‘ve got a lot of people who know how to make things.‖ 
 
Though these experienced workers could not do much to attract firms, they 
were a large part of the reason that firms either stayed or grew their 
businesses in the Milwaukee region. Maintaining this skilled workforce was 
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part of the strategy that local leaders employed in their ‗Betting on the Basics‘ 
response. As one local educator noted,  
 
―Wisconsin has a very strong technical college system. I think we‘ve got 14 
technical colleges spread around the state. The largest one is in Milwaukee; 
it‘s called Milwaukee Technical College.‖ 
 
Workforce development efforts have historically been a significant part of 
Milwaukee‘s history (Fung and Zdrazil 2004). In the wake of economic 
restructuring in the 1970s and 1980s, these efforts were also an important 
component in the economic development response seen in Milwaukee. 
Nevertheless, leaders were not naïve enough to think that a skilled workforce 
would be the only thing needed to grow or retain firms. Numerous other efforts 
were also made to market the Milwaukee region as a good place for heavy 
industry to do business.  
 
Rast (2009) argues that annexation was the first of many steps that the region 
took towards creating a more hospitable environment for businesses. An 
aggressive annexation program that was started in the 1940s and 1950s really 
took shape in 1960 with the election of Democrat Henry Maier as mayor of 
Milwaukee. Maier‘s main economic development initiative was to use the 
annexed land for industrial land banking as a way to ensure that there would 
always be a large supply of vacant industrial land ready for firms looking to 
expand specifically within the city (Ibid). Because a penchant for sprawling, 
single-story plants materialized during the 1970s and 1980s, the land banking 
approach to industrial development ended up being a pretty good bet for the  
city of Milwaukee, and thus for the region as a whole.  
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However, given that land banking was a relatively new phenomenon at this 
point in time and given that the upfront expenses of this approach were so 
high, one can appreciate just how risky this type of initiative may have felt 
back in the 1960s and 1970s. Nevertheless, interviewees frequently 
mentioned this approach as being one of the most important economic 
development tools used in the Milwaukee region. As one current city official 
noted,  
 
―It took a long time to be successful. The basic notion I think has some merit 
because it did allow the city to be competitive. It had parcels. It developed 
them in ways, put in the infrastructure. So when manufacturers make that last 
minute decision that they have to expand, (they) could buy and build in a short 
period of time. But since there was so little activity in the 1980s, we were 
getting smaller rather than larger, this land sat for a period of time, quite a 
while. In the 1990s, business picked up and we had some demand. It grew. 
The first part of the 1990s is probably some of the best growth we saw in a 
while.‖ 
 
In time, land banking for the purposes of industrial and economic development 
occurred in both the city and in the suburbs. In both cases, it generally 
occurred on land that had been purchased, cleared and subsequently ‗banked‘ 
by the public sector. As one public sector leader noted, this type of investment 
felt like a pretty risky move at the time.  
 
―Had we known what we were getting ourselves into - because there were 
environmental issues and the potential that we might not be able to sell the 
property to recoup the cost of the investment - would we still do it today?  At 
the time, we saw little other options. We knew that the private sector was not 
going to invest their money into these properties. If there were going to be any 
expansions, if firms were going to expand, they were going out west, up north 
into the greenfield areas, rather than into our brownfields…So, we thought that 
in order to be able to retain businesses, we had to do a number of things like 
banking the land, and spending money on roads, water and sewer.‖ 
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Though the land banking industrial development approach does not fit cleanly 
within the parameters of the ‗Betting on the Basics‘ approach that Markusen 
and Carlson (1988) describe, it undoubtedly reflects a desire on the part of 
Milwaukee leaders to bolster employment in the troubled urban core and make 
at least this part of the region a more attractive place for large manufacturers 
to do business. Because of the risk involved - both financial and political – the 
Milwaukee region represents one of the few cases where the leadership 
adapted by taking a real chance and ‗Betting on the Basics.‘ 
 
Buffalo  
In Buffalo, ‗Betting on the Basics‘ felt a little less like a choice and more like an 
inevitable fate. Early sectoral strengths in grain storage, steel production, 
railroad and shipping commerce, automobile production and aerospace design 
and construction brought the Buffalo region great prosperity in the early 1900s. 
But all that changed during the latter half of the 20th century, as the region 
began to confront a series of formidable challenges.  
 
Among the more devastating changes was the opening of the St. Lawrence 
Seaway in 1959, which made water-based travel through Buffalo considerably 
less relevant. While Buffalo grappled with these changes in transportation 
routes, it also confronted its own problems related to the national fundamental 
economic restructuring trend. The region, which had long been dependent on 
heavy manufacturers and related industries, had to deal with a maturing steel 
industry on top of this broader economic slowdown. In the 1970s, Buffalo steel 
manufacturers were increasingly strained by foreign competition, aging 
technology, and excess capacity. Such challenges contributed to a massive, 
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and painful, restructuring across the Buffalo region‘s economy. One former 
Erie County official said of his outlook at that time,  
 
―Everybody needs steel….and for a company to start saying we are not going 
to make as much steel as we used to, we are going to cut down not only 
Buffalo, but other plants….it was pretty traumatic. Not only were the numbers 
bad in terms of layoffs and the ancillary ripple effects, it was especially 
traumatic because (we felt) something was happening and it was a hard thing 
to take.‖ 
The severity of this restructuring became abundantly clear in 1977 when 
Bethlehem Steel, a major employer in the Buffalo region, took a $740 million 
dollar write-off and shut down most of its local operations. It scaled back even 
further with a reduction of approximately 3,500 more employees in 1978.  
Within three years, Bethlehem Steel closed its foundry and twelve-inch bar mill 
operations and Republic Steel also cut about 2,500 jobs. Overall, the 1970s 
and 1980s were a time of substantial job losses in steel and manufacturing in 
general. Most of the significant losses occurred between 1979 and 1986, when 
45,000 manufacturing jobs - one-third of the manufacturing jobs in the region - 
disappeared. Unsurprisingly, unemployment for the region as a whole (9.6) ran 
significantly higher than the national average (7.6) during this time period 
(Dillaway 2006).   
Compounding the troubles of significant regional job losses in the 
manufacturing sector and high unemployment overall were the related 
problems of population outmigration, a decaying downtown, inadequate 
infrastructure, pronounced white flight to the suburbs, emerging racial 
tensions, and highly segregated schools (Ibid). From 1970 to 1980, Buffalo 
lost almost 95,000 people or 5 percent of the total population (US Census of 
Population and Housing 1970, 1980). Job losses similarly made local leaders 
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increasingly concerned about the future of steel in Buffalo and the viability of 
the Buffalo regional economy as a whole. As Kraushaar and Perry (1990) put 
it, ―…the Buffalo economy was a perfect example of a region dedicated to and 
dependent on a mature industrial base‖ (50). Despite such dependence, 
Buffalo leaders from the private and public sectors did attempt to address 
these problems in a variety of ways.  
Buffalo is an interesting case because, unlike many of the other regions in this 
study, its early leadership came largely from the public sector. As Dillaway 
notes, power often resided with the political leadership ―because elite 
organizations did not provide proactive leadership in Buffalo‘s political and 
economic debates‖ (2006, 133). Though all of that would change in the late 
1980s, much of the early response to deindustrialization was indeed crafted by 
local politicians. Among the most influential strategies employed was the 
commissioning of a study - ―Buffalo Area Economic Readjustment Strategy‖ - 
by Arthur D. Little Consultants in 1978. The report card-like study was 
commissioned by the Erie County Industrial Development Authority (ECIDA) 
and supported by Mayor Griffin, who wanted to provide leaders with a 
framework for moving forward. A former economic development official had 
this to say about the study‘s findings: 
―It found over-concentration in steel and found some real problems in terms of 
labor-management relations. We were a union town, lots of negative 
implications…and a lot of strike problems that were giving the area a bad 
reputation. We had a very fragmented economic development scene with 
multiple agencies sometimes working at cross-purposes or too many people 
trying to do the same thing without any coordination. So the report card was 
pretty stark in terms of (Buffalo) being on a bad road and not terribly well-
equipped to deal with it… A plan for attempting to deal with it came out of (this 
report), which really became the blueprint for economic development over the 
next 15 years or so.‖  
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One of main the findings from the study was the recommendation that local 
leaders essentially write off the ailing steel industry and focus instead on 
retaining other, primarily industrial firms that were still active in the regional 
economy. The end goal of the study was to make the region self-sufficient by 
guiding it through long-term changes in its basic economic structure. The 
study provided recommendations for how the ECIDA could reach out and 
assist the firms that were experiencing difficulties as well as firms who were 
considering expansion. Because only Erie County, and not Niagara County, 
was part of ECIDA‘s jurisdiction, responses crafted in regards to the Arthur D. 
Little study primarily pertained to Erie County and the city of Buffalo. A former 
head of the ECIDA described this assistance process. 
―We had a staff of four and their job was to knock on doors…The goal was to 
call on every single company every two years and explain to them what we 
could offer to try to get things going. When you called on a company, you 
uncovered one of two things. One is that you uncover retention problems with 
companies at risk, either ready to take flight or disinvest. At least you can get 
them on your watch list and start dealing with them. The second thing is that 
you find the ones that, given the right incentives or given the right means of 
correcting some of the diseconomies they were facing in the Buffalo area, 
might actually put a shovel in the ground and expand.‖ 
This focus on retention strategies was one of the many ways in which the 
Arthur D. Little study influenced local decisions during the late 1970s and early 
1980s. In a sense, the authors of the study recommended that the region try to 
adapt by ‗turning the corner‘ from the rigidity of the conservation phase into the 
creative destruction of release. However, making this transition was not an 
easy task for regional leaders, as evidenced by their inability to ‗turn the 
corner.‘ 
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Another important development that stemmed from the study‘s 
recommendations was the creation of the Buffalo-Erie County Labor 
Management Council. Again, this effort was primarily focused on Buffalo and 
Erie County, not Niagara Falls or Niagara County. The group was formed 
largely in response to the tremendous ongoing problems between labor and 
management in the Buffalo region. As a former member of the council 
describes,  
―The council was created to attempt to deal with the union situation, the large 
number of strikes, the labor-management animosity that was present in town, 
the reputation that the Buffalo area had for being a heavy union town. If you 
were going to come and do business there you better be prepared to take a 
strike every once in a while and deal with it. The council‘s charge was to get in 
the middle of sensitive labor-management issues as neither management nor 
labor, but as an independent entity affiliated loosely with the ECIDA; someone 
who could just be an independent broker and arbiter. It was also an attempt to 
get more settlements without strikes and to attempt to change the reputation 
of the area.‖ 
Despite such lofty goals, the group was marginally successful at mediating a 
number of strikes and settling several major grievances (Dillaway 2006, 117). 
Interviewees, however, frequently made note of the lingering challenges 
associated with a heavily-unionized economy.  
Beyond the ECIDA, numerous other public sector players also weighed in with 
their own economic development responses. One of the most visible 
responses came from City Hall, when Mayor Griffin formed the Buffalo-Erie 
County Regional Development Corporation in 1978. This group, largely 
consisting of community development professionals, was designed to be a 
lending corporation that would give the public sector the ability to support 
innovative business initiatives in Buffalo. More importantly, the formation of 
this corporation was an important step towards creating a public-private 
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partnership and bringing business leaders into the fold. One interviewee, a 
former state economic development official described the need for private 
sector involvement. 
―We pulled together the steel companies…we did a lot of that stuff. But really 
we couldn‘t get a lot going. It was an investment issue. The public sector was 
really willing to do a lot but we needed the private sector.‖ 
Ongoing efforts amongst the business community ended up being an 
important part of the Buffalo story, especially in light of a significant shift that 
occurred amongst the regional leadership in the late 1970s. The shift occurred 
in part because of an infusion of new leaders who came from outside of the 
region and were highly entrepreneurial (Perry 1990). Amongst the newcomers 
were Ross Kensie, brought in to head Goldome Bank; Stanford Lipsey, 
publisher of the Buffalo Evening News; and Robert Wilmers, head of M and T 
Bank. These three joined with other members of the business elite to form the 
Buffalo 18, a powerful group of executives who worked together to assume 
control of the Greater Buffalo Development Foundation, a smallish group of 
business leaders; the Chamber of Commerce; and various other local groups. 
Members included heads of all the major regional banks, manufacturers, and 
service sector firms. In total, the Buffalo 18 included 17 CEOs and the 
president of the region‘s largest university (ibid). A former Director of the 
Western New York Economic Development Corporation (WNYEDC) said that, 
―With the Gang of 18, you knew you were dealing with a powerful group. 
When they made up their mind on something, it usually happened. You could 
only be in this group if you could be counted on to make things happen.‖ 
Ultimately, the group did make things happen, primarily by infiltrating the 
boards of various local organizations and funding the recruitment of key 
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personnel from outside the region. Such maneuvers were useful in the sense 
that they helped formulate the critical mass needed to devise a plan to move 
the region forward. Implementation of this plan, however, was not entirely 
successful.  
Collaborating with this group were certain state government officials and select 
elected officials. The WNYEDC was an important part of the recovery strategy, 
providing project assistance, industrial modernization and targeting clusters 
that had the potential of being globally competitive (Kossy 1996). At this point 
in time, cluster analysis focused primarily on a burgeoning medical corridor 
and leveraging some local assets for tourism development. For the most part, 
WNYEDC provided long-term strategic planning for the regional economy as a 
whole and helped guide the development process for certain larger projects. 
These types of larger projects, including waterfront development and a mass 
transit line, were generally considered embarrassing failures and did little to 
help the region‘s recovery process. Even with support from the nation‘s first 
Urban Development Action Grant and millions of dollars in Community 
Development Block Grants, the results did little to change or disrupt the 
region‘s trajectory.  
In the end, most of these valiant efforts did little to help Buffalo, and to some 
extent the region as a whole, gain traction. Alternative approaches seemed 
implausible as efforts to attract outside firms proved unsuccessful. Retention 
strategies were slightly more effective but generally not productive enough to 
stave off decline. Ultimately, the challenges facing Buffalo were larger than 
anyone had previously thought. A former city official in the Department of ED 
summarized it best when he said: 
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―The manufacturing and durable industries were restructuring and the plants in 
Buffalo were old and inefficient. The workforce was inefficient. Buffalo was 
going through a long period of structural economic decline. It was cold. It 
wasn‘t an attractive location. That was kind of the longer term challenge.‖ 
Indeed, these longer term challenges continue today. Buffalo remains a region 
that has struggled greatly to adapt to the challenges of the late 20th and early 
21st centuries. Its retention-based strategy – ‗Betting on the Basics‘ – was not 
enough to counter the region‘s massive industrial restructuring, move the 
region beyond the conservation and release phases, or improve the negative 
image of Buffalo as a whole.  
 
Cleveland  
Cleveland‘s early rise to prominence as a center of industry revolved around 
its strategic location at the nexus of the Cuyahoga River and Lake Erie. 
Beyond transportation, early strengths were all things steel with a focus on 
primary metals, fabricated metals, non-electrical machinery, electrical 
machinery, and transportation equipment. Like so many other manufacturing-
intensive regions, the Cleveland economy underwent significant restructuring 
in the latter half of the 20th century. Cleveland began confronting significant 
challenges in the 1950s, many of which would continue through the 1980s and 
beyond. Between 1967 and 1977, one in seven manufacturing lobs was lost 
(Rand 1982, 7). Continuing challenges resulted in a loss of nearly 18,000 
manufacturing jobs between 1976 and 1984 alone (Krumholz and Forrester 
1990, 16).  The biggest losses were seen in primary metals, electrical and 
nonelectrical machinery, and transportation equipment (Rand 1982). Increases 
in non-manufacturing employment helped to counter these losses but many of 
these new jobs were in lower paying positions. Overall, non-manufacturing 
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employment growth contributed to a slight increase in total employment but 
growth occurred at a much slower rate than the national average.   
 
The Cleveland region also confronted major demographic changes during this 
time period. Up until the 1970s, population had continually grown at a 
moderate pace. Intra-region population shifts accounted for some population 
losses in the inner core but growth in the suburbs generally was enough to 
offset any losses seen in the inner city. Total population losses began during 
the 1970s when the Cleveland metropolitan area lost about 150,000 people, or 
6.5% of its total population. Outmigration continued through the 1980s, when 
another 68,000 people left the region. Population for the region would stabilize 
in the 1990s but has not recovered to its peak level of 1970.   
 
Early warnings of economic restructuring combined with ongoing population 
outmigration in the 1970s and 1980s caused growing concern for Cleveland‘s 
leaders. In 1982, regional leaders were so concerned with these emerging 
problems that The Cleveland Foundation commissioned an assessment of 
economic and population trends by The Rand Corporation. Entitled, ―The 
Cleveland Metropolitan Economy: An Initial Assessment‖, the report‘s purpose 
was to gain ―a better understanding of how the metropolitan Cleveland 
economy works, what it special role has been in the U.S. economy, and how it 
has been responding to a changing economic environment‖ (Rand 1982, iii). In 
the Executive Summary of this assessment, the authors optimistically describe 
a changing Cleveland economy. 
 
―Cleveland‘s slow rate of total employment growth does not necessarily 
suggest a stagnant regional economy. The more detailed figures indicate only 
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that the Cleveland metropolitan economy is a mature but still quite dynamic 
economic system‖ (9).   
 
The authors specifically point to the slowing of steel manufacturing as 
evidence of a maturing economy for the region as a whole, adding that many 
of the more recent challenges also stem from the region‘s close ties to the 
automobile industry. Much of the early economic growth in Cleveland was 
linked to the automobile industry because the region‘s steel mills sold most of 
their output to automobile production firms. Still, the Rand report showed that 
Cleveland was less sensitive to fluctuations in the automobile industry than 
other metropolitan regions like Pittsburgh and Indianapolis (Rand 1982). 
Though the authors admit that Cleveland‘s economy in the 1970s was not all 
that diverse, ―Cleveland production serving other markets cushioned the 
shocks of swings in demand from the automobile sector‖ (Ibid, 14).  
 
To the extent that this diversity may have lessened the blows of cyclical 
fluctuations in the economy, such cushioning may have also masked the 
emerging challenges that Cleveland would soon confront as a result of 
widespread economic restructuring. Unlike other regions where manufacturing 
losses were sudden and sharp, Cleveland‘s early losses were less severe. As 
such, leaders had less incentive to consider alternative development 
scenarios. One economic development official with the City of Cleveland 
recalled an over-arching commitment to a ‗Betting on the Basics‘- type 
economic development response.  
 
―I think at that time we were still hoping to hold onto the heavy industrial 
pattern of the past: steel, metal bending (particularly in automobiles), tool and 
die work, chemicals, paints, varnishes … Those were the older industries that 
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had been very productive in the past and the city was still trying to hold its 
place with those industries.‖  
 
Interviewees frequently described how early response efforts did in fact align 
with a ‗Betting on the Basics‘ approach, focusing largely on retaining 
manufacturing firms in the region. However, as one former council member 
described, losses seen in the steel industry indicated that this approach was 
not working. 
 
―By the late 1970s, it was apparent that we were losing industries. I think in 
the early 1970s we had four steel manufacturing facilities: US Steel, Jones 
and Laughlin, New Republic‘s world headquarters, and one other. Early in the 
1970s, two of them closed down or merged, so we began to lose jobs in steel. 
We were very conscious of the local loss of population and we were 
increasingly very conscious of the fact that the existing population was very 
poor. We weren‘t helping anyone by trying to hold onto these dying facilities.‖ 
 
And so it was around this time that support grew for a more progressive 
approach to economic development. Calls for an equity-driven approach came 
largely from the City of Cleveland Planning Commission.  The Commission 
during this time period advocated ―not for the business community but for 
‗those people in Cleveland who had few if any choices,‘ for poor and working-
class city residents‖ (Krumholz and Forester 1990, xix). Because their work 
was so focused on advocating for the disenfranchised, the Commission‘s 
efforts were largely focused on the city of Cleveland specifically. The 
Commission was successful in many of their efforts, in part because their 
equity-based approach aligned closely with the political progressivism seen 
throughout Cleveland‘s history. During the 1970s and early 1980s, the 
Commission made it their goal to provide employment opportunities for 
residents so that they could feed their children, provide transportation for 
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residents to get to their jobs, and ensure that affordable housing was available 
to rent or buy.  
 
The Commission‘s efforts were by no means an official representation of the 
region‘s approach as a whole, but their highly visible and often successful 
initiatives made them a major player at the decision-making table and ensured 
that the ‗Sharing the Wealth‘ approach was at least heard. Beyond the 
Planning Commission, the corporations, and city government officials, other 
important stakeholders include suburban, regional and state representatives, 
as well as union officials.  
 
The suburbs, and the region as a whole for that matter, undoubtedly saw 
things from a different perspective. As one suburban county planner noted, 
outer portions of the region were experiencing changes of a different sort.  
 
―We, in the suburbs, were doing pretty well. We were the recipients of most of 
the outmigration and disinvestment that was taking place in the city. Until very 
recently, the suburbs… were not suffering from many of the problems that the 
city was suffering from. In general, the income in suburban jurisdictions was 
substantially higher than in the city.‖   
 
Though this interviewee does not mention it, racial disparity within the region 
was also on the rise. As outmigration was occurring, so too was a region-wide 
racial sorting of the population. While the population moved outward to the 
more prosperous suburbs, minorities remained in the central city.  
 
Though they were far removed from the everyday challenges of the inner city, 
suburban constituents with jobs in the central city still cared that the region as 
a whole remained strong and stable. Similar to the response seen in 
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Milwaukee, one of the main regional development efforts to come out of this 
time period was the development of a land bank, which would allow the city to 
take title of, and subsequently land-bank, tax-delinquent and abandoned 
properties.  Creation of the land bank required changing local, county and 
state laws.  Interviewees noted that such changes would not have been 
possible without the formation of a regional effort. A planner from Cuyahoga 
County said that,  
 
―Coalitions were very important for setting up a land bank. We had to study 
the problem of tax abandonment and change the state law on the ownership 
of real estate and you don‘t do that without a coalition. We set up a coalition 
both across the state and across region to accomplish that. None of this would 
have been done without region-wide support.‖  
 
In the end, the Cleveland region exhibited an interesting, and multi-faceted 
response to deindustrialization. After experiencing low levels of manufacturing 
job losses, the region slowly began to respond to the impending restructuring. 
Region-wide, early efforts aligned most closely with the ‗Betting on the Basics‘ 
approach, marked by a strong commitment to retaining existing heavy industry 
and remaining in the conservation phase. Later efforts, primarily in the city, 
coalesced around the issue of equity, and the creation of an economy and a 
community that was more accessible to all of Cleveland‘s residents.  
 
Conclusions 
Though their experiences varied substantially and all had different assets and 
opportunities at the start, all three case study regions (as well as Detroit) 
chose to place their bets primarily on manufacturing by ‗Betting on the Basics.‘ 
In each region, the gamble had a slightly different outcome; however, in the 
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end, none would be considered an obvious success. From these case studies 
emerge a series of observations about similarities across these regions and 
ruminations on the effectiveness of ‗Betting on the Basics‘ in response to 
deindustrialization. Observations and lessons follow below.  
Common Regional Characteristics 
Together, with supporting quantitative data, these conversations aided in the 
identification of three common characteristics across these three regions and 
in Detroit. First, findings suggest that all of these regions were heavily 
dependent on manufacturing both psychologically and economically. Although 
we already know from Table 2 that these three regions were most dependent 
on manufacturing as a percent of total employment, the numbers say little, if 
anything, about the nature of that dependence. Interviewees from these three 
regions frequently described a situation in which regional leaders (and their 
constituents) had difficulty envisioning an economy that did not rely on 
manufacturing as their region‘s primary economic base. In other words, 
leaders found it difficult to either personally envision a future that moved away 
from such dependence or convince their constituents, customers or 
employees of such an alternative future. Though that may have been the case 
in some of the other cases in this multi-N study, it is true for all of the regions 
that ultimately subscribed to the ‗Betting on the Basics‘ ideology.   
Second, all of these regions, with the exception of Milwaukee, were heavily 
dependent on manufacturing jobs of a certain type: steel production and 
bending. For many interviewees, being so entwined in the fate of one 
particular sector of manufacturing was significant; it often created a sense of 
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community and brought with it the understanding that most families‘ wellbeing 
would rise and fall with the success of the steel industry. Hourly wages were 
much higher for steel production than other manufacturing jobs: 14.04 versus 
8.33 dollars per hour in 1978, respectively (Crandall 1981, 90). Thus, many of 
these regions faced great difficulty when the global steel market collapsed 
during the mid- to late-1970s in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis and an 
increasingly saturated market for steel. As a result of this collapse, many steel 
mills in the United States Rust Belt were shuttered and many jobs were lost. 
Thus, for many Rust Belt regions, the decline of steel production and the loss 
of so many of these high-paying jobs would become the defining feature of 
their regional economy in the 1970s and 1980s. It seems fitting then that the 
majority of the regions who experienced such extreme losses might react 
similarly, in this case by ‗Betting on the Basics.‘  
Third, all of these regions are located on the shores of one of the Great Lakes 
and none are their state‘s capital. Though it is beyond the scope of this study 
to determine whether there is a relationship between shorelines and economic 
growth, it seems plausible that those regions that share a border with one of 
the Great Lakes might experience higher levels of lake effect snowfall and 
lower levels of desirability or longer and deeper histories of heavy industry as 
a result. Without specifying causation, it‘s worth noting that all of the regions 
who elected to ‗Bet on the Basics‘ are located on one of these lakes. All of 
these regions are also non-capital cities, meaning that their labor markets 
might be less diverse and less stable than their capital counterparts, where 
state government employment and capital act as a buffer against economic 
challenges (Markusen 1996). Determining causation in this regard is again 
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beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, establishing this link between 
these traits and the propensity to ‗Bet on the Basics‘ may prove useful in future 
research.  
 
Lessons Learned 
Turning now towards lessons we might draw from these case studies, two 
main points emerge. The first is that ‗Betting on the Basics‘, despite Markusen 
and Carlson‘s prediction, generally did not bode well for the regions that 
subscribed to it. Detroit, Milwaukee, Buffalo, and Cleveland all suffered greatly 
as deindustrialization unfolded and in the years that followed. Though some of 
these regions fared better than others and certain manufacturing corporations 
successfully weathered the storm, this approach as a whole did not benefit 
regions in the way that it was predicted to. Perhaps in anticipation of this 
potential disappointing outcome, Markusen and Carlson (1988) offered a 
warning about the difficulty in successfully executing this retention-based 
approach: ―Any retention strategy which works will have to tackle the reticence 
of many Midwestern manufacturers to revamp their labor relations systems, to 
develop strategic planning, to engage in technological experimentation, and to 
market aggressively‖ (33).  In Markusen and Carlson‘s opinion then, it is 
perhaps not the fault of the regions for choosing to ‗Bet on the Basics‘ so 
much as it is the fault of the corporations for not adjusting to new economic 
realities. Nevertheless, the outcomes were not generally good for these 
regions or the firms that called them home. 
 
Second, analysis of these interviews and related data suggest that the ‗Betting 
on the Basics‘ approach was not often associated with adaptive resilience or 
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with ‗good outcomes.‘ As Pendall, et al. (2010) reminds us, a reed is generally 
most resilient, or least breakable, when it bends. Likewise, adaptive resilience 
theory tells us that a region should experience the greatest levels of resilience 
when it, as a system, exhibits flexibility in a time of great flux. Flexible would 
not be the most appropriate way to describe the process of change in Detroit, 
Milwaukee, Buffalo, or Cleveland. To be certain, each of these regions did 
attempt to bend in their own way. Detroit activists tried to change the direction 
of economic development funding and prioritize a more equitable approach to 
development. In Buffalo, we saw the commissioning of the Arthur D. Little 
study and the formation of the Buffalo-Erie County Labor Management 
Council. In Cleveland, leaders working in the City of Cleveland Planning 
Commission fought diligently for transportation and employment opportunities 
to support the disenfranchised. And in Milwaukee, leaders came up with a 
creative solution to encourage development in the urban core. In the end, 
however, all four of these regions are known less for their progressive ideals 
or their creative solutions, than they are for their failure to adjust to the new 
realities of the post-industrial economy. If flexibility is indeed a positive 
attribute that is necessary for adaptive resilience and ‗good outcomes‘, we can 
be fairly certain that these four regions did little in the way of encouraging it. 
By ‗Betting on the Basics‘, these regions either ignored calls to diversify their 
economic base or lacked the tools and assets necessary to do so. For most of 
these regions, ‗Betting on the Basics‘ (either by default or by choice) created 
an inflexible reed that ultimately made adaptation and ‗good outcomes‘ a lot 
more difficult  to achieve in the years to come.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
Turning the Corner – Indianapolis, Cincinnati, Columbus and Pittsburgh 
 
In the face of an unfolding challenge like deindustrialization, many regions 
chose to stick with what they knew either because it felt safe, seemed easiest 
or was thought to be the only option available. In Buffalo, Detroit, Cleveland 
and Milwaukee, leaders did just that – they stuck with what they knew and 
chose to ‗Bet on the Basics.‘ For other regions – namely, Cincinnati, 
Columbus, Indianapolis, and Pittsburgh – that had both the will and the means 
to take a different approach, regional leaders took steps to consciously move 
beyond what was easiest or what was familiar in hopes of reaching a better 
outcome. For the most part, doing so meant looking for alternatives to ‗Betting 
on the Basics‘ by either ‗Bowing Out‘, ‗Bidding Down‘, or ‗Sharing the Wealth.‘ 
For some of these regions, betting on these alternative approaches did pay off 
and the regional response to deindustrialization was favorable. In others, 
regional outcomes were not as positive. The goal of this chapter is to increase 
our understanding of how these four remaining regions arrived at their 
decisions to, by and large, not ‗Bet on the Basics‘, and explore the extent to 
which doing so helped or hindered their region‘s future prospects.  
 
To be fair, regions do not always fit neatly within one box or another; many of 
the regional responses observed in the cases below may loosely apply to one 
or more categories. In some cases, a region‘s response fit relatively well within 
one single category, as was the case in Buffalo and Detroit (‗Betting on the 
Basics‘) as well as in Cincinnati, Columbus and Pittsburgh (‗Bowing Out‘). Still 
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for other regions –Cleveland, Indianapolis and Milwaukee – the appropriate 
response was not so set in stone, and more than one type of response was 
observed. In such cases, a hierarchy is easily identified; that is to say that 
though each region may have responded in more than one way, one response 
type generally took precedence as the overarching approach. In Chapter 6, we 
saw elements of ‗Sharing the Wealth‘ in Cleveland‘s response to 
deindustrialization, however, ‗Betting on the Basics‘ clearly emerged as the 
dominant agenda. As we will see in the discussion of Indianapolis below, 
‗Betting on the Basics‘ was clearly utilized but ‗Bowing Out‘ also played a role 
in the region‘s economic development response. 
 
Chapter 7 starts with a brief introduction to the regions, their economies, and 
the processes by which they crafted their respective responses. I then discuss 
similarities and differences amongst this mixed group of regional responses. I 
then conclude the chapter with a series of lessons that we can draw from both 
the data collected and from subsequent analysis.  
 
 
The Regions – Indianapolis, Cincinnati, Columbus, and Pittsburgh 
 
In contrast to the case study regions discussed in Chapter 6, the regions 
discussed below all crafted a response that emphasized something other than 
‗Betting on the Basics.‘ Though elements of ‗Betting on the Basics‘ are 
observed in some of the cases discussed below, these four regions are 
grouped together in this chapter because they all ultimately opted to move 
beyond a recreation of their region‘s industrial past. In a sense, leaders in 
Indianapolis, Cincinnati, Columbus, and Pittsburgh tried to ‗turn the corner‘ in 
hopes of better preparing their regions for the uncertainty of a post-industrial 
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economy. The process by which they arrived at this decision, and the extent to 
which their responses worked well for each region, will be the focus of this 
section. We begin first with Indianapolis, a region whose response once 
looked like ‗Betting on the Basics‘ but changed over time to include the 
hallmark techniques of ‗Bowing Out.‘ 
 
Indianapolis  
Indianapolis, surprisingly, was a hotspot for automobile production in the early 
20th century. Though that sector would fade to oblivion in the 1930s, it does 
help to explain the relatively strong manufacturing roots of the Indianapolis 
region. Despite being one of the more geographically peripheral Rust Belt 
regions of this study, the Indianapolis metropolitan region of the early 1980s 
looked a lot like the other regions than one might expect. In fact, 
manufacturing had always made up a significant portion of the region‘s 
economic base; along with health care, software and telecommunications, the 
Indianapolis region placed great emphasis on the retention of firms related to 
industrial automation, instrumentation and test equipment, and consumer 
electronics during the 1970s (Hudnut 1995, 77).  Despite looking a lot like a 
strategy to ‗Bet on the Basics‘, the region ultimately shifted gears enough so 
that the region would actually be defined by its efforts to ‗Bow Out.‘ Before we 
begin any discussion of this important transition, it‘s first necessary to take a 
step back and examine the unique features of the Indianapolis region. 
 
One of the characteristics that makes the Indianapolis case so interesting is 
the existence of Unigov, the consolidated city-county government that 
represents the City of Indianapolis and Marion County. The movement to 
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create Unigov began in the late 1960s, when Mayor Richard Lugar developed 
a plan to reduce duplication in services between the city and county 
governments. Unigov was created on January 1, 1970 by an act of the Indiana 
state legislature that allowed Indianapolis to expand its boundaries so that it 
encompassed the majority of Marion County. This expansion allowed for the 
elimination of many duplicated services and created the City-County Council. 
Though Unigov is generally not considered a uniform success, a 1995 study 
suggested that Unigov did enhance the effectiveness of economic 
development strategy involving public subsidization for private development 
(Blomquist and Parks 1995). Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, the 
mere existence of Unigov suggests that the region is not averse to innovative 
or more regional approaches to government. Even though Unigov does not 
represent a truly regional approach to governance – many of the suburban 
communities and counties are noticeably excluded – the merging of these two 
entities indicates a propensity to look for solutions beyond the urban core.  
 
Further supporting this interest in a broader agenda was a regional non-
aggression pact that most of the local governments agreed to. One former 
mayor of a suburban community noted that,  
 
―There wasn‘t a whole lot being done as a region. But one thing we did do was 
sign a non-aggression pact, whereby we said we would not try to cannibalize 
your prospect just so we can get the tax base in our city. The problem is that 
so many cities chase ratables, chase tax bases… So we signed an agreement 
with Unigov and many neighboring suburbs saying that, ‗If you‘ve got an ED 
prospect, we aren‘t going to try and raid it and jack up the sweeteners just so 
we can get it and you don‘t. We are going to respect each other to promote 
ED for the whole of the region.‘‖  
 
Such an arrangement undoubtedly played an important role in the deciding 
how to respond to the stresses seen as a result of industrial restructuring in 
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the late 1970s and early 1980s. As the region grappled with losses in 
manufacturing, they began to look to other industries for economic growth. 
Attraction strategies were an influential component of this transition in terms of 
economic development response. Knowing that this non-aggression pact 
would prevent inter-regional competition allowed for a more regional response 
to economic restructuring. 
 
The story of economic restructuring in Indianapolis is an interesting one. As 
one former mayor of Indianapolis noted, the automobile industry had been an 
important part of the industrial base in the mid-20th century. In 1913, 
Indianapolis ranked second in the United States in automobile production. 
Since then, however, the industrial base has become highly diversified.   
 
―We were pretty sanguine about the economic situation. We understood the 
importance of diversity. We had started as an automobile town. And then, 
because of the bankers‘ hardening of the arteries, the auto companies moved 
to Detroit. By the 1970s we were pretty well diversified.‖ 
 
Though it might not have felt like it at the time, an Indianapolis businessman 
noted that this ‗hardening of the arteries‘ may have been a blessing in 
disguise. 
 
―When the auto jobs began to leave town, we knew that we had to do 
something. In fact, even before they officially left, we had reason to believe 
that these shops weren‘t going to stay around forever. We didn‘t ignore this 
bad news. Instead, we tried to figure out other ways for Indianapolis to get 
ahead. Now, we know that we were lucky. We really dodged a bullet.‖  
 
Avoiding the plight of other over-specialized Midwestern regions, public sector 
leaders in the Indianapolis region took early and swift actions to diversify their 
economy and move towards reorganization. Rather than clinging to 
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automobile manufacturing or the other heavy industries that had been 
mainstays in the past, Indianapolis leaders chose an approach that most 
closely aligns with the ‗Bowing Out‘ approach to economic development. Early 
efforts to reorganize the regional economy emphasized business attraction, 
indigenous entrepreneurship, and sports-based development strategies.  
 
While the business attraction and entrepreneurship approaches were certainly 
useful to the Indianapolis economy, it is the sports-based development for 
which the region is best known. A former economic development specialist for 
UNIGOV pointed out that ―We embarked on this sports strategy not as an end 
in itself but as a means to an end of economic development.‖ In other words, 
the cultivation of sports-based development in Indianapolis was designed to 
complement the regional economy, rather than be the foundation on which 
everything else rested. Important components of this approach include the 
successful attraction of the Indianapolis Colts NFL team from Baltimore and 
continued loyalty of the NBA‘s Indiana Pacers, the construction of a downtown 
stadium and convention center, and the expansion of the Indianapolis Motor 
Speedway, which is home to the Indianapolis 500. As one former mayor notes, 
such moves were highly strategic. 
 
―When we built the downtown stadium, it was the first time in the country that 
a stadium had been yoked into a convention center. And our determination 
was that we weren‘t going to build this out in a cornfield somewhere so that 
they can only play 12 days a year. We‘re going to make this an asset with a 
convention center...When the Colts finally came in 1984 that was icing on the 
cake. That was nice for me because politically there was a hell of a lot of risk 
building a big stadium that seats 62,000 people … without a team to play 
there. After it was announced that the Colts were coming, downtown really 
perked up again. 
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To be certain, the sports-based approach has resulted in substantial gains for 
the Indianapolis region. A 1994 study found that Indianapolis is a unique case 
in that it was the only American city where the presence of professional sports 
teams exerted a ―statistically significant, positive impact on the metro area 
economy‖ (Baade, 19). Baade (1994) attributes the positive impact to a 
combination of things, including the statewide tradition of sports involvement, 
the relatively small size of the region, and the ―city‘s commitment to defining 
itself as America‘s sports capital, particularly for amateur sports‖ (Ibid, 19).   
 
As these formidable investments imply, capturing the tourism and convention 
market was an active strategy pursued by city and regional leadership in the 
1970s and 1980s. As Swindell, et al. (1995) suggest, ―The city‘s leadership 
had decided to change the image of Indianapolis through an extensive 
amateur sports emphasis that was joined with a downtown revitalization 
program. Together, sports and a new downtown were going to change 
Indianapolis‘s image and improve economic development‖ (143). Building on 
the nearly century-long success of the Indianapolis 500, the region has 
actively transitioned to become a sports destination for events like the Super 
Bowl, NCAA Basketball Final Four, and regular games for the Colts and the 
Pacers, among others. Attracting conventions has also been another regional 
strategy put forth by local leaders. The Indianapolis region has also played 
host to numerous meetings including the Future Farmers of America (FFA) 
and Gen Con, a role-playing game convention.  
 
Nevertheless, the sports-based development strategy has not been foolproof, 
especially in the long run. Numerous interviewees described today‘s 
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Indianapolis as a region experiencing pronounced challenges. A former 
Marion County economic development official noted that many of the problems 
they had avoided in the past are now beginning to rear their ugly heads. 
 
―I think we are now struggling to maintain the core….The problem is the 
people who have been moving to the suburbs, they suck the vitality out. We 
aren‘t as bad as Pittsburgh is. But throughout the Rust Belt, you‘ve got that 
same problem of people leaving. Whether or not they are going to return or if 
there is going to be an influx of new people, remains to be seen… the wealth 
and the power was moving out to the wealthier, cleaner suburbs….What can 
we do to keep people in town? I think we need to improve amenities and city 
services... It‘s a never ending fight for urban America to compete with the 
suburban dream.‖ 
 
Like so many of the other regions included in this study, the Indianapolis 
regional economy continues to struggle. In this case, however, the problem is 
less about the region‘s economic legacy than it is about classic centrifugal 
forces pulling people and jobs outward. When compared to these other cases, 
it actually seems that Indianapolis has experienced a fair amount of success. 
Whether this success is the direct result of the region‘s unique approach to 
economic development or some other factor is a question that remains 
unanswered. Nevertheless, it seems that the Indianapolis leaders‘ conscious 
decision to adapt by moving away from ‗Betting on the Basics‘ and towards a 
‗Bowing Out‘ approach likely a played a prominent role in determining this 
region‘s comparatively healthy economic path.  
   
Cincinnati  
Cincinnati‘s regional economy saw significant growth in the production of pork, 
beer, soap, machine tools, and carriages during the early 20th century 
(Stradling 2003). Though the breweries and carriage production would largely 
taper off, firms specializing in meatpacking, soap-making, and machine tool 
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production would continue to fuel the regional economy through much of the 
20th century. Cincinnati, which at one point was nicknamed Porkopolis, was 
the central processing point for pig farmers in Ohio, Indiana and beyond. Pigs 
would be brought into the region to be processed and packaged for shipment 
to other parts of the country. Incidentally, soap-making began as a way of 
utilizing the lard by-product from pork processing. One of Cincinnati‘s most 
important corporations – Procter and Gamble – initially began as a soap 
manufacturing firm in 1837. As one former city councilmember said, it remains 
one of the region‘s most powerful and productive firms today. 
 
―P and G is the key company. The things P and G wants, it gets…It‘s a very 
thoughtful company and, fortunately, an enlightened company with great 
leadership. The community benefits from that.‖ 
 
Because of its rather diverse assortment of industrial strengths, Cincinnati was 
not as dependent on heavy industry as the other case study regions. One 
former business leader in the region described how this diversity affected the 
region. 
 
―We never really felt wholly dependent on one corporation or one sector. 
Looking back, I don‘t think we realized how lucky we were to not be the auto 
town or the steel town. We definitely struggled in our own way but it probably 
wasn‘t as bad as it could have been.‖ 
 
So, as other regions grappled with severe losses in heavy industry, Cincinnati 
buried its head and plodded forward. An industrial base rooted in consumer 
goods and transportation helped the region to weather the stormy 1980s 
recessions. The region did, however, contend with many of the same land use 
problems as the other case study regions. During the mid-20th century, many 
of Cincinnati‘s largest companies moved outward from the urban core in 
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search of larger plots of land for their single-story plants. Even though the 
region felt fewer effects as a result of economic restructuring during the late 
1970s and early 1980s, it still felt the effects of the national recessions and 
grappled with an outward dispersion of people and capital. As one former 
county commissioner noted, these centrifugal forces created an acrimonious 
political environment. 
 
―The central county was decreasing while the outlying counties were growing 
bigger. The city was in competition with the rest of the county. The county 
commissioners were seen as anti-city and pro- part of the county. That was a 
real problem because we couldn‘t get a whole lot done and we didn‘t always 
cooperate.‖ 
 
In spite of these difficulties, leaders in the central city did make an effort to 
respond to unfolding challenges, namely a decaying downtown and a 
hollowing out of the inner core. A former mayor during the early 1980s 
described one such effort.  
 
―About that time, we commissioned a study called Cincinnati 2000. It was a 
ULI study that we commissioned to recommend to us what we should do 
about our core area... It urged us to concentrate on downtown living. We sort 
of ran afoul of the corporate chamber attitude, which was that we ought to 
continue to be a shopping destination and that we ought to be building more 
office buildings and maybe a few people would live downtown. I think the ULI 
had it correct.‖ 
 
During the 1980s, as leaders grappled with abandonment in the downtown 
area, tensions grew between those who supported downtown living, those who 
desired downtown shopping, and those who wanted to ignore the downtown 
and focus on booming suburban areas instead. The Cincinnati 2000 plan, 
which urged support for increased residential opportunities downtown, never 
really gained full support from the region‘s leadership. Instead, the idea to 
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make downtown a shopping destination won out. For better or worse, financial 
support was given to department stores, hotel developments and a convention 
center in the downtown area. In 1981, $6 million dollars were used to bring a 
500-room Hyatt Regency hotel near the expanded convention center. Despite 
such significant investment, interviewees described disappointing outcomes. A 
local business executive told of the many ways in which these investments 
came up short. 
 
―We maintain the fiction that we still are a downtown shopping destination. In 
retrospect, [I think] we spent too much time … trying to continue to be the 
downtown shopping destination and ignoring the reality of suburban shopping 
centers. We spent a lot of our public money subsidizing money in the Urban 
Development funds and all the rest, trying to make department stores work 
and trying to make downtown malls work.‖ 
 
In the end, a lot of time, energy and money were invested in downtown 
development and comparatively little was invested in responding to changes in 
the broader economy. In some ways, Cincinnati leaders‘ decision to ‗Bow Out‘ 
actually looks more like a non-response; local leaders were not all that 
concerned with retaining heavy industry or creating a business-friendly 
environment. To the extent that they actively pursued any strategy at all, 
Cincinnati leaders seemed at least peripherally concerned with stewarding the 
newer, high-tech firms of the late 20th century. During the early 1980s, leaders 
made a relatively modest attempt to craft a vision for how this adaptation might 
unfold. The former mayor described this effort.  
 
―I got some funding for a weekend conference out of town, 30 miles up the 
way in a place called Kings Island in the dead of winter. We had 100 people… 
representing a cross section of the community. From Friday night until 
Sunday, we doodled about what‘s good, what‘s bad, and what do we need to 
do. What are our goals and so forth. Some of the business-types that I asked 
to help fund this were very weary… In any event, we had some ideological 
cross section too. People talked about racism, employment and healthcare. At 
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the end of the two days we also said, we need to talk about economic 
development because without economic development, we can‘t drive all the 
rest of it ...‖ 
 
Though very little came of the event in terms of policy change or collective 
decision-making, the mayor later described how the meeting helped in other 
ways. 
 
―It was important that we had everyone in the room. Though I was 
disappointed that we weren‘t entirely effective, we did build up some 
goodwill… And that was really helpful for us down the road as we tried to take 
advantage of our machine tool industry and the changes that were taking 
place in that area. We could see ourselves as a place for high tech evolution 
of machine tools…‖ 
 
Ultimately, Cincinnati did see an uptick in high-technology industries and a 
host of ‗good outcomes‘ suggest that it weathered the storm of economic 
restructuring comparatively well. Some of its good fortune likely relates to the 
fact that it was not as dependent on heavy industry as many of the other case 
study regions were. It likely also benefited from the diverse industrial base that 
it had come to rely on. In the end, we can surmise that the Cincinnati response 
to the challenges of the late 1970s and early 1980s was to somewhat 
passively ‗Bow Out.‘ Rather than focus specifically on subsidizing business or 
attracting heavy industry, city and regional leaders chose to focus on 
maintaining the region‘s diverse industrial base. Most researchers would 
probably say that doing so paid off for the region because even when the 
downtown development strategies failed, the region as a whole continued to 
prosper.  
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Columbus  
In its early years, the Columbus region was settled largely by German and 
Irish immigrants. By the early 19th century, those who came to Columbus 
generally found a relatively stable and liberal community with an economy 
rooted in transportation, brewing, and, by the late 1840s, railroads. Because of 
its location at various inland crossroads, the Columbus region emerged as a 
major transportation nexus. As one former local official noted, this strategic 
inland position affected the regional economy in a variety of ways.  
 
―Having five railroads here led to a transportation and foodstuffs-oriented 
economy… We had various rail yards, supply organizations and steel 
equipment, not steel mills but people who use steel and make it into 
things…We also did a lot of defense industry production but I guess we had a 
lot less of the heavy industry than most other Midwestern cities.‖ 
 
For much of the late-19th century and early 20th century, the Columbus 
regional economy flourished as goods and people moved through the region. 
During World War II, the region played a large role in the production of naval 
defense equipment. As such, economic prosperity continued largely 
uninterrupted into the early post-war years, but as defense production slowed 
following WWII, the region was forced to consider its next course of action. As 
a local land use attorney described, a number of crucial decisions were made 
during this time period.  
 
―The goal of the city administration, basically Mayor Jack Sensenbrenner, in 
the early 1960s was to figure out how to build a strong economic base without 
relying on heavy industry. Heavy industry… was not encouraged to be here. 
And that decision led to increasing support for the education network (we‘ve 
got 11 universities within 30 miles), a major number of insurance companies 
here (Nationwide being the largest), and we had a lot of large banks until they 
started collapsing into various things…‖ 
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Columbus represents one of the few case study regions where leadership 
proactively and publicly adapted by moving away from heavy industry.  In a 
sense, the Columbus region ‗Bowed Out‘ before deindustrialization really even 
took hold in the Midwest. Though manufacturing never had the presence in 
Columbus as it did in other case study regions – manufacturing as a percent of 
total employment was the lowest here in all eight regions – it still fueled 
portions of the region‘s early economy. Other early industrial strengths 
included steel processing and carriage production. As the state capital and 
home to The Ohio State University, the region‘s economy has also benefited 
from the relatively stable employment base provided by government and the 
university.  
 
Over the course of the 1970s, Sensenbrenner‘s earlier-laid plans began to 
take shape and the Columbus economic base gradually shifted to an economy 
based less on manufacturing and heavy industry and more on transportation, 
the movement of goods, and the production and distribution of clothing. One 
local businessman describes what this has meant for the region.  
 
―We have become, recognizing that Columbus is in close proximity to much of 
the US population, a transportation-oriented distribution center for retail 
goods, money, insurance and education, all of which were in line with the 
original goals of Jack Sensenbrenner. Consequently, it has given us a pretty 
stable, non-boom and bust economy.‖ 
 
One of the main private sector players in this transition was Les Wexner, 
founder of The Limited Brand clothing company. A Columbus historian 
described Wexner‘s progression from startup to multinational corporation.   
 
―In the late 1960s, a dreamer called Les Wexner started a woman‘s clothing 
store….The Limited Brands….As Wexner expanded into different apparel 
lines – and needed a huge supply of inventory – he created a distribution 
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system tied to cargo places from Southeast Asia. This then created, in the 
1980s, a major distribution warehousing operation, not heavy industry at 
all….Everything coming in that was needed in their stores, repackaged and 
sent out by container to each of the particular stores in the chain, nationally.‖ 
 
The Limited Brands today represents a very important and expansive 
component of the Columbus economy. In the last few decades, the 
corporation has either bought or started numerous other retail brands, all of 
which have their headquarters in Columbus. They include: Victoria‘s Secret, 
Pink, Bath and Body Works, C.O. Bigelow, White Barn Candle Company and 
others. Other important clothing-related corporations also call Columbus 
home, including Hollister and Abercrombie and Fitch, as well as Retail 
Ventures, which is responsible for DSW, Filene's Basement, and Value City 
stores. Together, these clothing and retail companies make up a substantial 
portion of the economy and have played an important role in its diversification. 
Other notable corporations in the area include Wendy‘s (fast food restaurant 
chain), Chemical Abstracts Corporation (scientific information), and 
Worthington Industries (steel processing).  
 
When asked what factors may have played a role in the relative success of the 
Columbus region, interviewees commonly mentioned two main factors: a 
policy of liberal annexation of surrounding land and an invested group of 
Columbus-area leaders. The move towards annexation began under the reign 
of Mayor Sensenbrenner, who wanted to avoid the landlocked fate of other 
Ohio cities. Beginning in the 1950s, Sensenbrenner used water as leverage; 
any developers outside of the city that desired water and utilities would have to 
either annex their land into the city or into a suburb whose service area was 
controlled by Columbus (Jacobs 1998). This policy protected the city‘s tax 
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base from the rampant suburbanization seen during this time period. One local 
developer described how this annexation policy strengthened the region and 
allowed leaders to control development within its boundaries.  
 
―Sensenbrenner…had a policy of annexing anything. We‘ll extend 
infrastructure out to it and build so that Columbus does not become 
surrounded by suburbs as in the case of Cleveland, Cincinnati, and Buffalo for 
that matter. In all of those instances, those urban cores were isolated by 
suburbia… The annexation policy was exceedingly successful and precluded 
Columbus from being surrounded, which meant it was able to capture the 
income tax base and control the type of development in Central Ohio; in other 
words, no big industry.‖  
 
Overall, the annexation policy has proven relatively successful. The city has 
increased its total land from 39 square miles at the beginning of annexation to 
210 square miles today. This increase in land has brought both an increase in 
tax base and population. However, the playing field is not always even for 
those who live within city limits. Since the mid-1970s, people living in newly-
annexed areas have been allowed to send their children to suburban schools, 
thereby reaping the benefits of being within city limits but avoiding the 
struggling Columbus Public School District. As one would expect, this policy 
has had a considerable effect on the region‘s housing landscape. As Jacobs 
(1998) noted, ―between 1980 and 1990, the total number of housing units 
inside the Columbus Public School District actually dropped 2.1 percent; 
during the same span, aggregate housing units in the city of Columbus 
increased 17.5 percent‖ (136). Population trends from this time period indicate 
a similar fate. Together, these numbers hint at the potential downside of 
Sensenbrenner‘s decisions and suggest that while the policy may have been 
good for the region‘s tax base, it was less beneficial in terms of regional 
equity.  
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Though Sensenbrenner was a powerful mayor, the annexation policy and 
numerous other policies, plans, and strategies would never have been 
possible without the backing of regional leadership group known as the Titans. 
This powerful group of civic leaders was highly influential in the decision-
making process during the deindustrialization period and beyond. As one local 
historian and Columbus resident noted, this group shaped the region‘s 
trajectory in a variety of ways. 
 
―The leadership condition downtown at that point, was primarily the local 
utilities, the major commercial retail interests, Nationwide and the other 
insurance companies, Wolf Industries, which is the media conglomerate… and 
then the Banks.  All of those men knew each other well. Their biggest 
arguments were about how badly Ohio State was going to beat Michigan. You 
had a lot of people cooperatively working together and Sensenbrenner was 
closely involved with that. They were known as the Titans. It wasn‘t 
necessarily a fixed group; you just sort of knew something was happening. 
They were the ones that made the plan and then marketed it. Their ultimate 
goal was a strong, diversified and stable economy.‖ 
 
Little exists in the way of formal documentation of the Titans‘ work but 
interviewees agreed that the group had a lot of power over the development 
decisions made during the time period of this study.  
 
Though local leaders must have been concerned with creating a good 
economic climate for their own businesses, the overall approach to regional 
economic development did not look much like the ‗Bidding Down‘ approach or 
even the ‗Betting on the Basics‘. Instead, the group collectively sought a 
diverse economy and preemptively subscribed to the ‗Bowing Out‘ approach to 
economic development. Though it would be rather difficult to determine 
whether the Columbus region‘s comparative success and abundance of ‗good 
outcomes‘ was a result of having chosen this particular approach or just the 
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preemptive nature in which it was applied, the Columbus case offers us 
important insight into one region‘s unique response or pre-response to 
deindustrialization.   
 
Pittsburgh  
As was the case in many other of the case study regions, economic 
restructuring in the 1970s and 1980s proved extremely challenging for 
Pittsburgh leaders. What makes the Pittsburgh case slightly different from 
other regions, however, is the extent to which the region moved away from the 
corporatist governing model - influenced largely by the Allegheny Conference 
on Community Development - to a more inclusive public-private partnership 
style of governance. The new partnership included local and regional non-
profits, universities, foundations and other community-based organizations. 
The partnership was largely brought about by neighborhood-level challenges 
to the Democratic machine, the Conference, and their collective 
disproportionate focus on downtown development (Detrick 1999). The new 
partnership coincided largely with the beginning of Mayor Richard Caliguiri‘s 
tenure and Pittsburgh‘s Renaissance II period, a follow-up downtown 
redevelopment strategy based loosely on the earlier Renaissance I plan that 
unfolded during the 1940s and 1950s. While Renaissance I ―prevented 
Pittsburgh from becoming one of the problem cities of the 1960s by escaping 
the dire consequences of urban decline that befell such cities as Gary and 
Newark‖, Renaissance II saw the city, and its mayor, assume a more 
managerial role, acting as development facilitator for a more regional and a 
more inclusive group of civic and business leaders (Jacobs 2000, 89-90).  
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It was during the Renaissance II time period, the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
that Pittsburgh saw marked changes in the regional economy. Jobs were 
beginning to disappear from most sectors, the unemployment rate was on the 
rise, and various manufacturing plants closed their doors for good (Clark 1989, 
47). Looking back on that time period and on the economic landscape of 
Pittsburgh during that time, there certainly were warning signs. A former local 
politician who worked in Allegheny County said that,  
―In the late 1970s, the impending disaster was certainly apparent to anyone 
who wanted to think about it because we were far too dependent on heavy 
industry and becoming increasingly uncompetitive in those industries like 
steel, glass and aluminum.‖  
His concern highlights the increasingly apparent need to diversify the 
Pittsburgh economy, an idea that was not easily accepted at this point in time. 
Interviewees suggested that much of the general public either did not believe 
the predictions of the manufacturing sector‘s demise or did not agree with the 
diversification strategies that were being proposed. One prominent 
businessman said that,  
―At the community level there was a lot of conflict, a lot of disbelief that steel 
would ever disappear because you were talking about decades and 
generations of families that had relied on these jobs in the industrial base. You 
look at these giant factories and you think, no one is ever going to disinvest in 
that.‖ 
At the same time, however, a small but growing number of concerned 
Pittsburgh residents and leaders began to lose faith. A public official working in 
the Governor Thornburgh‘s office during this time period noted that,  
―People were worried. Not the general public, but folks that were really looking 
at the economy were saying that we were too dependent on an industrial base 
that just isn‘t going to be there decades from now…It was very apparent by 
the late 1970s, and really came home to roost in the early 1980s.‖ 
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As Pittsburgh grappled with the realities of economic restructuring in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, pointed efforts to facilitate a stronger and more 
diverse economy were observed. Interviewees noted that such efforts were 
planned as part of a larger strategy to move the region as a whole towards 
recovery. Specifically, recovery strategies included a regional collaboration, 
and later a plan for development, known as Strategy 21. Strategy 21 began in 
1985 as a partnership between the City of Pittsburgh, Alleghany County, the 
Allegheny Conference on Community Development (ACCD), Carnegie Mellon 
University, and the University of Pittsburgh. A 1990 plan that stemmed from 
this collaboration described the partnership as a ―collective effort to think 
strategically about the directions that our region‘s quality of life and economy 
are taking, and to implement the projects and programs that are most needed 
to help our communities adapt to the next century‖ (ACCD 1990, 1). An 
economic development official described the process behind the creation of 
this regional effort:  
―The Mayor and County Commissioners, along with business leaders, and the 
two universities, put together in 1985, a plan called Strategy 21. They came to 
the state for major redevelopment assistance around a new airport, industrial 
site redevelopment, and so on. Basically, physical investment trumped 
education or workforce development. That‘s evidence, if you will, that there 
was recognition that we had problems in this region and public and private 
sector entities had to respond.‖  
One of the major forces behind the creation of Strategy 21 was the ACCD. 
Though not considered the most inclusive organization, the ACCD was a 
powerful group that carried a lot of clout in the region. The ACCD originally 
formed in the 1940s as an effort to coordinate regional transportation and 
environmental efforts. By the 1970s and 1980s, this private sector leadership 
organization grew more concerned with the region‘s economic future. Their 
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concern led the ACCD to be an important driver in the creation of Strategy 21. 
As part of the Strategy 21 team, the ACCD spearheaded efforts to bolster the 
urban core, develop the new Pittsburgh International Airport and found The 
Andy Warhol Museum. Such efforts were seen as a move towards a broader 
and more regional vision of the future.   
Interviewees noted that, in general, Pittsburgh leaders were focused on 
diversifying their industrial base rather than committing solely to the 
revitalization of the manufacturing sector. Though leaders did not turn their 
back completely on the steel industry, in the 1980s they did place much more 
emphasis on development strategies geared towards research and 
development, insurance, and financial services. More specifically, strategies 
described by interviewees and indicated in plans from this time period suggest 
that the Pittsburgh region‘s collective approach aligned most closely with the 
‗Bowing Out‘ approach to economic development, meaning that the 
development of new and emerging industries was heavily prioritized.  
Personal reactions to the substantial losses seen in the early 1980s differed, 
but generally speaking there was growing support for an alternative industrial 
structure. A native of Pittsburgh and former member of Governor Thornburgh‘s 
cabinet described the decision to change course. 
―There is literally a cliff in 1982. And we fell off it. In some sense, people like 
Thornburgh could see that coming. That‘s why, at the state level, we were 
working around advanced technology strategies based on the idea that we 
had all these technical and knowledge strengths….We developed the Ben 
Franklin Partnership as an initiative to…take advantage of our R and D and 
our research universities in order to begin developing technology and 
knowledge-based jobs… this was the first partnership of that kind and it 
became a model that persists to this day.‖  
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Along with a non-profit called Innovation Works, which brought local 
universities together to receive state aid and other infusions of capital, the 
Partnership‘s efforts indicated a strong commitment to the diversification of the 
economy, which had long been over-reliant on the steel industry. Indeed, the 
industrial mix in Pittsburgh became far more diverse over the course of the 
1970s and 1980s as the region looked towards education, healthcare and 
high-technology as future growth areas (Sbragia 1990). While efforts to 
diversify the economy have largely proved successful, the overall employment 
outlook was not always so positive. The number of jobs in the region has not 
grown in the past few decades. A former Executive Director of the Allegheny 
Conference described the tension between diversification and overall job 
creation.  
―I think when people look at the overall economy, they say our employment 
hasn‘t grown and that‘s fair enough. But what has changed substantially is the 
mix in the employment base. We don‘t have any one employer that‘s big 
enough to cause that drop that we experienced in the early 1980s.‖ 
Though Table 3 indicates a mixture of both good and bad outcomes, 
interviewees suggested that the ‗Bowing Out‘ approach was still somewhat 
helpful to the Pittsburgh region. As in any place experiencing industrial 
decline, the growing pains were significant. Overall, however, the Pittsburgh 
region adapted comparatively well to the challenges of the late 1970s and 
1980s. It is important to note, however, that in the 1990s, regional employment 
began to fall behind the national average. Detrick (1998) suggests that this is 
due in part to a regional trend towards the old top-down, corporate-based 
planning process that was so prevalent in 1950s and 1960s Pittsburgh.    
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Conclusions 
As the cases in this chapter attest, there were a variety of ways in which 
regional leaders could do something other than ―Bet on the Basics.‘ Though all 
would incorporate at least some element of ‗Bowing Out‘, these four regions – 
Indianapolis, Cincinnati, Columbus, and Pittsburgh – all designed and then 
followed different paths on their way to recovery.  Based on these variations in 
pathways and similarities uncovered across cases, I offer a series of findings 
and lessons learned from these regions and their respective responses.  
Common Regional Characteristics 
In these four regions where the decision was made to not ‗Bet on the Basics‘, 
the most popular course of action was to ‗Bow Out‘ either as a stand alone 
response or in combination with one of the other response types. To some 
extent then, the eight case study regions seemed to only select the option of 
‗Betting on the Basics‘ or ‗Bowing Out‘ as their primary response type. Some 
of the regions in this chapter would choose to ‗Bow Out‘ and pursue some 
other response type as well, but the main platform from which they operated 
was generally ‗Bowing Out.‘ In Indianapolis, regional leaders started by 
‗Betting on the Basics‘ and then gradually shifted towards the ‗Bowing Out‘ 
approach over time. In Cincinnati, Columbus, and Pittsburgh, ‗Bowing Out‘ 
was pursued exclusively. It should be noted that though all four cases in this 
chapter pursued the ‗Bowing Out‘ approach, the degree to which they 
consciously engaged in this type of adaptive response varied significantly. For 
instance, in Columbus, regional leaders actively pursued a strategy of 
diversification and a shift away from manufacturing. In Cincinnati, on the other 
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hand, leaders effectively chose non-response, acting as stewards of the new 
economy rather than advocates of any major economic development agenda.  
Another commonality across most of these regions can be seen in the easy 
identification of a single leader or leadership group responsible for economic 
development decisions in the 1970s and 1980s. Indianapolis‘s Mayor William 
Hudnut was a central player in that region‘s shift to a tourism and sports-based 
development strategy. In Columbus, two leadership entities combined to make 
the important decisions: Mayor Jack Sensenbrenner in the late-1960s and 
early-1970s, and the Titans thereafter. And in Pittsburgh, many of the 
important decisions came from Mayor Richard Caliguiri and the ACCD. 
Cincinnati‘s leadership was less defined, which makes sense given the non-
response we saw there. In all but one of these regions, there was an easily 
identifiable leader, or as Mayor Hudnut would say, ―someone in charge of 
minding the store.‖ Distinctive leadership played a very important role in taking 
stock of the region‘s assets and opportunities, gathering input from other local 
leaders and confidants, acting as liaisons between local, state and federal 
entities, and ultimately deciding how each region would pursue its own 
variation of the ‗Bowing Out‘ strategy.  
In general, regions that chose to ‗Bow Out‘ were less dependent on 
manufacturing than their ‗Betting on the Basics‘ counterparts. If we look back 
to Chapter 4 and examine the figures for manufacturing as a percent of total 
employment in each of these regions in 1970, we see that the four regions that 
‗Bet on the Basics‘ had a larger percent of jobs in manufacturing to begin with. 
The four regions that did not exclusively pursue this strategy were least 
dependent on manufacturing as a percent of total employment. Though such 
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figures provide little evidence in the way of causation, the association between 
lower levels of manufacturing and the decision to ‗Bow Out‘ - or to concentrate 
on economic development strategies outside of traditional manufacturing - 
suggests that further study of this correlation is warranted.    
Lessons Learned 
Moving beyond commonalities and towards lessons we might draw from these 
four case studies, two main points emerge. First, this research suggests that 
among those regions that chose to ‗Bow Out‘, the regions that responded 
earlier to the unfolding challenges of deindustrialization were more likely to 
experience ‗good outcomes‘ in the long run. The benefits of an early response 
seem especially relevant in the cases of Columbus and Indianapolis, though 
their individual experiences differed greatly. In the case of Columbus, 
interviewees noted an early and conscious decision to move away from 
manufacturing as far back as the 1960s. Though we do not know whether this 
decision was pure luck or the result of serious deliberations and calculated 
projections, further exploration along those lines would be a useful line of 
questioning for future research. In the case of Indianapolis, the decision to 
‗Bow Out‘ was not as easy or as early as it was in Columbus. The Indianapolis 
region tried first to shore up its manufacturing base by utilizing techniques 
most commonly associated with ‗Betting on the Basics.‘ Discouraged by the 
results of this push to retain manufacturing, leaders then shifted towards 
‗Bowing Out‘ strategies, emphasizing tourism and sports-based development 
strategies as a way of differentiating themselves from other Midwestern 
industrial regions. Despite the ‗Betting on the Basics‘ detour, the region still 
made moves toward a ‗Bowing Out‘ approach in the early 1970s, long before 
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many of the other regions even acknowledged that they had an impending 
problem. Once decided upon, the move away from manufacturing and towards 
alternative industries was deliberate and swift in both regions. Though the 
long-term benefits of this response are difficult to isolate from other potential 
reasons for their relative success, the relationship between the timing of a 
region‘s response and ‗good outcomes‘ is certainly worth further exploration.  
 
The second important finding from these case studies is that innovative 
approaches – whether they worked or not – were almost always a part of the 
‗Bowing Out‘ approach. Creative approaches to dealing with the problems of 
deindustrialization allowed many of these regions to ostensibly ‗turn the 
corner‘ by recreating themselves or by leveraging their assets in new ways. 
Unlike many of the regions that chose to ‗Bet on the Basics‘ by committing to a 
recreation of the past, many of the regional leaders discussed in this chapter 
were much more inventive when devising an economic development plan to 
move their region towards recovery.  
 
As we saw above, the Indianapolis region analyzed their strengths and 
weaknesses, looked for an angle in which they might do well, and ultimately 
decided to build a new (and risky) downtown stadium as one major step 
towards their sports-based response. In Cincinnati, regional leaders took a 
gamble on downtown living and shopping; though this would not bode well for 
the region in the long run, it was still a relatively innovative approach at that 
point in time. Columbus leaders hedged their bets by adopting a policy of 
liberal annexation of surrounding lands to ensure that the region would not be 
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engulfed by suburban areas.14 And finally, leaders in Pittsburgh came up with 
Strategy 21, a plan that prioritized physical investment over things like 
education or workforce development. By all means this was a risky plan, but it 
was generally considered a success in that it targeted specific forms of 
development and asked other regional actors to help provide supplemental 
support.  
 
In the end, we learn from the regions in this chapter that innovative and 
creative responses to deindustrialization, whether they worked or not, were 
generally part of most ‗Bowing Out‘ responses. To the extent that such 
creativity is related to the flexibility of a region, the innovative responses 
associated with ‗Bowing Out‘ might also relate to higher levels of adaptive 
resilience in these regions. The ability to bend, adapt, and come up with 
creative solutions to insidious problems is likely an important characteristic of 
adaptive resilience in regions.  
 
Overall, what we learn from further examination of these cases (and the 
interviews conducted as part of this research) is that the gambles taken in 
each of these regions played out in different ways. From these case studies 
emerge a series of observations and ruminations on the effectiveness of 
various economic development responses to deindustrialization. Some regions 
turned the metaphorical ‗corner‘ and found a new economic mix or focus, while 
others were less successful in their navigation of deindustrialization‘s 
uncharted waters. Though all four regions would ‗Bow Out‘ in some way, 
                                                 
14
 Although annexation was utilized in Milwaukee, the Columbus region annexed land for 
residential, commercial and industrial whereas Milwaukee primarily annexed land for industrial 
development. 
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shape or form, no two regions ‗Bowed Out‘ in the same way. Variations in both 
the decision-making processes and in the resulting outcomes encourage us to 
continue conducting research on regions, regional responses and regional 
change in the face of a challenge.  
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CHAPTER 8 
 
Conclusions -To Reinforce History or Turn the Corner? 
 
From these interviews and subsequent analyses emerge a plethora of 
important findings about the types of responses seen in these eight regions. 
Table 9 highlights the significant variation seen across regions in terms of 
response type and specific strategies. As we tally up the findings across 
cases, we see that ‗Bowing Out‘ and ‗Betting on the Basics‘ were the response 
types most often utilized during this time period. This suggests that the most 
popular approaches amongst these large Rust Belt regions was to either ―fight 
or take flight.‖ In a sense, regions either ‗fought‘ against deindustrialization by 
continuing to target existing heavy industry for economic development 
initiatives or ‗fled‘ by abandoning the struggling manufacturing sector and 
focusing on other industrial sectors for development. Though elements of 
‗Bidding Down‘ and ‗Sharing the Wealth‘ were seen in some of the case study 
regions, regional actors were far more likely to choose one of the 
aforementioned approaches.  
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 Table 9 - Selected Characteristics of Regional Responses to 
 Deindustrialization 
 
Response 
Type(s) 
Notable Characteristics of 
Regional Response 
Buffalo 
Betting on the 
Basics 
- labor/ management conflicts 
- retention focus  
Cincinnati Bowing Out 
- early diversification 
- downtown development   
Cleveland 
Betting on the 
Basics (Sharing 
Wealth) 
- political progressivism 
- land bank 
- emphasis on equity 
Columbus Bowing Out 
- early diversification 
- transportation, clothing 
production and distribution 
- annexation  
Detroit 
Betting on the 
Basics 
- committed to automobile 
- workforce development 
- fragmented region  
Indianapolis 
Bowing Out, 
(Betting on the 
Basics) 
- Unigov 
- non-aggression pact 
- sports-based tourism 
- active diversification 
Milwaukee 
Betting on the 
Basics 
- high-tech manufacturing 
- annexation and land banking 
- workforce development 
Pittsburgh Bowing Out 
- diversification 
- focus on new and emerging 
industries 
- Allegheny Conference  
 
 
 
Revisiting Hypothesis 1 
Turning to measures of performance, of both the quantitative and qualitative 
means, we see subtle variation across cases. Recall that the first hypothesis 
proposed in Chapter 3 predicted that regions in which leaders committed to 
manufacturing by ‗Betting on the Basics‘ will not adapt as readily or as well as 
regions where leaders pursued other alternatives. The quantitative data 
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presented in Chapter 4 suggest that the four regions whose leaders chose to 
‗Bet on the Basics‘ were amongst the worst performers in both the response 
and recovery periods, meaning that they did not exhibit adaptive resilience, at 
least in terms of the quantitative data. However, if we look back to the findings 
from the qualitative data presented in Chapters 5 through 7, the results are 
mixed. This data similarly suggest that Buffalo and Detroit predictably 
exhibited lower levels of adaptive resilience. The data on Cleveland and 
Milwaukee, however, paint a slightly more optimistic picture. In Cleveland, 
where ‗Sharing the Wealth‘ was also incorporated into the economic 
development response, interviewees described regional improvements in 
terms of equity and workforce development. In Milwaukee, the region that 
quite literally ‗Bet on the Basics‘, interviewees similarly described the 
innovative approaches used to retain and expand manufacturing in the region, 
a technique that has worked fairly well for the region in recent years.  
 
When Markusen and Carlson (1988) developed this typology, the authors 
presented an argument that was the near polar opposite of my first hypothesis. 
At that time, the authors wrote that ―‗Betting on the Basics‘ may offer greater 
prospects for long-term success‖ (1). Based on the findings from this study, 
their assertion holds true in only some of the case study regions. Milwaukee 
and Cleveland have seen modest population growth and a moderately 
successful transition from heavy industry to a more high-tech economic base. 
On the other hand, the regional economies of Buffalo and Detroit have 
suffered great losses in recent decades and a hollowing out of the population 
continues to plague both regions. These mixed results suggest that further 
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investigation along these lines would be a useful contribution to future 
research.  
 
We move now beyond ‗Betting on the Basics‘ to the other preeminent 
approach - ‗Bowing Out‘ - which was employed in four regions: Cincinnati, 
Columbus, Indianapolis, and Pittsburgh. In these four regions, the general 
consensus of regional leadership was that the manufacturing sector‘s heyday 
was largely in the past. Regional leaders generally believed that heavy 
industry had peaked and that it was time to think about ways to ‗turn the 
corner‘ and explore other options to anchor the regional economic base. 
‗Bowing Out‘ afforded regions the opportunity to pursue these other options, 
like transportation and clothing distribution in Columbus, sports-based tourism 
in Indianapolis, or consumer goods and retail trade in Cincinnati. With the 
exception of Pittsburgh, the diversification strategy seems to have paid off for 
most of these regions as indicated by the ‗good outcomes‘ seen in terms of 
population growth and modest improvements in equity.   
 
If we think about the figure-8 diagram used in the adaptive cycle model (Figure 
2), we can imagine the ‗Bowing Out‘ approach as a deliberate attempt to ‗turn 
the corner‘ and move beyond the uncertainty of the reorganization phase and 
into the exploitation phase, a period of growth and opportunity. On the other 
hand, we can imagine that those regions that chose to ‗Bet on the Basics‘ 
struggled against global forces to maintain the stability of the conservation 
phase. Unfortunately, for most of these regions, the rigidity associated with the 
conservation phase ultimately proved to be quite detrimental. In a place like 
Detroit, which for many decades appeared to have prolonged its stability in the 
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conservation phase, the rigidity associated with such intense specialization 
likely triggered the region‘s precipitous fall in later decades. Though the 
qualitative data presented in this research do not prove causation, the findings 
do suggest a need to further explore the association between ‗turning the 
corner‘ (‗Bowing Out‘) and adaptive resilience.   
 
Revisiting Hypothesis 2 
Further consideration should also be given to the second hypothesis proposed 
in Chapter 3, which stated that adaptive resilience will be seen in regions 
where leaders responded to early signs of deindustrialization and quickly 
developed an appropriate economic development response. Again, the results 
seen in the quantitative and qualitative data are mixed. In Detroit, where the 
response remained largely unchanged throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, 
there was little haste. Though most interviewees recalled early conversations 
about the problems facing the region, very few remember any type of early 
strategic plan to move the region towards recovery. For most of the time 
period of interest, leaders in Detroit chose a veritable non-response approach 
by continuing on the same trajectory, giving incentives to large automobile 
corporations and supporting workers where they could.  Their response was 
not only slow, but it also lacked the insight and strategy that a more successful 
response might have had. A similarly sluggish and lack-luster response was 
also seen in Buffalo, where leaders spent a lot of time and energy debating 
how to respond with very little to show for it in the end. In Cleveland, the 
response was a little more organized but still quite sluggish. The region would 
wait until 1982 to commission a Rand report on that status of the regional 
economy. Although ultimately well thought out, the ‗Betting on the Basics‘-type 
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response occurred a little too late. Even later (but slightly more effective) were 
the attempts made to ‗Share the Wealth‘ in the Cleveland region. The delayed 
response in Cleveland may be explained in part by the relatively slow pace 
with which the region lost manufacturing jobs. Whereas other regions saw 
sudden drop offs in manufacturing, Cleveland‘s losses were slower to unfold.  
 
Rounding out the regions that ‗Bet on the Basics‘, a slightly more expedient 
response was seen in Milwaukee, where regional leaders began annexing and 
banking land in the 1950s and 1960s for later industrial development efforts. 
Though some interviewees described this effort as a gamble that happened to 
pay off, it is undeniable that there was some amount of foresight involved in 
crafting this type of early response. Leaders heeded the warning that 
challenges loomed ahead and put into place a plan to make the region more 
attractive to manufacturing firms. Milwaukee‘s efforts to get ahead of the curve 
were part of a conscious decision to use economic and industrial development 
tools to respond to the challenges of deindustrialization. Though the region‘s 
response and recovery resilience was not the best of the case study regions, 
the Milwaukee region fared relatively well - often times right around the mean - 
considering its disproportionately high dependence on manufacturing. 
Qualitatively, the region‘s flexible and innovative approach to ‗Betting on the 
Basics‘ suggests that the region exhibited at least some elements of adaptive 
resilience in the face of deindustrialization; like the example of the reed in the 
wind, the Milwaukee region was better situated to bend rather than break 
during the 1970s and 1980s. 
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Turning now to an examination of the timing of responses seen in those 
regions that ‗Bowed Out‘, we again see rather mixed results. Among the more 
sluggish responders were Pittsburgh and Cincinnati. In Pittsburgh, regional 
leaders were slow in their response because many believed that 
manufacturing losses were cyclical, rather than structural. Though the region 
would eventually shift directions by moving towards a public private 
partnership model that would ultimately encourage the region to ‗Bow Out‘, the 
response was slow and the region suffered greatly while leaders decided what 
to do and how to do it. In Cincinnati, non-response was the order of the day. 
Leaders in that region acted as stewards, rather than shapers of the ‗Bowing 
Out‘-like response. By and large, that non-response paid off for the region; 
Cincinnati performed better than the mean on all of the recovery period 
measures.  
 
Though their strategies and regional outcomes varied greatly, leaders in  both 
Indianapolis and Columbus were relatively pro-active in their response to 
deindustrialization. Flexibility was the hallmark of the response seen in 
Indianapolis. Because of very early retention efforts in that region, the regional 
response initially looked like ‗Betting on the Basics.‘ However, regional leaders 
described how a quick and decisive change in plan during the 1970s set the 
region on a very different path. Responding to early losses in manufacturing, 
regional leaders decided to pursue a sports- and tourism-based development 
agenda instead. This change in approach worked fairly well for the region in 
the long run, largely isolating it from many of the economic challenges of the 
past few decades. A similar change in direction was also pursued in 
Columbus, albeit at a much earlier point in time. Columbus leaders, foreseeing 
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some of the challenges associated with an overly-specialized economy, opted 
to diversify their economy before the term deindustrialization had even been 
written about. In the ultimate preemptive strike, Columbus leaders began to 
‗Bow Out‘ in the early 1960s, long before any other region in this study. Early 
efforts to diversify their economy appear to have paid off, as the region fairs 
well on most qualitative and quantitative indicators of adaptive resilience.  
 
In the end, we see that findings related to the second hypothesis are slightly 
more conclusive than in the first hypothesis. Though some confusion remains 
in terms of timing, the responses seen in the eight case study regions suggest 
that there is an underlying pattern. Many of the regions that responded swiftly 
did exhibit adaptive resilience; namely, Columbus, Indianapolis, and 
Milwaukee. Other regions – including Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit, and 
Pittsburgh - reacted less quickly, either because they lacked the wherewithal, 
authority, consensus, or gumption to do so. In these regions, some adaptive 
resilience was observed but less than in those regions that acted swiftly. And 
in Cincinnati, where manufacturing was slightly less important to the regional 
economy, non-action is the best way to describe the region‘s relatively 
successful non-response to deindustrialization.  
 
Remaining Questions and Future Research 
Data collected for the purposes of this research have been quite useful in 
terms of identifying the different economic development approaches that 
regions used to respond to deindustrialization. However, like any good 
research project, additional research questions have revealed themselves 
over the course of this exploration. Though the above research hints at some 
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potential answers, it is beyond the scope of this study to sufficiently address 
these questions here. Nevertheless, these remaining questions should serve 
as the basis for exciting future research on regions, resilience and 
deindustrialization.  
 
One of the more interesting findings from this research is the finding that the 
types of actors sitting at the decision-making table varied greatly across cases. 
In some regions, the public sector wielded a heavy hand in the crafting of a 
response. In others, the private sector called the shots. In most regions, it was 
a combination of public, private and civic sector leaders that decided how to 
proceed. Given the sheer variety seen in terms of actors, one might be 
inclined to ask how certain types of decisions were made. More specifically, 
we might ask where the foresight to ‗turn the corner‘ comes from. Or, why did 
some regions decide to ‗Bow Out‘ while others chose to ‗Bet on the Basics‘? 
How did regional leaders in Indianapolis and Columbus foresee the need to 
diversify their industrial bases? Knowing more about where this insight came 
from, and why only some regional leaders had it, would be immensely helpful 
to researchers and practitioners alike.  
 
Another question raised by this research is whether racial segregation played 
a role in how regions responded to deindustrialization. Amongst regions that 
‗Bet on the Basics‘, racial segregation was quite prevalent. This begs the 
question of whether racial divisions within these regions affected how and how 
well these regions responded to the challenges of deindustrialization. Though 
some interviewees discussed problems of racial division and even racism 
within their regions, their accounts were by no means conclusive. Further 
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investigation along these lines would be helpful to researchers and 
practitioners alike.   
 
If we move from demography to geography, an additional set of questions 
emerge. Knowing that policies of annexation featured so prominently in at 
least three of the case study regions, we must ask if regional geography 
relates to how well a region has fared in light of deindustrialization. In Detroit, 
Buffalo, and to some extent in Pittsburgh, being ‗boxed in‘ by surrounding 
suburbs acted as a serious impediment to economic development. Expansive, 
shovel-ready sites were not generally available to corporations looking to 
locate or expand in the central cities. On the other hand, in Milwaukee, 
Columbus and to some extent, Indianapolis there were deliberate and often 
aggressive policies to annex land. In most cases, this annexation helped 
improve these regions‘ chances of fiscal stability in the central city, which was 
the anchor in most of these regions. Whether this economic development 
strategy of early annexation (before it became impossible) was the reason for 
the slightly better outcomes in these three regions is a question that certainly 
merits further study. 
 
 
Having discovered that adaptive resilience was more likely in those regions 
that chose to ‗Bow Out‘, it‘s not too far of a stretch to imagine that certain 
regional benefits likely accompanied that type of response. It‘s a little more 
difficult, however, to imagine the potential benefits associated with the other 
popular response: ‗Betting on the Basics.‘ In other words, we are still left 
wondering, what (if any) are the benefits of ‗Betting on the Basics‘? Though 
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the response as a whole was generally associated with lower adaptive 
resilience, the approach could not have been completely without merit. The in-
depth case study of Detroit provided ample evidence of potentially resilient 
outcomes in a region where the over-arching approach was still ‗Betting on the 
Basics.‘ Markusen and Carlson (1988) also predicted potential benefits 
associated with the retention-oriented ‗Betting on the Basics‘ approach. So, 
even though the response type was not generally associated with adaptive 
resilience, certain elements of this approach were likely quite effective for 
regions adapting to deindustrialization. Knowing more about what worked and 
what did not would be useful to regions confronting similar challenges in the 
future.  
 
Perhaps the most important remaining question is the question of how useful 
these findings really are. Or, in other words, what are the implications of this 
research for future economic development responses to slow-burning 
challenges? Though we cannot guarantee that every practitioner and policy-
maker will find these conclusions useful for their own regional challenges, 
there are certain elements of this research that will likely be helpful to anyone 
thinking about economic development responses to slow-burning challenges 
of the future. For instance, it may be useful to practitioners and researchers to 
know that, when faced with a slow-moving challenge like deindustrialization, 
most regional leaders will take steps to better position their region moving 
forward. Regions generally are quite capable of adaptation, reminding us that 
adaptive resilience is a useful lens through which we can examine regional 
responses. The adaptive resilience concept is most useful when both 
quantitative and qualitative measures are incorporated; examining only one 
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type of measure often masks some of the more subtle nuances of a given 
regional response.  
 
In the end, we saw that the degree to which a regional economy was rooted in 
manufacturing likely played an important role in how much response and 
recovery resilience was exhibited in that region. Manufacturing, therefore, has 
a rather strong legacy, one that is often difficult to escape from. Still, some 
regions were able to move beyond their manufacturing legacy and from their 
responses emerged another set of important lessons. In Chapters 5 through 7, 
we saw that regional responses of a more creative variety are more likely to be 
associated with adaptive resilience than responses that focused solely on 
recreating the past. In terms of timing, swift responses were generally more 
likely to be associated with adaptive resilience than slower responses.  
 
Together, these findings suggest that we have indeed increased our 
understanding of how Rust Belt regions responded to the challenges of 
deindustrialization. More specifically, we find that the typologies designed by 
both Markusen and Carlson (1988) and Clavel and Kleniewski (1990) are quite 
useful in helping us to better understand regional responses to 
deindustrialization. Though numerous questions about causation still remain, 
the typologies prove to be extremely useful for studies of economic 
development responses in regions experiencing economic restructuring. 
Findings from this study indicate that there was no one uniform response to 
deindustrialization across Rust Belt regions. Regions varied greatly in terms of 
the choices they made and the paths that they followed. As a result, some 
regions fared better than others and some still search for the higher road. This 
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study has helped us to identify commonalities across cases and group regions 
based upon the type of response they employed. Doing so brings us one step 
closer to understanding how regions might successfully respond to long-term 
economic challenges in the future. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Sample Interview Guide - All Regions 
*This form was used to interview former and current economic development 
officials in deindustrializing regions. My primary intention was to glean 
information about the local effects of deindustrialization, the causes of this 
trend, and the ways in which their community chose to react to it (including 
policy recommendations).  
I‘d like to talk with you about your (city/region/town/etc…)‘s experience with 
deindustrialization.  I‘d also like to ask about the changes you saw/have seen 
in the economic climate of your area and ask how your office/group responded 
to those changes. I have asked you to sign a consent form.  If there are any 
questions that you do not care to answer, please let me know. 
 
DEINDUSTRIALIZATION  
1) How would you describe the economic climate of your community in the 
1970s? 
  PROBE 
  A) What were its main strengths at that time? 
  B) Weaknesses? 
 -  In the 1980s?  
 - Today? 
  PROBE  
  A) What are the current strengths of your local economy? 
  B)  Weaknesses? 
  C) How have these changes over time? 
 
2) Could you tell me a little more about the changes that took place 
between then and now?  
 
3) Could you tell me why you think that these changes occurred? 
  PROBES 
  A) When did these changes occur? 
  B) Did you anticipate any or all of these changes? 
  C) If so, how and when did you react?  
 
4) What have been the main effects of deindustrialization on your 
{city/town/region}? 
 PROBE  
 A) Demographic changes 
 B) Industrial structure 
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 C) Fiscal health 
 D) Labor force 
 E) Overall economy 
 F) Civic 
 G) Social 
  
RESPONSES 
1) What have been the specific types of policies, programs and/or 
strategies that you have implemented to address deindustrialization?  
 PROBE 
A) Did you concentrate resources on high-tech, sunrise industries 
instead of manufacturing? 
B)  Did you focusing efforts on decreasing the cost of doing business in 
your region? 
C) Did you emphasize the retention and expansion of existing 
industries? 
D) Were any efforts made to redistribute gains made from the service 
sector growth seen in your community? 
 
 
2) Could you tell me a little more about the level(s) of governance at which 
these policies were implemented? 
  
 PROBE 
A) What was your relationship with surrounding communities (ie. 
surburbs, cities, other municipalities?) 
 B) Were regional efforts considered?  
 C) If so, what did they consist of?  
 D) Who did they involve?   
 E)  
 
3) Who was involved in these policy changes? 
 
4) Which of these were most successful for your community? 
  - How was success measured? 
  - How did success vary over time? 
 
5) How has economic development policy changed to reflect the combined 
pressures of deindustrialization and globalization? 
 PROBE 
- Scale?  
- Focus? 
 
6) How would you rate the current economic performance of your 
{city/town/region} today? 
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